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Abstract 
Privatisation (defined as change of ownership and control of State-owned enterprises- 
SOEs) is a controversial economic and political policy that elicits diverse opinions and 
academic conclusions on its impact. With regard to its impact on industrial relations, the 
privatisation literature concludes that in most privatised SOEs, problems anise between 
unions and management over some important dimensions of the employment relationship. 
This Author's search of the privatisation literature led to the emergence of two hypotheses, 
as follows: 
I. The employment relationship changes in its expression and management in 
privatised enterprises as a consequence of the change in ownership and control, 
structure and product market competition arising from privatisation; and, 
2. The employment relationship in pnvatised enterprises changes, not necessarily as a 
consequence of privatisation, but as a consequence of changes in 
managerial/corporate strategies, national and firm-level industrial relations policies 
and other environmental factors not related to privatisation. 
Data was collected from two privatised finance SOEs and one privatised petroleum SOE in 
Nigeria to test these hypotheses. Some key findings emerged which differ slightly from the 
conclusions of the prIvatisation literature, as represented by these two hypotheses. First, the 
study concludes that contrary to the conclusion of the privatisation literature, the observed 
changes in the employment relationship of privatised SOEs are mediated by the different 
effects of environmental and sectoral factors, economic centrality, the nature of the unions 
involved in bargaining and the balance of bargaining power between unions and 
management, as determined by the development context of the country concerned. 
Secondly, the study concludes that contrary to the conclusions of the pri'vatisation 
literature, the employment relationship in privatised enterprises changes as a consequence 
of changes in managerial/corporate strategies and fin-n-level industrial relations strategies 
directly related to privatisation. These conclusions suggest the need to slightly modify the 
conclusions of the privatisation literature and theory to take account of the economic, 
institutional and political differences between developing and developed economies, rather 
than seek to apply similar theories and conclusions to both development contexts like is 
currently the case. 
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CHAPTER ONE- INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE RE\11EW 
I-1. Introduction 
Privatisation has been a subject matter of academic studies and debate for some 
decades. Opinions and academic conclusions on its impact are however diverse 
and will be examined in the course of this study. This literature review is situated 
within the context of a larger within-country, cross-sectional case study aimed at 
critically analysing privatisation's impact on trade unions and employment 
relationship in privatised state owned enterprises (SOEs) in Nigeria, in two parts 
as follows: 
i. A review of the literature on privatisation; and, 
11 .A review of the literature on trade unions and employment relationship 
1.2. A review of the literature on privatisation 
1.2.1. Introduction 
Simply put, privatisation represents both the idea of reducing state involvement in 
industry and commerce as well as the drive to reverse the intervention of 
government in the economic life of a country (Letwin, 1988). Generally, it 
involves the enhancing of the scope of private ownership and the private sector 
and the sale of government-owned equity in nationalised industries or other 
commercial enterprises to private investors, with or without the loss of government 
control of the organisations (Hurl, 1995). Privatisation represents a range of 
different policy initiatives designed to alter the balance between the public and the 
private sectors (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988) via a reduction of government 
ownership and control of SOEs in favour of private sector participation (Vickers 
and Wright, 1988). In view of its various definitions, it becomes imperative to 
adopt a definition of privatisation for this study. In this study, therefore, 
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privatisation refers to the tilting of the scale of ownership and control of SOEs in 
favour of the private sector. 
Two opposing schools of thought dominate the debate in the pilvatisation 
literature- the 'Social view' and the 'Agency view'. The 'Social view' advocates 
public ownership of enterprises and argues that under conditions of perfect 
competition, absence of information problems and complete contracts, ownership 
does not matter since the same performance of firins would be observed 
(Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 1999). The 'Agency view, ' on the other hand, 
supports private ownership and is comprised of two perspectives. 
The first- the 'managerial perspective'- argues that monitoring is poorer in 
publicly-owned firms and, as a result, incentives for efficiency are low-powered. 
According to Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999) this perspective argues that 
managers of SOEs are poorly monitored because the firrns are not traded in the 
market like private firms and do not face the threat of take-over when they perforrn 
poorly, shareholders cannot observe and influence the perforinance of SOEs and 
debt markets cannot play the role of disciplining the managers because SOEs debt 
is actually public debt that is perceived and traded under different conditions. 
The second perspective, the 'political perspective, ' argues that political 
interference results in the distortion of SOEs' objectives and the constraints faced 
by public managers. It posits that distortions in both the objective function that 
public managers seek to maximize and the so-called 'soft budget' constraint they 
face result in lower efficiency under public ownership (Ibid. ). The political 
perspective sees public managers as 'empire builders' who tend to report to a 
politician, pursue political careers themselves and incorporate aspects that relate to 
14 
the maximization of employment (at the cost of efficiency) and political prestige 
into the objective function of SOEs (Ibid. ). 
1.2.2. Methods of privatisation 
There are various methods of privatisation. Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988, pp. 3-4) 
identify three broad methods, as follows: 
1. Denationalisation or divestiture 
This refers to a change in the ownership of an enterprise (or part of it) from the 
public to private investors in a number of different ways depending on the state of 
a country's capital market. Where the capital markets are well developed, it 
involves the sale of all or part of the SOE's equity to the public. In most 
developing economies with less developed capital markets, it involves the sale of 
the enterprise as a complete entity. Denationalisation may also involve the 
introduction of private sector participation into a public enterprise Ooint venture) 
or the abandonment or formal liquidation of the SOE or management or employee 
buy-out. 
ii. Liberalisation 
This involves the deregulation of entry into protected markets previously restricted 
to SOEs in order to increase competition but may not necessarily involve the 
transfer of ownership of assets by the SOE to the private sector. According to 
Politt (1999) liberalisation often consists of the related policies of ownership 
transfer (conventionally defined as pnvatisation), structural change to the 
industries concerned and the introduction of statutory bodies to oversee the 
behaviour of incumbent firms. 
iii. Franchising or contracting-out 
This may involve the transfer of the provision of goods or services from the public 
Iý 
to the private sector (while government remains responsible for supplying the 
service) or the leasing of SOEs' assets to the private sector. 
Zanker (2001, p. 3) on the other hand, classifies the various forms of privatisation 
under three main categories, as follows: 
1. Functional privatisation which involves "contracting-out" of government tasks 
to private companies while the tasks remain the responsibility of the 
government. 
ii. Organisational privatisation involving the privatisation of the organisation and 
management through the establishment of civil law partnerships. The task 
remains with the government but is fulfilled under civil law and according to 
commercial criteria. 
Privatisation of task and capital involving the partial or full sale of public 
property to private investors or through a public listing, with the government 
withdrawing its responsibility for what was up to then a public task and 
relinquishing ownership and control of the enterprise. 
According to Zanker (2001) there are many mixed forms among these variants in 
practice and often, all three stages run simultaneously. As Letwin (1988) observes, 
privatisation may involve buy-outs of management and/or workers. 
1.2.3. The objectives of privatisation 
The objectives of privatisation vary from one country to another, depending on the 
government's ideological perspective and from one sector/SOE to another as well. 
Sheshinski. and Lopez-Calva (1999, p. 7) summarise the various objectives of 
privatisation identified in the literature into four categories as follows: to achieve 
higher allocative and productive efficiency; strengthen the role of the private 
sector in the economy; improve the public sector's financial health; and, free 
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resources for allocation in other important areas of government. 
Vickers and Wright (1989, pp. 5-8) on the other hand, summarise the various 
objectives of privatisation identifiable in the literature into five categories, 
including: 
i. Ideological motive 
As an ideological tool, privatisation pushes back the frontiers of the State and 
increases the choice of consumers by eliminating the monopoly status of public 
enterprises and services and making the consumer sovereign as in the private 
sector. 
Economic motive 
As an economic tool, privatisation helps to produce a substantial irreversible shift 
in the structure of the economy and promotes economic efficiency through the 
enablement of well functioning and competitive markets and internationally 
competitive enterprises, promotes the efficiency of erstwhile SOEs by exposing 
them to market forces and eliminating government interference in their operations. 
It also facilitates the adoption of tough labour policies by governments and 
constitutes a means of rationalising State asset portfolios and reorganising 
investment strategies. 
ill. Managerial motive 
As a managerial tool, privatisation breaks down public sector empires and 
reasserts consumer sovereignty, raises the standard of service provision and 
increases efficiency while reducing costs. By freeing management from political 
control and exposing them to market forces, privatisation, according to Vickers 
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and Wright (1989) makes profit the critical element in corporate survival. 
iv. Party political motive 
As a political tool, privatisation is seen as a means of increasing the frontiers of 
private enterprise vis-a-vis the state in order to create a conservative, anti-socialist 
electorate. 
v. Financial motives 
As a financial tool, privatisation is seen as a means of reducing state financial 
commitment to the erstwhile state-owned enterprises, i. e. a tool for reducing the 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) by giving firms access to capital 
markets, fostering stock exchange growth, ending costly state rescue operations, 
and raising money for the state treasury (Ibid. ). 
The policy objectives of privatisation also differ from one economic development 
context to another. Adam et al. (1992, p. 13) for instance, Identify six principal 
objectives of privatisation in developing countries, as follows: 
i. Public finance rationalisation objectives 
Most developing countries see privatisation as a means of reducing net budgetary 
transfers in order to eliminate contingent external debt liabilities, generate valuable 
capital revenue, ease the pressure for expenditure cuts in other areas and reduce 
the adverse effects which deficit financing can have on domestic investment 
through the proceeds of privatisation. The assumption here is that through the 
process of privatisation, the private sector reduces its cash holdings or other 
financial assets and acquires equity in privatised enterprises, while the government 
reduces its equity and increases its cash holdings. 
is 
ii. Economic efficiency or supply-side objectives 
These objectives are closely related to the broader issues of liberalisation in most 
developing countries, which perceive privatisation as a means of promoting 
economic and enterprise efficiency and attaining supply-side goals via the 
elimination of government intervention in enterprise management. Generally, the 
aim is to promote a higher level of managerial supervision and profit- 
maximisation. 
III . Private sector development objectives 
Most developing countries see privatisation as a tool for facilitating the growth in 
private sector investment by removing the high degree of protection enjoyed by 
public enterprises, eliminating the practice of making public investment decisions 
by fiat and re-establishing the link between economic risk and reward thus 
inducing the private sector to switch from asset accumulation to more risky 
domestic capital assets. 
iv. Capital market development 
Some developing countries construe privatisation as a means for developing or 
revitalising local capital markets and enhancing the mobilisation of domestic 
savings. Such countries see the augmentation of the supply of stock through the 
sale of government equity as a way of kick-starting their capital markets. 
v. Income distribution 
In some developing countries, a main objective of privatisation is the promotion of 
income distribution targets through consciously determining the relative access of 
domestic and foreign participants in the privatisation exercise. Sometimes, shares 
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are under-priced to achieve favourable distribution of wealth. 
vi. Meeting structural adjustment conditionalities 
Privatisation is often pursued by most developing countries as a component of 
economic structural adjustment programmes (SAP) due to the emergence of 
policy-based lending by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank in the 1980s. The latter for instance, was involved in 143 adjustment loans 
directed towards SOE reform world-wide in the decade up to 1989 (Galal, 1990, 
cited in Adam et al, 1992, p. 25). Nigeria's Federal Government for instance, was 
granted a credit facility of US$ 114 million repayable over 35 years to pay for 
privatisation support, institutional and consensus building, telecoms and power 
sector reforms and the Lagos State Water Corporation Project (Bureau for Public 
Enterprises, BPE 2001, p. 22). 
Although all these objectives of privatisation apply to most economic sectors, it is 
important to note that the Privatisation of the oil industry is quite unlike that of most 
other sectors. As Wright (2003, pp. 1-2) notes, upstream oil and gas production have 
the under-listed characteristics which render the classical privatisation model both 
inappropriate and ineffective: 
i. The issue of ownership is more complex in the case of the oil and gas industry 
due to its dual dimensions of sovereign ownership of an exhaustible natural 
resource and public and private sector involvement. Privatisation of oil and gas 
SOEs does not generally transfer ownership of the resource to the private sector. 
Rather, it means opening up access to the resource to the private sector either in 
the form of a full or partial privatisation of the SOE or allowing greater private 
sector participation in the industry alongside the SOE or both. 
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ii. The role of the market and competition are a priori compromised in the case of 
the oil Industry because the prices of oil and gas are determined in the 
international marketplace, which is characterised much more by the deployment 
of power than by market forces. Moreover, oil producing countries haý7e different 
objectives. For those oil producers whose production is mainly for export (like 
Nigeria) lower prices for consumers is usually not an objective, while those 
producers whose production is mainly for domestic consumption are usually 
more concerned with downstream tax revenue than with lower final prices. 
ill. Regulation is not the agenda since the objective of upstream liberalisation is to 
reduce the regulatory burden, particularly as far as tax instruments are concerned. 
Wright (2003, p. 2) argues therefore, that the particularity of liberallsing upstream oil 
and gas production is captured by the drive to liberalise fiscal regimes, presented as a 
precondition for achieving non-oil and gas-related objectives like addressing 
scarcities of investible funds and technological know-how, creating employment and 
seeking to improve balance of payments positions. Privatisation in the context of the 
Nigerian oil industry so far has been by way of opening up access to the resource to 
the private sector via the privatisation of the SOEs in the downstream sector of the 
industry and allowing greater private sector participation in the industry alongside 
SOEs yet to be privatised. The State however, still owns the oil and natural gas 
resources, through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). 
Three questions arise from the objectives of privatisation discussed above, as 
follows: Are all of these objectives relevant to all privatisations? Do these different 
motives have different implications for industrial relations? Which of these 
objectives are most significant in Nigeria's privatisation? 
With regard to the first question, it is important to note that Vickers and Wright 
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(1989) and other authors cited above are not arguing that all objectives of 
privatisation are universally relevant to all privatisations. Secondly, the different 
objectives of privatisation portend different implications for industrial relations 
and their consequences for the regulation of employment are bound to vary from 
one privatisation programme to another. Thirdly, it is worthy of note that although 
these objectives are situated within the context of United Kingdom (UK) 
privatisation theory, they are useful for an understanding of Nigeria's privatisation 
of its finance and petroleum industries. 
For instance, unlike in the UX privatisation where the ideological motive of 
reducing government involvement was an important goal for the Conservative 
government (see Politt, 1999 for instance) Nigeria's privatisation exercise was not 
ideologically motivated. However, like in the UX, the need to increase economic 
and managerial efficiency is an important objective in Nigeria as evidenced by 
objectives (i), (11) and (ill) of the country's privatisation programme discussed 
below. 
The financial objective of reducing the PSBR is equally an important goal in 
Nigeria, as evidenced by the objectives of her privatisation programme, which are 
as follows: 
i. To restructure and rationalise the public sector by reducing the dominance of 
unproductive investments. 
ii. To re-orientate the enterprises for privatisation and commercialisation 
towards a new horizon of performance improvement, viability and overall 
efficiency. 
Ili. To raise funds for financing socio-economic developments in such areas as 
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health, education and infrastructure. 
iv. To ensure positive returns on public sector investments in commerciallsed 
enterprises through more efficient management. 
V. To check the absolute dependence on the Treasury for funding by otherwise 
commercially oriented SOEs and encourage them to source their funding from the 
Nigerian capital market. 
vi. To initiate the process of gradual cession of public enterprises that are better 
operated by the private sector to the latter. 
vil. To create more jobs, acquire new knowledge and technology and expose the 
country to international competition (Bureau for Public Enterprises, 2000, pp. 66- 
67). 
Objectives (ill) to (v) were major motives for the privatisation of UNIC Insurance, 
FBN Plc, Conoil Plc and other SOEs so far privatised in the country. However, the 
political objective of reducing the power of trade unions that was important in the 
British case is not an important objective of Nigeria's privatisation, as evidenced 
by the fact that no privatisation-related labour legislation was enacted by Nigeria's 
government to reduce the unions' power. 
The social objective of promoting distributional equity is an important goal of 
Nigeria's privatisation where the government allotted 5 percent of the shares of 
privatised SOEs to the employees and established Zonal Shareholders 
Associations to cater for the interest of individual Nigerian shareholders. However, 
the government's aim was not to gain electoral advantage through privatisation 
since the programme commenced under military dictatorship. There is also no 
evidence to indicate that the civilian government that succeeded the military 
gained any electoral advantage from implementing the second phase of the 
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programme. 
These objectives of Nigeria's privatisation have certain implications for the 
conduct of post-privatisation industrial relations in the country. Objectives (1) and 
(11) for instance, imply restructuring; objective (iv) implies a transformation of 
managerial practices from public sector style to a more professional and 
commercially-oriented industrial relations, while objectives (v) to (vii) imply 
expansion, upskilling, technological change and investment. All of these 
objectives also have consequences for macro level change in ownership and 
control, structure of the firm and the nature of the product market competition 
which in turn, impact on micro level changes in industrial relations after 
privatisation. It is important therefore, to examine the theoretical consequences of 
privatisation in order to assist the current study's evaluation of the implications of 
privatisation for employment relationship in the privatised case study SOEs that 
constitutes its focus. 
1.2.4. The consequences of privatisation 
Kikeri and Nellis (2001, p. 7) group the consequences of privatisation into five 
categories as follows: 
i. Its impact on financial and operational performance at the enterprise level, 
particularly as it relates to productivity and profitability before and after sale, 
changes in output, investments, capacity utilisation, etc; 
ii. The fiscal and macroeconomic effects; 
iii. The broader welfare and economic consequences, 
iv. The employment and broader labour market impacts, and; 
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V. Privatisation's impact on income and wealtb distribution. 
Generally, the theoretical arguments behind the theory that privatisation can 
achieve its stated objectives are built around its microeconomic and 
macroeconomic impacts. As Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999) note however, 
the theoretical literature on the macroeconomic effects of privatisation is not as 
rich as that on the microeconomic effects (although few theoretical models try to 
link privatisation with macroeconomic performance) due to the difficulty 
associated with isolating the effect of privatisation from other variables that have 
an influence on aggregate measures. This often results in the observance of certain 
trends, though with weak causality. 
Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999) note therefore, that there is no strong evidence 
of the effects of privatisation at the macroeconomic level, although it is possible to 
give an overview of the trends observed in key aggregate variables and relate those 
to the privatisation programmes that have been implemented. However, it is not 
possible to attribute the observed patterns of change at the macroeconomic level to 
privatisation alone since other policy measures like trade liberalisation, fiscal 
adjustment and tax reform and weakening of controls to capital inflow are 
implemented simultaneously with privatisation. At the microeconomic level on the 
other hand, the empirical evidence strongly supports the theory that privatisation 
has positive effects on profitability and efficiency, with capital expenditures 
tending to increase after privatisation, although the evidence on firm level 
employment is mixed. For large firms, employments seem to rise after divestiture 
while profitability and performance also increase (Ibid. ). 
Evidence from the literature suggests therefore, that privatisatIon has varying 
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degrees of impact, with the different objectives of pr1vatIsatIon having different 
implications for industrial relations. Privatisation's impact on trade unions and 
employment relationship can however, only be better appreciated against a 
background of a review of the literature on trade unions and employment 
relationship. 
1.3. Trade unions and employment relationship 
1.3.1. Definitions 
In the context of this study, the tenn, 'employment relationship' (also referred to 
in this study as industrial relations) is taken to mean "the tacit bargains struck over 
the exchange of pay, benefits and conditions on the one hand, and work on the 
other" (Brown, 1988, p. 54, cited in O'Connell Davidson, 1993, p. 7). It embraces 
two main aspects of work: the nature of the tasks that workers undertake, and, the 
tenns on which workers labour power is procured (O'Connell Davidson, 1993). 
The ten-ns on which workers' labour is procured depends on their bargaining 
power. According to Gennard and Judge (1997) the potential relative bargaining 
power of employees as a group is dependent on a combination of factors. First is 
the centrality of the group to the workflow, the extent of its organisation, its 
cohesiveness and solidarity. Next is the degree to which the group can be 
substituted and the extent to which substitute products or services for those 
provided by the group are available to the organisation's customers. The group's 
willingness to exercise its disruptive power and the quality of its leadership are 
also important considerations. Where the quality of its leadership is high and the 
group is cohesive, aware of its potential bargaining power, is willing to press home 
its advantage and has a history of having done so in the past, the group tends to be 
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in a relatively strong position in its negotiations with the employer (Ibid. ). 
Trade unions are the best known type of collective employee organisations. 
Various definitions of the term 'trade union' exist. Sidney and Beatrice Webb 
(1964) classically define a trade union as "a continuous association of wage 
earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their 
working lives" (Webb and Webb, 1964, p. 1). Rollinson (1993, p. 58), on the other 
hand, defines a trade union as "an organisation, whether permanent or temporary, 
which consists mainly of workers of one or more descriptions and is an 
organisation whose principal purposes includes the regulation of relations between 
workers of that description and employers or employers association". As the 
British Trade Union Congress- TUC (1966,1967, cited in Robertson and Thomas, 
1968, p. 36) notes however, unions have always provided and continue to provide 
a wide range of services for their members which do not involve employers or any 
outside agency. 
In view of its various definitions, the terin 'trade union' as it applies in this study 
is defined as 'a melting pot, an agglomeration of the diverse interests of workers- 
political, social and economic. It is both a socio-political movement and a moral 
vanguard and constitutes workers' voice in national and international economic 
and socio-political developmental processes'. This study's definition of unions is 
informed by the contemporary nature of their objectives and functions discussed 
below. 
1.3.2. The objectives of trade unions 
Three major trade union objectives are identifiable in the literature, as follows: 
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1. The economic objective 
According to Gennard and Judge (1997) as economic actors, trade unions manage 
the internal employment relationship of an enterprise between their members and 
capital (represented by management) in their members' favour, act as a channel 
through which the effective issues concerned with the employment contract are 
handled and legitimise decisions jointly reached via negotiations with 
management. Essentially, unions protect their members' jobs, seek the objectives 
of full employment, improvement on pay and other conditions through collective 
bargaining. 
The political objective. 
According to Muller-Jentsch (1988, cited in Fairbrother, 2000, p. 5) in their 
capacity as political agencies, unions are 'Intermediary organisations' positioned 
as collective organisations representing workers to employers and the state. This 
objective, as Fairbrother (2000) argues, is predicated on an assumption that trade 
unions are organisational entities which (theoretically at least) are distinct and 
separate from the state and employers, although union representatives may enter 
into alliances with the state or employers or be drawn into co-operative 
relationships at both employer and state levels. 
The social objective 
According to Gennard and Judge (1997) unions provide social and welfare 
benefits to their members like educating their members on unionism, economic, 
social and political matters, in addition to counselling and the provision of 
legal 
aid. 
Arising from the above-mentioned objectives is a set of complementary functions- 
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economic, political and social. According to Robertson and Thomas (1968, p. 36) 
these can be classified into five major categories as follows: 
i. Industnal activities 
Robertson and Thomas (1968) identify three main industrial activities. First, 
unions maintain or advance terms and conditions of employment. This role 
includes both the obvious terms of employment- wages, hours of work, etc., as 
well as the nature of the contract of employment and the procedures to be followed 
in amending it, i. e. both procedural and substantive issues in the employment 
contract. Secondly, unions safeguard and increase the employment opportunities 
of their members. As Fairbrother (2000) notes however, this role of unions has 
come under increasing threat in the face of the changing terrain of workplace 
unionism, which includes downsizing by corporations, the fragmentation and re- 
institutional i sation of the state sector, the closure and/or relocation of enterprises, 
and the reconfiguration of managerial hierarchies. Thirdly, unions engage in the 
conduct of industrial disputes through recognised machinery that may sometimes 
involve the use of the strike weapon and raise and disburse funds in this regard. 
Unions in Nigeria engage in all three industrial activities. 
ii. Benefit and welfare activities 
According to Robertson and Thomas (1968) unions engage in the provision of 
unemployment and sickness benefits, legal aids, educational facilities, etc., to their 
members. Though the development of State welfare provision has clearly reduced 
the importance of this function in the advanced economies of the West, it remains 
an important role for most unions in the developing nations. Nigerian unions 
however, do not provide unemployment and sickness benefits to their members. 
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Ill. Increasing workers' participation in the control of industry 
According to Robertson and Thomas (1968) in most countries, trade unions 
advocate nationalisation and state control of the means of production as an indirect 
means of workers control. Where this is not attainable, unions demand the right to 
be consulted where appropriate. 
IV. Political activities 
The political activities of unions (including Nigerian unions) are expressed in the 
forrn of 'indirect' or 'direct' actions or a combination of both. Indirect action takes 
the form of lobbying members of existing political parties or in the case of 
developing countries plagued by military rule, lobbying either the ruling junta or 
influential members of the Armed Forces. Direct political action takes the form of 
either an alliance with a political party largely financed by the union or the 
establishment of a political party by the union (Ibid. ). 
V. Watchdog activities 
Unions serve as the main pressure group. Such actions, as Robertson and Thomas 
(1968) note, take place at all levels of the trade union movement with unions 
acting individually, in groups or through their umbrella organisation against local 
authorities and the national government. 
The role of trade unions is however, much more dynamic than the appraisal in the 
preceding paragraphs tend to indicate since changes in the overall environmental 
context of the fin-n (like privatisation) impact on the role of unions in different 
ways. Trade unions' responses to privatisation derive from their different 
perception of its impact on their members, structures and their political agenda 
which supports government ownership of public enterprises. There is a need 
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therefore, to appraise the theoretical debate on the impact of privatisation on 
unions and employment relationship in privatised SOEs, as presented by existing 
literature, below. 
1.3.3. The impact of privatisation on trade unions and employment relationship 
According to Clegg (1979) and Fogarty (1986) both cited in Ogden (1994, p. 70) 
before privatisation, industrial relations in most SOEs are characterised by: 
1. The recognition of trade unions and the promotion of collective bargaining; 
11 .A high density of trade union membership; 
ril. Detailed national agreements regulating pay and conditions of service; 
IV. A highly forinalised and elaborate system of joint consultation and a 
commitment to being a good employer. 
This framework of public sector industrial relations changes after pnivatisation. As 
Ferner and Colling (1991, p. 391) note, there are three consequences of 
privatisation for the industrial relations of former SOEs as follows: 
The ending of direct political control 
ii. The creation of a regulatory framework, and, 
iii. The replacement of a 'political' orientation by a 'shareholder' orientation. 
Generally, changes in the industrial relations of most privatised SOEs revolve 
around improving labour productivity through greater flexibility, Improved 
training and new payment structures that are more performance-related and are 
accompanied by changes to established industrial relations practices such as 
single-table bargaining, and harmonisation of pay and conditions (Ogden, 1994, 
cited in Femer and Colling, 1991, p. 391). As Ogden (1994) notes such changes 
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are driven by the need to achieve improvements in efficiency and a determination 
to distance the new organisations from their previous style of Industrial relations, 
and portend significant consequences for management strategies and industrial 
relations in the emerging companies. 
Femer and Colling (1991, p. 391) ascribe the gradual erosion of the classic 
institutions of public enterprise industrial relations after privatisation to the under- 
listed reasons: 
1. The weakening of trade unions' ability to use political strategies as well as 
industrial ones. 
The emphasis on flexibility, quality and workforce commitment which leads 
management to de-emphasise traditional channels such as the joint consultation 
machinery, while concentrating more on direct communication with the 
workforce. 
Ill. The devolution of managerial responsibility to 'profit-responsible' business 
units, which encourages less reliance on highly centralised bargaining 
relationships with national union officials, and, 
iv. The reduction of the coverage of collective bargaining in some privatised 
enterprises by the 'creeping de-recognition' of managerial and professional unions 
for collective bargaining purposes and under which managers are offered 
incentives to move on to personal contracts. 
Ferrier and Colling (1991) conclude however, that the predictive changes in the 
industrial relations of privatised enterprises are by no means universal, since some 
experience stormy industrial relations while others have a peaceful time 
negotiating changes. They note that what appears to be emerging in privatised 
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enterprises in the UX is a dual pattern of industrial relations. In the core business 
the traditional industrial relations ethos of public enterprises persists on the ývhole 
or reasserts itself after a period of Instability with well organIsed unions (at least 
for non-managerial staff), strong bargaining relationships and management by 
agreement, with a new and changing culture of industrial relations emerging in the 
new areas of business. 
Zanker (2001, pp. 7-9) surnmarises the consequences of privatisation for 
employees and trade unions under two main categories as follows: 
1. Consequences arising from reorganisation 
According to Zanker's (2001) privatisation often entails a comprehensive 
restructuring of the enterprise involved via concentration on core business areas, 
dividing the enterprise into partially independent units, closing unprofitable 
locations , introducing new performance-oriented personnel management and other 
management methods, adopting comprehensive cost reduction measures 
(particularly with regard to staff costs) and introducing perfon-nance-oriented pay 
structure. 
Consequences arising from the transition to a new framework on industrial 
relations and working conditions 
According to Zanker (2001) privatisation involves the catapulting of erstwhile 
SOEs from the framework of the "public service" (with major effects on industrial 
relations and working conditions) and often involves moving from a public sector 
collective bargaining to a private sector bargaining framework. It results in the 
replacement of civil servant status (characterised by life tenure) by an employment 
contract, the replacement of public sector pay structure (linked to career paths and 
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formal qualifications, etc. ) by private sector pay structure (often-times 
performance-related), the shift to a new professional requirement with respect to 
the skills and qualifications of the staff and a new preference for commercial skills 
and a strong customer-orientation. 
Zanker (2001) concludes that privatisation (like other liberalisation. measures) also 
has implications for trade union structures and involves a metamorphosis by 
unions from sector-wide unions to industrial unions, resulting, in some cases, in 
non-unionisation of the employees. Zanker notes however, that privatisation's 
impact on employees cannot be attributed to any policy alone since each policy 
has an inter-dependent effect on others. 
The predictive impact of privatisation on trade unions and employment 
relationship has elicited two different perspectives in the privatisation literature. 
As Cook and Murphy (2002) note, critics of privatisation contend that the policy is 
anti-labour unions and most (if not) all workers, shrinks the public sector 
(especially in the developing countries) in which workers have achieved the 
highest levels of organisation and wages, job security and decent working 
conditions, results in layoffs and downsizing, erodes other protections or removes 
them from the labour codes, increases the repression of workers, weakens trade 
unions and results in negative distributional effects and the growing abuses arising 
from the weakening and non-monitoring of labour standards. 
Proponents of privatisation, on the other hand, argue that it is a necessary antidote 
to bloated, inefficient, and debt-ridden public sectors, organised public sector 
workers (who seek rents from the state via overstaffing, generous pay and benefits, 
and restrictive and inflexible labour contracts, block efficient allocation of 
econornic resources and crowd out social spending on the unorganised poor) and 
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wasteful subsidies but stimulates economic recovery and growth (Ibid. ). Cook and 
Murphy (2002) note however, that the empirical results on the impact of 
privatisation are at best mixed, although both proponents and advocates of 
privatisation agree that it has real costs for organised labour. 
According to Pendleton (1999, cited in Arrowsmith, 2003, p. 150) the theory of 
privatisation commonly used by its advocates and critics draws on Agency theory 
to predict that a change in ownership would lead to wide-ranging changes in 
employment and pay because of the requirement of profit maximisation. As 
Arrowsmith (2003) notes, pressures from shareholders and regulators would 
require managers to cut costs and improve efficiency by driving changes to 
working patterns, employment levels, and terms and conditions of employment. 
Femer and Colling (1991) note in this regard that the new competitive post- 
privatisation environment results in considerable diversity in both the speed and 
scope with which management pursues innovative policies, with some privatised 
SOEs experiencing massive cutback in employment, deteriorating pay and 
conditions, and a worsening industrial relations climate. 
They argue that privatisation allows new forms of direct communication with the 
workforce represented by the growing use of personal contracts, performance and 
profit-related pay, etc, calls into question some of the traditional aspects of 
industrial relations and poses serious strategic dilemmas for trade unions. 
Moreover, management's attitudes to unions in some privatised enterprises are 
influenced by the perceived expectations of shareholders, with some management 
harbouring the desire for a union-free environment. However, changes in industrial 
relations are not necessarily confined to privatised enterprises and may not 
necessarily be a product of privatisation, while changes in the overall environment 
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of trade unions are by no means universal in their nature and implications since 
diverse environmental factors impact upon trade unions and make a contextual 
appraisal of any trade union that is the focus of a study necessary (Ibid. ). 
As Cook and Murphy (2002) note therefore, evidence from the privatisation 
literature tends to suggest that its impact on employment and social welfare varies 
for various countries and sections of the labour force. Unions' response to 
privatisation policies also vary and are shaped in complex ways by the structure of 
the national labour movement and their relationship with both the State and other 
social and political movements. According to Cook and Murphy (2002) 
privatisation has implications for the organisation and solidarity of labour 
movements and for the forms of organization that best pro tect workers, with 
singular, national confederations better positioned to resist or negotiate the terms 
of privatisation schemes, while decentralized unions are able to respond more 
quickly to situations in individual plants or industries and may better serve the 
interests of workers after privatisation has been implemented. 
The mixed conclusions of the privatisation literature about its impact on trade 
unions and industrial relations raise a need for critical reflection on such 
consequences. For instance, while Clarke (1987) argues that although privatisation 
may lead to a rapid contraction in number of employees and a swift reform of 
antique restrictive practices, the prospects for employees in privatised 
organisations will be enhanced, Nichols (1986) and Heald and Morris (1984) 
argue, on the other hand, that privatisation results in the reduction of trade unions' 
powers and abruptly reverses the official promotion of public sector trade 
unionism as one of the basis for sound public sector industrial relations. 
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Ogden (1990, cited in O'Connell Davidson, 1993, p. 57) argues in a similar vein 
that privatisation reduces the power of public sector unions by making 
management more cost conscious in responding to trade union claims and 
providing opportunities for dismantling national (collective) agreements. 
According to O'Connell Davidson (1993, p. 57) in virtually all the industries and 
services that have been privatised in the UX for instance, there has been a shift 
away from the national-level negotiating, away from a 'constitutionalist' 
approach towards industrial relations". O'Connell Davidson (1993) notes also that 
the increasing substitution of contract labour for direct labour after privatisation 
reduces union membership and control in the workplace. 
According to Blyton and Morris (1991, cited in O'Connell Davidson, 1993, p. 
128) privatisation results in substantial alteration of the organisation of work as 
well as tacit agreements reached over the wage effort bargain by facilitating 
changes to payments and work allocation (by management that pursue flexibility 
through deskilling, casualising work, or 'upskilling' jobs) and initiating 
integrationist labour policies, the growth of part-time employment, changes in 
industrial relations practices regarding contracts and pay deten-nination, the 
application of new technologies, the removal of statutory regulations governing 
the labour market and the use of legislation, etc, in order to reduce trade union 
powers. 
1.3.4. Conclusion 
It is evident from the preceding analyses that the impact of privatisation is context- 
specific. The nature of government intervention, for instance may depend largely 
on its perception of trade unions' role as dictated by its ideological orientation. 
Moreover, the predictive reduction in the power of unions may not be a product of 
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privatisation alone but could be due to a combination of factors like intra-union 
crisis, national economic policies like structural adjustment programme (SAP), 
changes in labour legislations, etc. The argument that privatisation results in a 
reduction in staffing levels may also not be universally applicable (see Gupta et al, 
2003, for instance). 
Moreover, in addition to changes there may also be continuity in some aspects of 
industrial relations. Pedersini (2001) notes for instance, that despite the observed 
general tendencies in post-privatisation European industrial relations, it is not 
possible to say that industrial relations within specific companies have necessarily 
changed because elements of both change and continuity are present within such 
companies. Pedersini therefore advices on the need to distinguish between 
developments within the specific companies undergoing privatisation and changes 
that may be taking place in the sectors concerned or even at national level. 
Trade unions' experiences of privatisation also vary from one country and sector 
to another. According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 1997) 
privatisation generally affects unionisation, bargaining patterns and collective 
agreements, but the results are fairly mixed. In countries where public sector 
workers or specific categories of them have more limited union rights and, in 
general, lower labour standards than employees of private companies, privatization 
may well bring improvement. But in a good number of cases, unionisation and 
industrial relations come out weakened from privatisation and restructuring 
processes. 
According to the ILO (1997) national political contexts and habits play a key role 
in determining the pattern of industrial relations, even after privatization. For 
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instance, as Alexander (2002) notes in the case of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco 
(which share broad cultural affinity, earlier development strategies that created 
large public sectors and unions that had played important political roles despite 
their authoritarian environments) differences in the organisation of labour and in 
the history of state-labour relations across the cases shaped labour's differing 
responses and outcomes. In all three North African cases, trade unions' exclusion 
from privatisation policy-making led to varying degrees of worker militancy, 
tendencies towards labour fragmentation and the formation of new unions (lbid. ). 
Jiyad (1996, p. 15) on the other hand, concludes that privatisation seems not to 
have led to redundancies in Egypt and Morocco due to the arrangements agreed 
upon with the new owners of the privatised companies under which workers in 
privatised enterprises in both countries were allowed to keep their jobs for a 
transitional period (three years in Egypt and five years in Morocco). In Morocco, 
some of the privatised firms actually increased employment while in Tunisia 3,580 
employees (26 percent of the labour force) lost their jobs, although a majority of 
them disengaged voluntarily through early retirements and generous severance pay 
(Ibid. ). 
A number of questions ( fundamental to this study) arise from the analyses in this 
section, as follows: Are the predictive impacts of privatisation on trade unions and 
employment relationship appraised above universal? If the answer is yes, do all 
trade unions share similar privatisation experiences or are the experiences 
conditioned by different environmental, structural and institutional variables? 
What factors other than privatisation are responsible for the observed changes in 
trade unionism and industrial relations after privatisation? Attempts will be made 
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to answer these questions in chapters four, five and six of this study. 
Suffice to note for now like Kikeri and Nellis (2001, p. 9) that one of the biggest 
issues in evaluating privatisation lies in comparing its outcome with the 
counterfactual, i. e. "what would happen in the absence of privatisation". As 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) and Hodge (2000) (both cited in Kiken and Nellis, 
2001, p. 10) note for instance, change could have occurred due to changes in 
management or economic factors or both or due to timing, i. e. some of the change 
may occur before privatisation due to the 'announcement effect' rather than 
privatisation. 
Generally, according to the privatisation literature, problems arise in privatised 
SOEs over political issues as well as changes in the under-listed aspects of the 
employment relationship: 
i. The balance of bargaining power 
ii. Joint consultation or collective bargaining 
iii. Wage negotiations 
iv. Downsizing (particularly as it relates to union membership loss), and; 
v. New disciplinary and grievance procedures (See Ferrier and Colling, 1991, 
O'Connell Davidson, 1993, and Ogden, 1994, for instance). 
These factors constitute the adopted analytical variables of the current study and 
are defined below. 
1.4. The current study's analytical variables 
A summarised review of the context in which these adopted analytical variables 
are applied in this study is conducted in this section as follows: 
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1.4.1. The balance of bargaining power 
This term refers to the balance between measures of employers' and trade unions' 
power. There are various definitions of bargaining power in the literature on the 
subject matter. Katz and Kochan (1992, cited in Singh and Dannin, 2002, p. 5) for 
instance, define bargaining power as the ability of one party to achieve its goal in 
bargaining in the presence of opposition by another party to the process. Seen in 
this context, according to Singh and Dannin (2002) bargaining power is perceived 
in terms of microeconomic factors like strike leverage, i. e. the degree to which 
workers and employers are willing to and have the ability to withstand a strike. 
Singh and Dannin (2002) however, view bargaining power solely as a 
consequence of economic circumstances. They posit that employers will have 
higher strike leverage (and more power) if the effects of the strike on production, 
sales and profits are inconsequential, while unions will have higher strike leverage 
(and more power) if employees have an alternative source of income and 
unwavering workers solidarity. Strike leverage (and power), according to these 
authors, also depends on macroeconomic factors like wage flexibility over the 
business cycle and income policy, with unions, for example, at a disadvantage 
during economic recessions and under wage and price controls but at an advantage 
under economic buoyancy and a flexible wage regime. Martin and Thomson 
(1992, cited in Singh and Dannin 2002, p. 5), on the other hand, view bargaining 
power as a product of factors like product market power, characteristics of the firm 
such as the size of its employment unit, and non-economic forces such as the 
political and legal environment. 
Cook and Murphy (2002) note however, that the political context in which 
privatisation takes place influences the propensity of workers to resist sell-off 
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schemes and the forms such resistance might take. Moreover, the relationship 
between labour unions (and between their leaders and their rank-and-file) also 
matters greatly, same as the presence or absence of genuine partisan political 
competition. For example, in democracies where unions provide key support to 
governing political parties or coalitions they tend to exercise the greatest influence 
on the privatisation programmes, although even this influence produces 
dramatically different outcomes. Where privatisation is initiated by authoritarian 
governments however, labour's response depends partly on whether union leaders 
have been co-opted and whether the rank-and-file have been repressed. Co-opted 
leaders tend to focus their energies on bargaining over benefits and transitional aid 
for displaced workers, and are at risk of losing credibility with their membership. 
Where repression is not extreme, workers who are affected most directly by 
privatisation may respond more assertively than their unions (lbid. ). 
Jennifer Smith (1996, pp. 8-20) identifies certain microeconomic variables as 
important for the measurement of the balance of bargaining power. On the part of 
the firm, according to Smith (pp. 12-15) these include: 
i. The finn's liquid assets 
The size of the firm's liquid assets in relation to fixed costs- overheads (e. g. 
heating, lighting, storage, and support staff), hiring charges on leased equipment or 
interest payment on debt- is important in determining the firm's bargaining power 
relative to the union. According to Smith (1996) the greater the firm's liquid assets 
or the firm to continue to meet its are in relation to fixed costs, the easier it is f 
financial commitments during a stoppage. Greater liquid assets, according to 
Smith (1996) might raise bargaining power and reduce wages. 
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The firm's inventory 
Higher stocks enable the firm to better survive a stoppage and increases its 
negotiating strength while the firm's holding of inventory (or inside option) is the 
income from temporary arrangements that keep the business running. The higher 
the value of the stocks, the longer the firm can last before the effects of lost 
production manifest in terms of reduced sales and profits (Ibid. ). Smith (1996) 
argues that larger inventories should increase bargaining power and reduce wages 
and vice versa. The higher the level stocks of finished goods, the greater the firm's 
ability to survive a temporary work stoppage and the greater its bargaining power 
and, by extension, its ability to resist workers wage demands, although a high level 
of inventories might also be indicative of a reduced demand for the firm's product 
and as a result, might induce workers to accept a lower pay settlement. It is worthy 
at this stage to note the fact that for non-manufacturing concerns like banks and 
insurance companies, the firm's inside option cannot be represented by its 
inventory of stocks. The deposits base of banks and the net premiums of insurance 
companies are more relevant and will be employed for this study's analyses of the 
finance case studies. 
III . The 
level of capital intensity 
According to Smith (1996) workers in capital intensive finns receive higher 
wages. Capital intensity therefore lowers a finn's bargaining power by raising 
(rental or interest) costs during a temporary stoppage. 
On the part of trade unions, Smith (1996, pp. 15-18) identifies the under-listed 
factors as important for measuring the balance of bargaining power between 
unions and employers: 
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IV. The identity of the trade union 
According to Smith (1996) workers' bargaining power equally depends on features 
specific to the main trade union involved in bargaining such as the size of its 
membership, its reputation, financial strength or information and the number of 
unions involved. More unions bargaining together increase negotiating strength 
while unions might have greater bargaining power with higher total membership 
as a result of better finance, information and reputation. 
Rainsberger (2003) notes in the same vein that bargaining power is a reflection of 
the internal dynamics of the union as much as it is a function of its relationship 
with relevant employers, although the power of a bargaining committee relative to 
the employer is affected by the capacity of the committee to operate on a solid 
base of membership support. As Gennard and Judge (1997) equally note, where a 
trade union is cohesive, aware of its potential bargaining power, is willing to press 
home its advantage, and has a history of having done so in the past, the group 
tends to be in a relatively strong position in its negotiations with the employer. 
Equally important is in this regard is the notion of union mobilising potential since 
issues change over time and the bargaining agenda also changes. For example, job 
losses are less important in sectors where the unemployment/vacancy ratio is low 
same as health and safety issues generally have low mobilising potential except 
there is a major health or safety issue like a train crash, for instance. Mobilising 
potential is, therefore, not static but depends on the bargaining agenda. 
V. Union density 
Smith (1996) notes that the greater the proportion of the workforce who are 
members of a union, the more damage the union could inflict on the firm by a 
strike and therefore, the less willing the fin-n might be to pursue a bargaining 
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strategy that could induce a stoppage. Union density (or the ratio of unionised to 
non-unionised workforce) affects the bargaining parties' relative power through its 
effect on the firm's inside option (i. e. the income from temporary arrangements 
that keep the business running) which vanes positively with the firm's holding of 
inventory and can be used to buffer the firm against the effects of a strike. 
Vi. The existence of alternative wage for union members 
The existence of alternative wage in the form of a strike fund is also important for 
measuring a trade union's bargaining power. As Smith (1996) notes, in case of a 
delay in reaching an agreement due to a strike action, union members might 
receive income from union strike funds or from temporary employment elsewhere 
or from the income of the striking worker's household (which represent measures 
of the trade union members' 'inside option' wage- the sample annual average 
wage that can be used as a measure of 'inside option' wage). In cases where 
workers are unwilling to seek alternative employment outside their regions during 
strike-related delays, the prevailing average wage in the worker's region might be 
more influential as a measure of 'inside option' wage'. As Visser (2000) notes 
however, two important conditions relate to unions' ability to influence layoffs and 
re-hiring decisions, and hence, their ability to check loss of membership. These 
include the presence of unions in the workplace and the organisation of 
unemployment insurance. 
vii. The macro level vacancy/unemployment ratio 
According to Smith (1996) the probability of getting an alternative wage is 
inversely related to the ratio of vacancies to unemployment. The greater the 
number of job positions that require filling in relation to the number of applicants 
for those jobs, the greater the chances of a striking worker finding temporary 
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employment. A higher vacancy/unemployment ratio is associated with higher 
union bargaining power and higher wages, and vice versa. An increase in the 
proportion of the unemployed who have been without a job for more than one year 
also has implications for wages. According to Layard and Nickell (1986, cited in 
Smith, 1996, p. 11), for a given unemployment rate, an increase in this category of 
unemployed will have a positive effect on the bargained wage and the expected 
value of the employees 'Inside option'. 
For our analytical purpose in this study, Smith's model of bargaining power will 
be adopted alongside other relevant variables (discussed below) that are equally 
important for measuring bargaining power. 
Vill. The economic centrality of the industry/sector 
As Singh and Dannin (2002) note, under certain conditions, non-economic forces 
such as the political and legal contexts are more important determinants of 
bargaining power. In this Author's opinion, the economic importance of the 
industry/sector in which a work stoppage occurs, in terrns of its contribution to a 
country's economy (i. e. its contribution to national revenue and Gross Domestic 
Product- GDP) is equally important for measuring bargaining power, as this 
determines to a large extent, the political leverage unions are able to exert in the 
course of negotiations. This factor is particularly significant in the case of 
developing economies that rely heavily on mono-cultural industries or economic 
sectors for a majority of their national revenue. In such economies, where the 
country depends on a particular industry for most of its revenue, both government 
and employers are likely to compromise more with unions in order to minimise the 
incidence of strikes and work stoppages in that particular industry. 
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Where the sector or industry is strategically central to an economy. union 
bargaining power in the sector/industry derives more from political leverage and 
may not reflect the conclusions of market measures of bargaining power and vice 
versa. The Nigerian economy which, for instance, relies on the oil industry for 
between 90 and 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings and nearly 80 percent of 
government revenues (Johnson, 2003, p. 1) is an example of such economy. 
ix. The political context of bargaining 
There is a political and market structure to privatisation. As Beckman (2002) 
notes, politically unions are instrumental in disseminating notions of individual 
and collective rights and the need for representation and bargaining to other groups 
in society. Trade unions forge alliances with other groups in society (with whom 
they share common interests) in order to influence the political process because 
they are not convinced that market forces alone will resolve the problems of mass 
unemployment without efficient state interventions aimed at combating waste and 
corruption and the promotion of accountability. 
Beckman suggests therefore, that a high level of institutionalisation (i. e. a widely 
accepted and well consolidated union-based labour regime) enhances union 
bargaining power, although the scope for union intervention in the politics of most 
African countries varies with the nature of the state and state-society relations, as 
influenced by political experiences, colonialism, wars, social divisions, civil strife, 
militarism, dictatorship, foreign intervention, etc., and affects the way industrial 
relations is regulated. 
X. The legal context of bargaining 
According to Singh and Dannin (2002) this refers specifically to the prevailing 
legislations that establish the rules of the game between unions and employers on 
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the one hand and employers and employees on the other hand, particularly as they 
relate to the right to organise and bargain collectively, union recognition, the 
process of collective bargaining itself, as well as the grievance procedure, dispute 
resolution and arbitration. According to Cook and Murphy, 2002, the nature of the 
regime in power influences the type of legislation the government enacts to 
regulate industrial relations and moderate the balance of power between trade 
unions and employers. Where the regime is a democracy, it encourages 
consultation and dialogue under the rule of law. A military dictatorship, on the 
other hand tends to regulate the industrial relations process by fiat with 
intimidation, repression and confrontation the hallmark of state industrial relations 
policy. 
1.4.1.1. Empirical measurement of bargaining power 
It is worthy of note at this stage that disciplinary procedure and communication are 
not central to the measurement of bargaining power and will not be employed as 
analytical variables in this study. It is equally important to note that other factors 
discussed above do not translate on their own into empirical measures of 
bargaining power. The question therefore, is: how can these analytical vanables 
translate into empirical measurements of bargaining power? Scott M. Fuess, Jr. 's 
(2001, p. 5) formula for measuring bargaining power will be adopted in this study 
in order to translate these factors into empirical measures. 
Scott M. Fuess, Jr. (2001, p. 5) advocates a formula that is based on the premise 
that organised labour can be considered more powerful the closer it comes to 
obtaining its initial demands. In order to gauge a union's power to influence a 
contract to its liking, the author compares the settlement (or contract) wage with 
the union's original demand. The more the leverage a union has in bargaining, the 
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closer the contract wage (w) will be to the union's demand (d). So union leverage 
(? ) can be indexed as: 
? :: = (w/d) x 100. 
According to Scott M. Fuess (2001, p. 8) if unions and firins have routinely 
achieved harmony in their wage negotiations, ? will be fairly steady over time. 
However, if consensus is reallsed simply by splitting their differences, ?= 50, 
meaning unions obtained half of the amounts demanded. If, on the other hand, 
unions are not keen to press their demands, ?< 50. If union leverage is eroded 
along with the decline in union density, then ? should fall for the latter years of the 
sample. Every time contractual pay growth falls by at least one percent, union 
power is assumed to have dropped. Conversely, union leverage improves every 
time pay growth accelerates by at least one percentage point. 
In the opinion of this Author, Scott's M. Fuess Jr. 's (2001) fonnula is only 
relevant for an empirical measurement of bargaining power within the context of 
market forces. It will therefore, be adopted in this study to empirically measure 
post-privatisation bargaining power in Nigeria's finance and petroleum industries 
under market conditions, although cognisance will be taken of political and legal 
factors. For the pre-privatisation period where decisions at the enterprise level are 
based more on non-economic factors, political and legal factors will be used as 
basis for measuring the balance of bargaining power, with due cognisance taken of 
relevant macroeconomic factors. 
1.4.2. Collective bargaining 
Simply defined, collective bargaining is the negotiation of work conditions on 
behalf of workers and employers by their respective organisations at different 
levels- the firm level, the industry level and the regional/national level (Aidt and 
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Tzannatos, 2002). According to Aidt and Tzannatos (2002, p. 81) the importance 
of collective bargaining can be measured by union density, i. e. "the number of 
workers who are members of a union, as a percentage of all workers or total labour 
force unionised and non-unionised" and bargaining coverage, i. e. "the number of 
workers, unionised or not, whose pay and employment conditions are deten-nined 
by a collective agreement, as a percentage of all workers, unionised and non- 
unionised". 
According to Rainsberger (2003) collective bargaining is said to be centralised 
when national union confederations and the national employers' organisations can 
influence and control wage levels and patterns across the economy. The author 
notes however, that not all local unions approach the collective bargaining process 
with the same scope of institutional power because in some cases a local union 
may be responsible for all aspects of the bargaining process while the national (or 
international union) fills only an advisory, consultative or oversight function. In 
other cases, the bulk of the contract may be negotiated at the national (or 
international) union level with a relatively narrow scope of bargaining left to local 
union negotiators. 
Privatisation, as noted earlier in this chapter, has implications for collective 
bargaining. As noted in section 1.3.4, the ILO (1997, p. 14) for instance concludes 
that privatisation generally affects unionisation, bargaining patterns and collective 
agreements, although the results are fairly mixed. 
1.4.3. Union membership size and finances 
Evidence from the privatisation literature suggests that conceptually, privatisation 
can lead to a reduction in an enterprise's workforce (i. e. employment) in the short- 
run due to the elimination of redundant labour (see Gupta et al, 2003, p. 3, for 
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instance). According to Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999, cited in Gupta et al, 
2003, pp. 3- 4) over the medium-to-long-run period, employment may increase 
alongside efficiency gains at the microeconomic level and increased stability at the 
macroeconomic level. 
Gupta et al. (2003) however, argue that in analysing the impact of privatisation on 
labour, a number of factors need to be taken into consideration. First is the fact 
that the adverse impact of privatisation on employment may seem small as layoffs 
may have been made prior to restructuring. Secondly, new ownership and 
management may lead to an expansion of activities in the privatised enterprises 
and thereby lead to an increase in the workforce over time. This suggests that over 
the three periods- the pre-privatisation, the privatisation and the post-privatisation 
periods- the level of employment in the finn could follow a U-curve, declining 
during the first two periods and increasing at some point during the third period 
(Ibid). 
1.4.4. Wages 
In the literature on wages, a distinction is made between money wages, real wages, 
and labour costs. The ILO (1987, p. 4) defines money wages as payments in cash 
which workers receive for their work, while the goods and services workers buy 
with wages are known as "real" wages. The total value (in money terms) of the 
wages paid by an employer, together with other payments he makes in employing 
workers (like social security payments and training expenditures) are his labour 
costs and constitutes part of the total cost of production. According to the ILO 
(1997, p. 13) however, the impact of privatization on the pay of employees is less 
clear. For some occupations and grades employees' pay may decline, while for 
others it may increase and in others no change in pay occurs. 
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A much clearer and common feature of post-privatisation pay, according to the 
ILO (1997) is the move towards more flexible and individualized remuneration 
systems, in which larger portions of pay are determined by personal performance 
or the firm's profits. Gupta et al. (2003) note equally that privatisation can have 
adverse impact on salary levels and structure, working conditions and pay 
supplements and that for SOEs, privatisation tends to reduce employment and 
wages, at least initially. Over time, however, if a privatised enterprise can expand 
its activities and increase its efficiency, employment and wages are likely to 
increase. 
1.4.5. Grievance/Disciplinary procedures 
In almost all cases of privatisation in both developed and developing economies, 
unions embarked on strike actions. According to the Open World Conference of 
Workers (2002) for instance, privatisation-related strike actions occurred in seý, 'eral 
African nations. For example, in South Africa, the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU) called for a powerful general strike against privatisation 
in August 2001. In Algeria, the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) 
embarked on general strikes against privatisation in 2003. Privatisation-related 
strikes also occurred in Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, and Senegal (Open World 
Conference of Workers, 2002ý downloaded from 
http: //www. owcinfo. org,. ýafrica, 'N', ew%20Conference%2OAppeal.. htni). 
Trade unions and management in unionised companies negotiate grievance/ 
disciplinary procedures at the level of the firm. The negotiated items usually allow 
for any party not satisfied with the outcome of the internally mediated grievance to 
declare a trade dispute. Where a trade dispute is declared, it is regulated by the 
provisions of the relevant national laws. In some countries, management and the 
unions are obliged to deposit any collective agreement for the settlement of 
disputes with the relevant agency. 
1.5. The current study's objectives 
It is important to observe at this stage that the conclusions on the predictive impact 
of privatisation discussed in this chapter are derived largely from Western 
literature. Very little empirical work has however, been done on the impact of 
privatisation on trade unions and employment relationship, particularly in 
developing African countries, which suggests a gap in the literature. This study's 
objective is to contribute towards broadening knowledge in this under-studied 
area. 
A survey of the privatisation literature by this Author reveals that most studies on 
privatisation focus on its theory and/or policy impact (See Kay, 1986, Letwin, 
1988, Vickers and Wright, 1989, Price Waterhouse, 1989, Sheshinski and Lopez- 
Calva, 1999, Noland, 1999, Littlechild, 2000, Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development- OECD, 2000, Brickley and Van Horn, 2000 and 
Megginson and Netter, 2001, for instance) while most studies on its policy impact 
examine either its macroeconomic or microeconomic impact. 
A second category of studies use single or multiple case studies of privatised 
organisations or sectors to elicit its macro and micro policy impacts, or its impact 
on efficiency, firm performance, productivity, structure and managerial functions 
in the privatised SOEs or sectors (see Parker, 1997, Martin and Parker, 1997, 
Ishikawa, 1998, Hulsink, 1999, Cox and Parker, 1999, Frydman, Gray, Hessel and 
Rapaczynski, 1999, Brickley and Van Hom, 2000 and Tian, 2000, for instance). A 
third category of privatisation studies focuses on countries/economic regions (see 
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Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988, Ramanadham, 1989, Vickers and Wright, 1989, 
Majundar, 1999, Pedersim, 2000, Boardman, et al., 2000 and Megginson and 
Netter, 2001, for instance). 
A fourth category of privatisation studies evaluate the effects of government 
versus private ownership (see Peltzman, 1971, Kole and Mulherin, 1997 and 
Megginson and Netter, 2001, for instance) with a fifth category of studies focusing 
on privatisation's impact on equity, i. e. its distributional effects (see Ramanadham, 
1989 and 1995, Chisari, et al., 1997b for instance) while a sixth category of studies 
focuses on methods of privatisation (see OECD, 1993 and 1997, for instance). A 
seventh category of studies involves country-specific surveys of privatisation 
within a historical time-frame (see World Bank, 1995, Politt, 1999, Megginson 
and Netter, 2001 and Parker, 2004 for instance). 
Yet another category of studies focuses on privatisation's impact on industrial 
relations and trade unions. Although growing, compared to other categories of 
privatisation studies however, these are relatively few (See Ferner and Colling, 
1991, Colling and Ferrier, 1995, Pendleton 1999 cited in Arrowsmith, 2003, op cit, 
and Fairbrother, et al., 2002, for instance). Most of such studies use single case 
studies to evaluate privatisation's impact on industrial relations as the principal 
method of analysis (see Colling, 1987 and 1991, Pang Bing- hung, 1993 and 
O'Cornell Davidson, 1993, for instance) while a few study countries or regions 
(see Pedersini, 2000 for instance) or different sectors of an economy (see 
Arrowsmith, 2003, for instance). 
A small number of studies have attempted to break new grounds by evaluating the 
impact of privatisation on unions, as opposed to studies that focus largely on 
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management's perspective (see Colling, 1987, Miller, 1992, ILOý 1997 and 
Pedersini, 2000 for instance). The current study is an attempt to evaluate 
privatisation's impact on industrial relations from both management and trade 
unions' perspectives within a country-specific, cross sectional context. 
According to Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999) most empirical research on 
privatisation generally fall into either the macroeconomic or the microeconomic 
category. These authors note however, that empirically, the microeconomic 
research has faced a severe data availability constraint with the literature (though 
growing) still young. Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999, p. 8) identify three 
groups of empirical studies under the microeconomic strand of research as 
follows: 
1. Those based on firm-specific data in different countries with very small 
samples or case studies (see for instance, Galal, et al., 1994, Eckel, et al., 1997, 
amongst others, cited in Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 1999, p. 8), 
ii. Studies based on a large sample of firms in different sectors of a specific 
country known as within-country studies (See, for instance, LaPorta and Lopez- 
De-Silanes, 1998, etc, cited in Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 1999, p. 8), and, 
III . Cross section analysis of privatised 
firms that are publicly-traded known as 
cross section studies (See, for example Megginson, et al., 1994, D'Souza and 
Megginson, 1998, and Bourbakri and Cosset, 1998, cited in Sheshinski and Lopez- 
Calva, 1999, p. 8). 
On the other hand, according to Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999) the 
macroeconomic empirical studies (which are more difficult to evaluate) examine 
aggregate measures like public sector financial health, the capitalisation of the 
55 
stock market and their evolution during the reform period. They note however, that 
it is difficult to aggregate the effects of prvatisation on variables like Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth, employment level, and fiscal deficit due to the 
diversity of macro-level events taking place simultaneously. 
Kiken and Nellis (2001, p. 7) on the other hand, group the supporting studies on 
the impact of privatisation into five categories, as follows: 
1. Most assessments of privatisation which examine financial and operational 
performance at the enterprise level, comparing productivity and profitability 
before and after sale, changes in output, investments, capacity utilisation, etc; 
A limited but growing body of work about the fiscal and macroeconomic 
effects of privatisation; 
ill. The rather few studies on its broader welfare and economic consequences; 
iv. A growing number of studies on its employment and broader labour market 
impacts, and; 
V. Studies on its effects on income and wealth distribution- the least studied 
aspects of privatisation but on which considerable work is now in progress. 
The current study falls under the fourth group of studies and aims to contribute to 
current knowledge in the area of privatisation's impact on trade unions and 
employment relationship. In order to justify its relevance, an appraisal of some 
earlier studies of the same genre is imperative. Bing-hung (1993) for instance, 
examines the process of change in industrial relations in the public sector arising 
from privatisation, using British Rail as a case study. The study focuses on the 
implications of the changing environment precipitated by privatisation for 
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industrial relations and the reaction of rail unions to the changing power 
relationships between unions and management. Based on qualitative methodology, 
it lacks data depth, devoid as it is of interviews with officials of relevant trade 
unions, government, interest groups and British Rail management. 
Miller's (1992) study on the other hand, uses the British Telecommunications (BT) 
as a case study and examines the effects of privatisation on the British National 
Communications Union's (NCU) internal organisation, internal relationships and 
collective bargaining and concludes that privatisation and corporate/technological 
change have fundamentally affected the NCU's conduct of industrial relations, 
pressurised its structure, and altered the bargaining agenda. Arrowsmith's (2003) 
comparative study however, uses case studies of firins in two different sectors (rail 
and electricity)- Virgin Trains and Powergen- to show how privatisation had 
differential impacts because of a combination of sectoral context and strategic 
choice. The author concludes (p. 151) that there is no generic experience of 
privatisation because of variation in sectoral characteristics of the industries 
concerned and the fact that unions and managers have significant scope for 
deciding how they engage each other within a given competitive regulatory 
context. All of these studies were conducted in developed Western economies. 
An additional justification for the current study therefore, lies in the fact that 
Europe and America and the newly industrialised Asian/Latin American nations 
are over-represented in existing studies on the impact of privatisation on trade 
unions and industrial relations. Very few of such studies evaluate developing 
(particularly African) economies, where the labour markets are not as well 
developed (see Jones, Jamal and Gogkur, 1998, for instance). As Kikeri and Nellis 
(2001) observe, most of the growing body of work assessing the impact of 
57 
privatisation in developing countries focus on privatisation's impact on enterprise 
performance (see LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1998 and 1999, Macedo, 2000, 
Campbell-White and Bhatia, 1998, and Boubakri and Cosset, 1997 and 1998, and 
Hailemariam, von Eije and van der Werf, 2000 for instance), its macroeconomic 
and fiscal effects (see Davis, Ossowski, Richardson and Barnett, 2000 and 
Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 1999 for instance) or its welfare consequences (see 
Galal, Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang, 1994 for instance). 
The current study seeks to evaluate the impact of privatisation on trade unions and 
employment relationship in privatised SOEs in two industrial sectors in a 
developing, non-regulatory setting- Nigeria. Its aim is to elicit conclusions that can 
then be tested against the hypotheses derived from some of the conclusions of 
existing literature (based on this Author's reading of the privatisation literature) 
and thus add to current knowledge on the subject matter. It is envisaged that the 
current study will open new grounds for more comparative studies on the impact 
of privatisation on trade unions and employment relationship and thus aid the 
testing of the conclusions of the privatisation literature across different countries 
and economic development contexts. 
Conclusion 
It is evident from the preceding analysis that privatisation theory and its literature 
suggests that the hypothetical interaction between privatisation and industrial 
relations are mediated through issues such as changing ownership and control, 
structure, as well as the nature of the product market and competition, etc. 
However, the literature suggests that such macro-micro interactions are by no 
means universal but are rather mediated by factors other than privatisation which 
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might also be responsible for producing the micro level changes observable In the 
industrial relations of privatised SOEs. 
Certain questions, therefore, emerge from the privatisation theory and literature 
which this study seeks to answer, as follows: 
1. Is there any obvious connection in the theory on privatisation between the 
macro-level change in ownership and control, structure of firm and the nature 
of the product market competition on the one hand, and the micro-level changes 
in industrial relations on the other? 
2. Are there factors responsible for the micro-level changes in industrial relations 
observable in privatised enterprises other than privatisation? 
Although these questions are rooted in the implications of privatisation for 
employment relationship as defined by Western literature, they are relevant to the 
Nigerian experience and constitute the theoretical and analytical reference points 
for the current study, although their implications may not be the same due to 
Nigeria's different environmental and trade union contexts. 
Two hypotheses arise from these two questions that this study seeks to explore, as 
follows: 
1. The employment relationship changes in its expression and management in 
privatised enterprises as a consequence of the change in ownership and control, 
structure and product market competition arising from privatisation. 
Arising from the first hypothesis is a second hypothesis as follows: 
2. The employment relationship in privatised enterprises changes not 
necessarily as a consequence of privatisation, but as a consequence of changes in 
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managerial/corporate strategies, national and firm-level industrial relations policies 
and other environmental factors not related to privatisation. 
There are two sets of concepts embedded in the first hypothesis that this study 
seeks to test. The first set of concepts, represented by the term 'privatisation', 
includes changes in: 
Ownership 
Control 
Structure of the fin-n; and, 
IV. Product market competition. 
The second set of concepts, represented by the term 'employment relationship', 
includes changes in: 
i. The balance of bargaining power between management and trade unions 
11 Collective bargaining 
iii. Union membership size and finances 
iv. Wages; and, 
V. Grievance/ Disciplinary procedures 
Two sets of concepts embedded in the second hypothesis which the current study 
also seeks to translate into operational terms include: 
1. Changes in corporate and management strategies, the firm's industrial 
relations policies arising from post-privatisation restructuring and other 
environmental factors not related to privatisation; and, 
ii. Changes in 'employment relationship' as defined above. 
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It is imperative at this stage to note that these two hypotheses will be tested within 
the context of two economic sectors- Nigeria's finance and petroleum industries. 
An appraisal of the Nigerian context of privatisation and trade unionism is thus 
essential and will be conducted in chapter three. Prior to this however, an 
evaluation of the research programme and methodology will be conducted in 
chapter two. 
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CHAPTER 2- THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, the research programme and methodology adopted In the current 
study, its scope and limitations will be evaluated in two parts. The first part will 
involve a review of the current study's analytical framework in terms of its 
ontological and epistemological assumptions, methodology, preparation and the 
selection of case studies, the negotiation of access, the selection of respondents, 
the research methods employed and the ethical issues faced in the course of the 
research. The research process itself will be reviewed in the second part via an 
appraisal of the interview setting, the interviewing schedule, and the interview 
methods, methodological and field work difficulties, data reduction, analysis and 
interpretation as well as the study design and structure. 
2.2. The Study's Analytical Framework 
2.2.1. The ontological and epistemological assumptions of the study 
The current research is situated within the context of the constructivist 
(interpretive) paradigm. Its ontological assumptions are that the social world can 
best be achieved by immersion in some part of it in order to learn the local 
language, meaning and rules (Blaikie, 1993) and that social reality: 
Is reproduced by social actors (in this case management and trade unions). 
ii. Is a pre-interpreted, inter- subjective world of cultural objects, meanings and 
social institutions with multiple realities. 
iii. Occurs in wider social conditions of which social actors may not be fully or 
even partly aware (Burrell and Morgan 1979, p. 203, parenthesis mine). 
Three fundamental epistemological assumptions- a holistic view, an inductive 
approach and naturalistic inquiry (Rudestam and Newton 1992, p. 32) underlie the 
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current study as follows: 
i. A holistic view 
The study seeks to understand the experiences of trade unions in privatised 
enterprises. 
11 . An inductive/deductive approach 
The study is premised upon specific observations aimed at the development of 
general patterns from the cases under study. 
III 
. Naturalistic inquiry 
The study involves a 'discovery-oriented' approach (Rudestam and Newton, 1992) 
in evaluating the phenomena in their natural environment. Unlike purely positivist 
research, it does not seek to employ controlled conditions and a limited set of 
outcome variables. 
In addition to the above-mentioned, the current study is premised on certain 
assumptions concerning human nature. Based on the voluntarist perception of 
human beings as the creators of their environment (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) it 
perceives the social world as much more subjective than the positivist researchers 
tend to concede and therefore, stresses the subjective experience of individuals (in 
this case, management and trade unionists) in the creation of their social world. 
2.2.2. Research Methodology 
The above-mentioned assumptions account for the adoption of qualitative 
methodology for the collection of data that will assist in an examination of the 
impact of privatisation on trade unions and employment relationship during the 
pre-privatisation and post-privatisation periods. At the heart of this empirical 
exercise are case studies of enterprises drawn from two different sectors of 
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Nigeria's economy- the finance and petroleum industries. In order to 
operationalise the hypotheses that the study seeks to test (discussed in chapter one) 
data was collected from three privatised SOEs based on concepts derived from 
each hypothesis as enumerated in section 1.6 of chapter one. 
The current study thus involves methodological and data triangulation via a 
combination of semi-structured interviews with a representative sample of 
management and trade union representatives, official data from government, 
company and trade union records, and data from newspapers, academic journals 
and publications, the internet and existing literature. The interviews were taped 
and transcribed with a view toward yielding relevant qualitative data. These data 
were then tested against the theoretical conclusions generated from the 
privatisation literature as represented by the two hypotheses discussed in section 
1.6 of chapter one. 
The study therefore, comprises of both empirical and analytical aspects. The 
empirical aspect is based on three inter-related and sequential components as 
follows: 
1. Semi-structured interviews with national and company level trade union 
officials and senior management representatives in the selected SOEs; 
ii. An evaluation and analysis of official data from government, company, and 
trade union records as well as data from newspapers, academic journals and 
publications, the internet and existing literature; and, 
iii. A critical sectoral analysis of individual case study data and a comparative 
analysis of both sets of sectoral data. 
2.2.3. Selection of case studies 
Three privatised SOEs were selected, comprised of one commercial bank- FBN 
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Plc, one insurance company- the UNIC Insurance Plc and one petroleum 
marketing company- Conoil (formerly known as National Oil and Chemical 
Marketing Company- NOLCHEM) Plc. The justification for this research sample 
is two-fold. First, the selected companies were chosen to reflect variations in 
sectoral characteristics and in the important dimensions of employment 
relationship (discussed in the literature review chapter) in two industrial sectors 
during three different phases- the pre-privatisation phase, the transition phase and 
the post-privatisation phase. All of the selected enterprises however, share certain 
characteristics. For instance, industrial relations in both industries were regulated 
by the same labour laws. 
The Nigerian federal government also owned majority equity in all three 
enterprises before privatisation and interfered in their board appointments and 
management. However, despite sharing similar characteristics in terms of pre- 
privatisation ownership and control, the selected enterprises differed markedly in 
terms of their pre-privatisation structure, sectoral industrial relations 
characteristics, economic centrality and the nature of their product market 
competition. 
The selected cases are therefore meant to achieve the under-listed: 
i. Assist in evaluating the impact of privatisation on trade unions and 
employment relationship in relation to two contrasting sectors, and, 
ii. Help in eliciting the unique features (i. e. the ideographic characteristics) of 
each case. 
The aim here is to seek explanations for similarities and differences in the impact 
of privatisation on trade unions and employment relationship in the selected 
SOEs 
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and thereby gain a deeper understanding of the phenomena under different 
industrial sector contexts. 
A second justification for the selection has to do with cost. It was not possible in 
view of the constraints of time and money that charactense a study of this nature 
to examine all the III enterprises (Bala 1995, p. 220) privatised under the first 
phase of Nigeria's privatisation programme. The sample selection was therefore 
limited to the two most important sectors of the country's economy, with two 
enterprises (one bank and one insurance company) selected from the finance 
industry, and one selected from the petroleum industry. 
2.2.4. Selection of respondents 
In order to test the causal linkages between privatisation and employment 
relationship as represented by the two hypotheses discussed in chapter one, it was 
important for the Author to collect the following sets of data: 
i. Indicators of the balance of bargaining power between unions and 
employers; 
ii. Indicators of union membership size, finances, density and organisation; 
iii. Indicators of pre/post-privatisation enterprise performance, structure and 
restructure; 
IV. Indicators of the context, nature and processes of collective bargaining; 
V. Indicators of pre/post-privatisation industrial relations practices and their 
implications for trade unions' role. 
The data set collected (quantitative and qualitative) have a historical dimension to 
it and span three distinct time frames- the pre-privatisation, transition and post- 
privatisation periods- and are necessary for establishing the causal linkages 
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between privatisation and employment relationship. The data collection method 
involved a combination of semi -structured interviews of management and trade 
union representatives in the selected enterprises with official company, trade union 
and government records as well as data from newspapers, academic journals and 
publications, existing literature and the internet. 
The Author collected two distinct sets of data (core and background) necessary to 
establish first, whether the hypothetical consequences of privatisation (as 
established in section 1.6 of chapter one) have indeed occurred in the predicted 
directions in Nigeria (in both cases or in one or not at all) and secondly, to 
establish how the privatisation theory can be refined/improved to take account of 
sectoral and other differences as revealed by the two case studies. The core data 
was aimed at establishing the following: 
i. Whether privatisation has in any way led to a change in trade unions' 
bargaining power and structures; 
ii. A shift in the pattern of industrial relations in terms of a change in other 
indicators of employment relationship specified in section 1.6 of chapter one; and, 
iii. The impact (if any) of factors other than privatisation. 
This set of data was collected from interviews with a fully representative sample 
of union Presidents, General Secretaries, branch level union representatives and 
relevant management representatives in the selected enterprises within the 
historical timeframe of the study. On the trade unions side, officials of the under- 
listed unions were interviewed: 
i. National Union of Banks, Insurance, and Financial Institutions Employees 
(NUBIFIE); 
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ii. Association of Senior Staff of Banks Insurance and Financi I 'a] Inst*tutions 
(ASSBIFI); 
iii. National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG); and, 
IV. Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria- 
PENGASSAN (see Appendix 1). 
This selection of interview respondents was considered most appropriate for the 
collection of data required to answer the research questions and test the 
conclusions of the privatisation theory and literature (as represented by the two 
hypotheses deduced from the literature review) for the under-listed reasons: 
1. Semi-structured interviews with a representative sample of principal union 
officials, union shop stewards and management representatives in the selected 
cases (see Appendix 1) was expected to generate the relevant qualitative data 
necessary to test the causal relationship between privatisation, trade unions and 
changes in employment relationship discussed in chapter one and also help in the 
collection and triangulation of data necessary for establishing the indicators of 
union strength, finances and organisation and establish the context and the nature 
of the collective bargaining process. 
11 . interviews with a representative sample of management in the selected cases 
was expected to aid the collection of data necessary for establishing the context 
and nature of change in the process of collective bargaining and industrial relations 
practices and corporate structure as well as their implications for trade unions and 
employment relationship (See Appendix I for details of interviewees). 
A second set of data- essentially background data- was collected through a process 
of data triangulation from newspapers, official records obtained from the relevant 
unions, employers and government agencies, including: 
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1. The Nigeria Employers' Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied 
Institutions (NEABIAI). 
11 . The Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE) and, 
Ili. The Oil Producers' Trade Group (OPTS) - the umbrella organisation for 
Nigeria's oil industry employers. 
Official data was also collected from the Nigeria Labour Congress- NLC (the 
central labour organisation to which all industrial unions in Nigeria are affiliated). 
Data from pre and post-privatisation company records relevant to the study was 
also collected from the three selected enterprises. 
The above-mentioned sources were considered most appropriate for the collection 
of data required to triangulate data obtained from the selected unions and 
management in order to provide value-free answers to the research questions and 
test the two hypotheses deduced from the privatisation literature review discussed 
in section 1.6 of chapter one. Data from official company records, trade unions and 
other relevant organisations are useful for triangulating interview data and 
establishing macro and micro patterns of change in trade unionism and industrial 
relations in the two selected sectors. 
2.2.5. Negotiation of Access/Constraints 
From the onset, this Author recognised the fact that attempts to collect these data 
sets may be thwarted by time and/or travel constraints or by difficulties of access. 
To overcome these anticipated constraints, efforts were made by the Author to 
negotiate access to the selected SOEs through the trade unions, senior staff and 
employers' associations and the management. Letters were sent to relevant 
organisations in Nigeria in 2001 requesting permission to conduct interviews and 
collect data. Informal representations were also made to trade union leaders and 
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officials of employers' representative organisations known to this Author. 
Despite these initial attempts, no official response came from the selected 
enterprises largely due to problems of communication at the Nigerian end. This 
Author therefore, resorted to negotiating access through informal channels via 
contacts in the Nigerian trade union movement and the selected enterprises. 
Finally, the Author visited Nigeria between January and March 2002 for field 
work. A follow-up visit was conducted in August 2005 to collect outstanding 
relevant data. These research methods were considered appropriate because a 
quantitative, structured, interview-based method of data collection alone could not 
help in eliciting the sort of historical data necessary for testing the hypothetical 
causal relationship between privatisation, trade unions and employment 
relationship discussed in chapter one, which constitutes the focus of this study. 
2.2.6. Problems/ethical issues 
This Author was equally aware that qualitative methods of data collection, on their 
own part, have inherent problems. The possibility of bias (by both the researcher 
and respondents) in interviews existed. Moreover, repeat interviews are expensive 
(particularly because of the financial constraints faced by the Author as a privately 
funded researcher) while co-operation may be more difficult to achieve during 
follow-up interview, which could result in a high degree of panel attrition due to 
unwillingness on the part of earlier respondents. 
In order to avoid such obstacles, the Author kept the cost of the research within 
reasonable bounds by guarding against any extended stay In the field and the use 
of proxies thereafter to collect relevant data. To reduce the margin of biased 
interview responses, efforts were made to validate interview responses through a 
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process of data triangulation. Another problem encountered by the Author was the 
initial refusal by some trade union respondents to be tape-recorded. On assurance 
that their anonymity will be guaranteed however, most of them agreed. In the only 
case where objection persisted, the Author manually recorded the interview. Some 
union respondents (particularly national-level union leaders) however, waived 
their anonymity. Where this occurred, it is noted in the study and the data are 
ascribed directly to such respondents. 
In order to reduce the risk of panel attrition, the survey instrument was de- 
personalised. The rights of respondents (as dictated by ethical considerations in 
research) were also explained to them at the onset of interviews and they were 
made aware of the fact that they were not obliged to answer questions they did not 
feel comfortable with and were free to answer any question off record. 
2.3. The research process 
2.3.1. Data gathering 
Approximate time for data gathering was initially estimated at seven months but 
this lasted over one year from 2001 to 2002 and was done in two phases. In the 
first phase of fieldwork (July 2001 to March 2002) access into the case study 
companies was negotiated (between July and October 2001), preliminary data 
from newspapers, existing literature and the internet was gathered and interviews 
conducted in the selected enterprises between January and March 2002. Official 
documents and literature relevant to the research were also collected in addition to 
interviews and evaluated during the first phase. 
The research questions were re-examined based on the initial data gathered and 
where necessary arrangements were renegotiated with informants in order to 
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obtain additional data, while the Author also employed the services of informal 
contacts to obtain data where necessary. A follow-up data gathering exercise was 
conducted in Lagos between 10th and 20th August 2005. Data collection and 
analysis was however, continuous all through the study. 
2.3.2. Data analysis and interpretation 
Data analysis was carried out during and immediately after the fieldwork. The 
transcription of the interview data however, posed a bit of a problem. Because the 
existing transcription softwares are not designed to cope with Nigerian English, 
accents and terminologies of the interview respondents, the Author resorted to 
manual transcription using tape recorders rather than use the Warwick Business 
School's transcription facilities. Laborious as this was, it took months to complete 
and resulted in the generation of an enormous amount of data that was then 
evaluated for relevance. Simple questionnaires were also used to gather relevant 
data that could not be obtained during the first field work. These were sent by 
electronic mail/post or via the Author's contacts (paid and unpaid) to the relevant 
organisations. Observed discrepancies in interview data were also cross-checked 
via the same process. 
The initial plan was to conduct data reduction and interpretation through the use of 
the Nvivo software from May 2002. However, this plan was abandoned in 
preference for manual coding and interpretation due to the Author's realisation 
that the Nvivo software could not capture the totality of the data generated in a 
manner the Author considered most appropriate. Consequently, the Author 
resorted to the method of relative frequencies, i. e. aggregating measures across 
cases (Stake, 1995) which Phillip Runkel (1990, cited in Stake, 1995, p. 36) refers 
to as 'casting nets and testing specimens'. This was employed as the primary 
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method for an initial individual analysis of the finance and petroleum sector cases. 
However, the analysis also involved pressing for an understanding of "the complex 
interrelationship" among the two cases through description (Ibid. ). The aim was to 
treat the uniqueness of individual cases and contexts as important to an 
understanding of the phenomena of privatisation while at the same time trying to 
find the most general and pervasive explanatory relationship between the two 
cases, in order to establish their relevance (if any) to one another and elicit patterns 
of unanticipated relationships (Ibid. ). 
In order to achieve this aim, data collected in the course of the research were 
manually coded based on the analytical variables derived from conclusions of the 
literature - the balance of bargaining power, union membership size and finance, 
etc., discussed in section 1.4 of chapter one. Each set of data for every variable 
was then divided into subsets and further sub-coded on historical basis- pre- 
privatisation, transitional and post-privatisation- for each case. Each set of raw 
data was then analysed under various possible interpretations and patterns of data 
elicited (whether or not indicated by the research issues) with linkages sought 
between the disaggregated raw set of data and the analytical variables. 
Tentative conclusions and draft chapters were then drawn up and organised on the 
basis of research issues derived from the two hypotheses the study seeks to test. 
The draft chapters were subsequently reviewed in line with observations raised by 
supervisors, new data was gathered where relevant to triangulate or enrich the 
chapters with a conscious effort made to deliberately seek disconfirmation of the 
research findings (Ibid. ). Throughout the data analysis, the Author continuously 
gathered relevant data on the two cases but made a conscious effort to validate 
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each data set via triangulation. These were then analysed in two draft case study 
chapters and placed side by side in a draft comparative chapter in order to elicit a 
pattern- the similarities and the differences between the two cases. All the draft 
chapters were subsequently reviewed, edited and fine-tuned and the outstanding 
grey areas updated. With due consideration given to relevant up to date data, a 
final draft of the thesis was then written up for submission in readiness for the 
presentation and defence of the key research findings. 
2.3.3. Study Design and Structure 
The current study will attempt to paint a broad picture of the impact of 
privatisation on trade unions and employment relationship in Nigeria's finance and 
petroleum industries under five sections, as follows: 
I An appraisal of the situation before privatisation through an evaluation of 
measures employer and union power (i. e. the balance of bargaining power 
including the political and legal contexts of power), collective bargaining, 
union membership size and finances, wages and grievance/disciplinary 
procedures; 
11 An evaluation of the situation after privatisation using similar indicators as in 
(i) above; 
nents that could be attributed to ... An identification of those change elen 
privatisation by relating them to specific proposals from finance employers and 
their strategic proposals for restructuring the privatised SOEs, i. e. the post- 
privatisation corporate strategies of the new companies. This will involve an 
assessment of the extent to which changes identified can be explained by the 
new companies' post-privatisation corporate strategies. 
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iv. An analysis of those changes that appear to be related to factors other than 
privatisation, and, 
V. Finally and by way of conclusion, an assessment of the overall impact of 
privatisation on trade unions and employment relationship. 
The analysis will involve an evaluation of trade unions and employment 
relationship before and after privatisation at both macro and micro levels based on 
the adopted analytical variables defined in chapter one. An overview of the 
Nigerian context of privatisation and trade unionism (conducted in chapter three) 
is therefore important as this will serve as a background to an understanding of the 
privatisation-related changes that may eventually be identified in the course of the 
current study. 
The finance and petroleum case studies are evaluated in chapters four and five 
respectively. In chapter six, the findings of these two chapters are comparatively 
evaluated and by way of conclusion, the study's key points are recapitulated, its 
theoretical perspectives restated, its contribution to the privatisation literature 
discussed, while issues and themes for future research are identified. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT OF PRIVATISATION 
I. Introduction 
In this chapter, an appraisal of the environmental context of Nigeria's privatisation 
programme will be conducted in two parts. The first part will involve a 
reconstruction of the programme's environmental context - political, economic and 
industrial relations. In the second part, the programme's background, objectives, 
implementation and problems will be discussed. 
3.2. The Environmental Context 
Nigeria's privatisation programme is comprised of a complex interplay of 
political, economic, industrial relations and managerial contexts, each of which 
portends implications for employment relationship in the country's privatised 
SOEs. These factors are examined below. 
3.2.1. The political context 
Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation, comprised of 36 States and the Federal 
Capital Territory of Abuja, became independent of British colonial rule on October 
1,1960 and a Republic in October 1963. Situated on the West Coast of Africa, the 
country has a population of 88.99 million (1991) and occupies a land area of 
923,768 square kilometres (Federal Office of Statistics- FOS, 1998). Since 
independence, Nigeria has been ruled intermittently by the military for 29 years 
and by democratically-elected governments for only 16 years. 
The political context of Nigena's pnvatisation has two dimensions- geo-political 
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and labour. With regard to the geo-political dimension, privatisation of SOEs 
engendered an atmosphere of mutual suspicion amongst Nigeria's numerous 
ethnic groupings, each of which fear the domination of the economy by the other 
groups (Bala, 1995). As noted by Akhaine (2001) for instance, the participation of 
Northern States of the country in the first phase of the exercise was low compared 
to the much more westernised southern states. In order to assuage fears of 
domination by any ethnic grouping, the BPE evolved a system aimed at ensuring 
distributional equity in share acquisition. Under the system, shares were allotted to 
Nigerians on State quota basis. Where the citizens of a state do not buy the shares 
allotted to it, such shares were sold to that state's investment company (Bala, 
1995). Moreover, under the provisions of the Privatisation Act of 1999, shares 
were strictly and equally allotted amongst Nigeria's federal constituencies, with 
only Nigerian residents in those constituencies aged 18 and above eligible to buy 
shares. 
The total number of shares owned by the state governments in the privatised 
enterprises was however, insufficient to enable them exert any appreciable 
influence on the privatised SOEs, while individual Nigerian share holders were 
dispersed and could not effectively advocate their interests. With no single 
Nigerian shareholder (including state institutions) holding up to 4% of the total 
shares of privatised SOEs, foreign shareholders (whose equity holding in some of 
the privatised enterprises date back to the pre-privatisation era) had majority 
control despite the provisions of the 1999 Privatisation Act (Ibid. ). Foreign 
shareholders' dominance of most of the privatised SOEs however, changed with 
the sale of majority equity to Nigerian core investors by the BPE. 
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Prior to the latter development, the defunct Technical Committee on Privatisation 
and Commercial i sati on (TCPC) was confronted with the problem of articulating 
the rights of individual Nigerian shareholders, especially as it relates to 
appointments to the boards of privatised enterprises and ensuring equitable 
distribution of board membership based on Nigeria's plural context. Consequently, 
the TCPC promoted the formation of Zonal Shareholders Association in 1991 to 
organise individual Nigerian shareholders into formidable groups in privatised 
enterprises. The Association's objectives are as follows: 
1. To undertake the education and enlightenment of Nigerian shareholders and 
to stimulate their interest in the affairs of their companies. 
11 . To facilitate shareholders' participation 
in corporate decision making 
through regular attendance at annual general meetings. 
Ill. To nominate shareholders' representatives to serve on the Boards of 
Directors of privatised companies, and, 
iv. To facilitate easy access by individual shareholders to information for the 
purpose of claiming their dividends and scrip share certificates (Bala 1995, p. 
219). 
Geo-political considerations aimed at achieving distributional equity also resulted 
in substantial part-ownership of some privatised enterprises by State (regional) 
governments. In order to ensure plural spread in board membership in the 
privatised SOEs and nation-wide participation in the affairs of the Shareholders 
Association, the BPE which succeeded the TCPC divided the country into seven 
geographical zones with equal representation on the boards of privatised 
enterprises, irrespective of the percentage of shares owned by shareholders in each 
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zone. According to Bala (1995, p. 219) 100 seats on the boards of privatised 
companies were allocated to shareholders in the seven Zonal Associations as at 
1995, with an estimated 300 board membership seats expected to be taken over by 
these associations by the time the allotment of shares of privatised enterprises is 
completed. 
With regard to the labour-political dimension of Nigeria's prIvatisation 
programme, opposition by trade unions was initially very strongly expressed by 
the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) and the Senior Staff Association of Statutory 
Corporations and Government-owned Companies (SSASCGOC). At the fifth 
triennial delegates' conference of the SSASCGOC for instance, both unions 
threatened strike action over the government's proposal to pnvatise the National 
Electric Power Authority (NEPA), Nigerian Telecommunications Limited 
(NITEL), Nigerian Postal Services (NIPOST), Nigeria Ports Authority (NPA), 
Federal Aviation Authority of Nigeria (FAAN), Federal Housing Corporation 
(FHA) and the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) which were initially 
slated for commercialisation based on the under-listed reasons: 
1. The absence of a credible valuation of assets of the companies to be 
privatised. 
ii. Non-formulation of a legal framework in line with Nigeria's present 
democratic political dispensation for the privatisation exercise (the existing legal 
framework is a decree enacted by the defunct military administration). 
iii. Non-representation of senior workers in the privatisation scheme (Akhaine, 
2001). 
IV. The unserious attitude of the BPE to labour issues, and, 
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V. The determination of the BPE to sell off public assets under the scheme 
within an unrealistically short period (Ogidan, 2001). 
Nigerian unions initially perceived their role in privatisation in tenns of stopping 
4c any attempt to mortgage the future of Nigerians alive and unborn" by the BPE 
which the unions saw as engaging in "sheer asset stripping devoid of 
transparency" (Ogidan, 2001) due largely to their pol i tic ally-motivated preference 
for government ownership of public enterprises and their role ag representative 
agencies that represent their members and the down-trodden populace as well. The 
NLC, for example, has a political mandate to protect all workers like in the French 
industrial relations model, unlike in the Bntish model where unions have a 
political mandate to protect only their members' interests. 
The culturally- specific context of the nature of trade unions' opposition to 
privatisation and particularly the dynamics of union mobilisation in Nigeria where 
unions do not ballot their members before embarking on strike actions are also 
relevant to an understanding of the unions' initial political ly-motivated opposition. 
Unlike the case in the U. K, where mobilisation is usually premised on how the 
issues involved will affect the members, in Nigeria, this Author's experience 
indicate that strikes can be deployed as a political weapon as happened over the 
annulled June 12,1993 Presidential elections. Despite Nigerian unions' opposition 
however, the privatisation of some SOEs went ahead and was intensified when the 
leadership of the NLC, NUPENG and PENGASSAN were proscribed by the 
country's military dictators between 1994 and 1997. The unions eventually 
modified their opposition to privatisation following the election of new democratic 
union leaders in 1998 when the NLC President was co-opted into the National 
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Privatisation Commission. 
While the NLC's initial opposition was motivated by ideological considerations, 
pragmatism appears to have played a major role In its eventual support for 
privatisation. Nigerian unions were however, not unanimous in supporting 
privatisation. For example, the then NLC Deputy President who was also the 
General Secretary of the Nigerian Union of Electricity Workers (NUEW) and his 
union strongly opposed privatisation and threatened to plunge the nation into total 
darkness if the government goes ahead to privatise NEPA (Inte-rview with the 
NUEW General Secretary, 2002). 
The petroleum industry unions (supported by the NLC) were also opposed to the 
privatisation of the NNPC and its subsidiaries. Privatisation in the context of the 
downstream sector of Nigeria's oil industry took the form of opening up access to 
the resource to the private sector via full privatisation of SOEs in the industry's 
downstream sector. Ownership of the oil and natural gas resources however, 
remains vested in the Nigerian State, represented by the NNPC. In 2001, the 
government proposed the partial privatisation of subsidiaries of the NNPC by 
offering 40 percent equity to strategic investors and 20 percent to the general 
public, with the Federal Government retaining 40 percent. The enterprises include 
the Port Harcourt Refinery I and 11, the Kaduna Refinery and Petrochemicals, 
Eleme Petrochemicals, Pipelines Products and Marketing, Company Limited, the 
Nigerian Petroleum Development Company Limited and Nigeria Gas Company 
Limited. The NNPC itself was slated for full privatisation same as the II oil 
service companies in which it has shares (El-Rufai, 2001, p. 4). 
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The government's plan was strongly resisted by NUPENG and PENGASSAN 
which embarked on two days nationwide 'warning' strike in September 2002. 
Consequently, the government reached an agreement with the two unions and 
other stakeholders in the industry at a conciliatory meeting held on 29th December 
2003 where it was agreed (amongst other things) that the strategic partnering 
option proposed by the trade unions will be adopted and competent and credible 
investors will be allowed to acquire 51% equity in the NNPC, with the government 
retaining 49% (PENGASSAN, 2003b, p. 1). The government has so far been 
unable to privatise the NNPC and its subsidiaries due to the unions' opposition. 
3.2.2. The economic context 
Nigeria is the sixth largest producer of crude oil in the world and also the largest 
domestic market in sub-Saharan Africa. A member of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Nigeria depends largely on the petroleum 
sector from which it derives between 90 and 95 percent of export revenues, over 
90 percent of foreign earnings and nearly 80 percent of government revenues 
(Johnson, 2003, p. 1, Tables 29,30 and 31). Agriculture, previously the mainstay 
of the economy, employs about two-thirds of the labour force but accounts for 
about 31 percent of Gross Domestic Product (FOS, 1998). 
The unexpected increase in oil prices in 1973 led to a lot of developmental projects 
in Nigeria, with a boom in both private and public sector employment 
opportunities. Large numbers of industrial establishments were established 
alongside significant improvements in infrastructure (Fashoyin, 1980). In 1986 
however, as a result of increasing economic pressures arising from a sharp fall in 
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oil prices, a structural adjustment programme (SAP) was introduced by the 
government, resulting in a period of relative fiscal austerity in the late 1980s, ýN,, ith 
the government running huge budget deficits up to 1995. Consequently, the 
manufacturing sector's contribution to the country's GDP declined from 7.17 
percent in 1994 to 6.90 percent of the country's GDP in 1998 at 1984 constant 
factor cost (FOS, 1998, p. 17). Industrial capacity utilisation also declined due to 
poor infrastructure, the devaluation of the Naira (Nigeria's currency unit) and the 
negative effects of the SAP. This economic downturn impacted on Nigeria's 
industrial relations, particularly in the area of redundancy and staff rationalisation 
in her public and private sectors. 
Four aspects of Nigeria's economy portend critical consequences for newly- 
pnvatised enterprises. The first is the dwindling fortunes of the manufacturing 
sector since the 1990s, which, in the 1995-97 plan period, achieved a negative 
cumulative growth rate of -3.77 percent (National Planning Commission, 1998, p. 
4). The second aspect is the negative effects of the country's economic adjustment, 
which in combination with the third factor- the dwindling revenue from oil- 
resulted in high unemployment rate and a decline in real wages as a result of the 
devaluation of the national currency. 
Fourth are the responses that these developments have in tum elicited from 
employees and their unions, which took the form of demands for increases in 
wages and other emoluments, with serious implications for employment 
relationship. In the wake of SAP in 1986 for example, 87 trade 
disputes were 
declared by the trade unions (as opposed to 77 in 1985). Of this number, 53 
resulted in strike actions (as opposed to 40 in 1985) with 461,345 man-days 
lost 
83 
(Central Bank of Nigeria, 1986, pp. 43 and 45). The public sector in particular was 
worst hit by strike actions due to the non-payment of outstanding arrears of 
salaries and fringe benefits and negotiated increases in basic salaries. 
It is evident from the foregoing that economic variables have a direct bearing on 
the conduct of industrial relations in Nigeria. At different times in the country's 
history, workers have based their demands for a review of the reward system on 
adverse economic conditions as evidenced by the July 2000 minimum wage strikes 
across the country. On the part of employers, particularly in the private sector, 
downsizing has oftentimes been premised on adverse economic conditions which 
in the extreme of cases, have resulted in factory closures. Sometimes, the review 
of collective agreements is made conditional upon "an improvement in the 
economy and the operations of the companies" (Imoisili, 1984, p. 385). 
Another notable feature of the economic context of Nigeria's privatisation is the 
large extent of government involvement in the economy. The latter has its root in 
the massive accumulation of oil revenue by government as a result of the oil price 
increases of the early 1970s and 1980s. According to Nambudiri and Iyanda 
(1986) the government owned 14 companies exclusively, and was in joint venture 
agreements with foreign partners in 27 others. Additionally, the government 
owned a minimum of 60 percent in financial institutions, 55 percent in the oil 
sector and an average of about 49 percent in insurance companies, with a total 
investment estimated at $1,275 million (Damachi and Siebel, 1986, p. 94). The 
magnitude of government ownership of SOEs resulted in its control of their 
Boards of Directors, with board appointments in many of these enterprises used 
for granting political favours. Such political interventions in the affairs of SOEs 
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were often at variance with their strategic objectives, 
The inadequacy of infrastructures crucial for efficient business operations is 
another relevant aspect of Nigeria's economy worthy of mention. This situation 
explains the predominance of labour intensive operations in most enterprises, 
although the picture is changing gradually in the banking and oil industries where 
new technologies are increasingly being introduced and operations computensed. 
Technological inadequacies result in higher costs of manufacturing goods relative 
to imported products largely as a result of the inadequacies in the production and 
supply of electricity, water, and communication services. Such high costs of goods 
often result in stock-piled inventories and dwindling profit margins for 
manufacturers who in turn sometimes resort to redundancy as a survival strategy. 
3.2.3. The industrial relations context 
Historical evidence suggests that collectivism as the dominant form of industrial 
relations in Nigeria has its origin in the colonial era. The first attempt at formal 
joint machinery for collective bargaining between representatives of the Nigerian 
government and workers took place in 1942 when the composition of the country's 
Provincial Wages Committees (set up in 1937) was enlarged to include 
representatives of workers (Yesufu, 1962). These Committees were responsible for 
setting wage levels in different parts of the country in accordance with prevailing 
local conditions. The establishment of the Whitley Councils A and B, which cut 
across government departments and the provinces and covered workers in the 
clerical and manual cadres respectively followed later. These councils were 
reconstituted in 1951 and became the machinery for collective bargaining in the 
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public sector, with the departmental committees remaining as in-house grievance 
and consultative bodies (1bid. ). 
In the immediate post independence era, this practice was reconsidered by the 
governm ent-establ 1 shed Morgan Commission of Inquiry (1963 to 1964), which 
recommended a restructuring of the relevant machinery into: 
1. Whitley Councils A and B dealing respectively with the salaries, wages and 
conditions of service of all categories of senior and junior staff in the civil service, 
and, 
ii Separate National Joint Negotiating Machinery for all categories of local 
authority staff, teachers and the statutory corporations and parastatals respectively, 
radio and television marketing boards, and finance corporations, electricity, 
railway, ports and coal (Yesufu, 1991). 
However, the government committed itself to the principle of National Joint 
Industrial Councils (NJIQ specifically for the private sector and, by extension, the 
public sector (Ibid. ). Fashoyin (1980) notes that the failure of this practice led the 
Udoji Commission established in the 1970s to support the establishment of the 
National Public Service Negotiating Council responsible for regulating wages, 
arbitration, and centralisation of the machinery of negotiation. Meanwhile, the 
unprecedented increase in number of trade unions prior to 1978 made negotiations 
difficult and created an unstable industrial relations climate characterised by wild 
cat strikes and other forms of trade union actions. 
Consequently, the number of unions in the country was ratIonalised by 
government via the promulgation of the Trade Unions Decree No. 31 of 1973. The 
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decree increased the minimum size of a union to fifty and made major 
fundamental requirements in the internal administration of unions, particularly in 
the areas of union democracy and accountability. This decree was followed by the 
Trade Unions Amendment Decree No. 22 of 1978 that sought to enhance union 
solidarity and introduced a compulsory check-off system to make the unions 
financially viable. According to Fashoyin (1980, p. 27) with this development, the 
role of government in industrial relations in Nigeria moved from "persuasive 
intervention" to "imposed limited intervention" due to what the government 
perceived as the unions' inability to bring about its dream of relative industrial 
peace, given their fierce ideological and jurisdictional struggles and 
factionalisation. 
Unionism was however, not limited to workers alone. By 1954, eight employers' 
associations existed (Ibid. ) most of which were primarily interested in regulating 
trade practices and in providing friendly services, with only two- the Nigerian 
Plantation Employers' Association and the Nigerian Mining Employers' 
Association- interested in the conduct of collective relations with employees 
(Yesufa, 1962 cited in Fashoyin, 1980, p. 27). However, many employers at the 
time preferred to handle labour relations on an individual enterprise basis and were 
unwilling to discuss their industrial relations practices with one another on the 
assumption that it will amount to revealing the secret of their success. 
Moreover, 
with the fragmentation of the labour movement into well over 
1000 unions before 
1978, micro level union membership was not significant enough to pose a threat to 
employers' interests (FashoYin, 1980). 
The 1978 Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree eventually increased employers' 
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awareness of the increasing strengthening of the improved organisation and 
bargaining power of employees. Under the terms of the 1978 labour decree, the 
government merged the existing four central labour organisations into one (the 
NLC) and restructured the over 1000 previously registered unions into 42 
Industrial unions. This number was later reduced to 41 when the Customs and 
Excise Workers Union was classified as essential service and de-registered. Four 
professional unions, fifteen unions for senior management and nine employers 
associations were also created under the 1978 decree (Fashoyin 1980, p. 33) with 
employers associations increasing to 22 by 1987 (Imoisili, 1987). 
The 1978 Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree extended all the rights and 
obligations that apply to trade unions to employers' organisations interested in 
collective bargaining, including access to the mediation and conciliation services 
of the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) and the National Industrial Court- NIC 
(Ibid. ). As Damachi (1986, p. 120) notes however, the 1978 trade unions 
restructuring made unions "virile and solvent" and a "threat to government and 
employers" as evidenced by the high incidence of strikes in the early 1980s. In 
2005, the Federal Government deregulated trade unionism and registered the 
Trade Union Congress (TUC) as an umbrella body for Senior Staff Associations. 
Generally, industrial relations in Nigeria before privatisation was characterised by 
the under-listed: 
i. The right of association 
Nigerian workers (except members of the armed forces and essential services' 
employees) were free to join trade unions (in line with the ILO's convention 87 on 
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freedom of association to which Nigeria is a signatory) and embark on strike 
actions. Under the provisions of the country's labour laws, any enterprise that has 
more than fifty employees was obliged to recognise trade unions and pay or deduct 
check-off dues in respect of its employees who are members to the union. 
The right to organise and bargain collectively 
Both management and employees were permitted under the country's labour laws 
to exercise these rights. Additionally, workers' rights were reinforced through the 
Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) and National Industrial Court (NIC) that handle 
complaints of anti-union discrimination and by ILO's convention 98 on the right to 
organise and bargain collectively to which Nigeria is a signatory. The government 
however, retained broad authority over labour matters and intervened in labour 
disputes that it considered a threat to its economic or political objectives. 
iii. Prohibition of forced or compulsory labour 
The 1974 labour decree and Nigeria's constitution both prohibit forced labour and 
this was generally observed in practice by employers. 
iv. Conditions of work 
The Factories Act 1976 prescribed a forty-hour work week, two to four weeks of 
annual leave and overtime payment for extra hours worked above the legal limit, 
with workers who work on Sundays and legal public holidays paid a full days 
wage in addition to their normal wages. The government was also permitted by 
law to set a minimum wage for the country. Additionally, the 1976 Factories Act 
provided guarantees for workers health and safety, as well as compensation in the 
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event of death arising from work. 
It is imperative at this stage to emphasise the fact that there are no historical 
differences in public and private sectors' industrial relations in Nigeria before 
privatisation, although differences exist in the nature and practice of collective 
bargaining in both sectors. Collective bargaining in the private sector was an 
outcome of negotiations between management and trade unions, while the State 
was the key actor in public sector collective bargaining. The Nigerian government 
did not however, engage in negotiations with public sector unions under the aegis 
of the National Joint Negotiating Councils. Rather, the government arbitrarily 
legislated wage awards without bargaining with public sector unions. Before 
privatisation however, the government was perceived as a good employer which 
provided secure jobs up to retirement age. 
3.3. A reconstruction of Nigeria's privatisation programme 
In order to understand Nigeria's reason for privatising SOEs however, a 
reconstruction of its background, its objectives, implementation and problems is 
important. 
3.3.1. Background to privatisation 
In compliance with International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank 
conditions/guidelines on debt rescheduling, Nigeria accepted in principle to 
deregulate its economy and privatise most of its SOEs. A number of factors 
informed this decision. First was the need to promote economic recovery by 
removing the financial burden which the SOEs constituted on the public and 
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thereby release resources for the essential functions of government (Obasanjo. 
1999). As Nigeria's President Obasanjo (1999, p. 1) noted at the inauguration of 
the National Council on Privatisation (NCP); 
"It is estimated that successive Nigerian governments have invested up to 800 
billion Naira (about E4 billion at the time) in public-owned enterprises. Annual 
returns on this huge investment have been well below 10 percent. These 
inefficiencies and , in many cases, huge losses are charged against the public 
treasury... State enterprises suffer from fundamental problems of defective capital 
structure, excessive bureaucratic control or intervention, inappropriate technology, 
gross incompetence and mismanagement, blatant corruption and crippling 
complacency which monopoly engenders. Inevitably, these shortcomings take a 
heavy toll on the national economy. " 
As Anya (2000, p. 1) notes, "The issue of mismanagement and under-utilisation 
which led to huge wastage of resources and manpower potentials gave the 
government of the day no other option but to pursue quickly the privatisation 
programme. ". With over 600 SOEs run or controlled by Nigeria's Federal 
Government and many more owned by the state governments, SOEs consumed a 
sizeable portion of the federal budget, with government appointing over 5000 
loyalists into SOEs' management and Boards. Apart from constituting a veritable 
source of political patronage, transfers to these SOEs (in the form of subsidised 
foreign exchange, import duty waivers, tax exemptions and/or write-off of arrears, 
un-remitted revenues, loans and guarantees, grants and subventions) ran 
into 
billions of Naira. Additionally, most of the SOEs were characterised by abuse "of 
monopoly power, defective capital structure, heavy dependence on treasury 
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funding, rigid bureaucratic structures and bottlenecks, mismanagement, corruption 
and nepotism". 
In 1987, the then military government announced an extensive programme of 
privatisation in which some 67 SOEs were slated for full privatisation. Included in 
this category were hotels, breweries, insurance companies and other light-industry 
enterprises, in addition to 31 heavy-industry SOEs slated for partial privatisation 
under the second phase. The latter include oil marketing companies, steel rolling 
mills, Nigeria Airways, fertiliser companies, paper mills, sugar and cement 
companies (Fafowora, 1998). Under the second phase, 25 other SOEs were to be 
either fully or partially commercialised but were to remain larýwly state-owned, 
amongst which were NNPC, NITEL Ple and NEPA (Ibid. ). 
In March 1988, the then military Head of State promulgated Decree No. 25 (later 
converted to the Public Enterprises Privatisation and Commercialisation Act of 
1999) which gave legal backing to and formally initiated the country's 
privatisation and commercialisation programme, Under the provisions of the 
decree, a total of III enterprises were slated for privatisation, while 35 others 
were to be commercialised. An eleven-man Technical Committee on Privatisation 
and Commercialisation (TCPC) was also established with a broad mandate to 
oversee the programme (Jerome, 2003, p. 7). 
Under the TCPC, public sector reform was conceived under two inter-related 
components- privatisation and cominercialisation. Under the first phase of the 
privatisation exercise (from July 1988 to June 1993) the TCPC privatised 36 SOEs 
through public offer of shares, 4 SOEs through deferred public offer, 8 SOEs 
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through private placement, one SOE through management buy-out and 8 SOEs 
through sale of assets. Additionally, the TCPC sold off the non-water assets of 18 
River Basin Development Authorities (Ibid, p. 2) but was later replaced by the 
NCP and its administrative body - the BPE in 1999. 
The second reason for Nigeria's decision to privatise her SOEs was the need to 
further liberalise her economy by bringing in more service providers and thereby 
encourage increased competition that will help regulate the market for fairer 
pricing and the delivery of quality services. The Nigerian government saw 
privatisation as a means of creating competition in the economy and in order to 
achieve this goal, it abrogated all anti-competition laws in the monopolistic power, 
telecommunications and related sectors, while strengthening some regulatory 
institutions (World Investment News, 2000). 
The third reason was the need to integrate the country's economy into the 
mainstream of an increasingly globalized world economic order. According to 
Nigeria's President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999), this factor has two inter-related 
aspects. First is Nigeria's need for technology, managerial competence and capital 
from the developed world to enhance the performance of public utilities. The 
second aspect is the important linkage between the efficient functioning of 
Nigeria's utilities and her ability to attract foreign investments. 
The fourth reason was the need to satisfy multilateral institutions, particularly the 
World Bank and IMF. Despite claims to the contrary by the government and 
officials of the BPE, the influence of the IMF and World Bank in Nigeria's 
privatisation is evident. For instance, Nigeria relinquished control of and divested 
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her interests in several SOEs through loan arrangements with the IMF (Mutume, 
2001). Moreover, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank 
have been working with the Obasanjo government since May 1999 to privatise key 
infrastructure and have been advising the government on the sale of Nigeria 
Airways and the Lagos State Water Corporation but withdrew from this role in 
May 1999 when Nigeria adopted an open skies policy on Nigeria Airways' against 
the advice of the two multilateral institutions (Ibid. ). 
The influence of multilateral institutions is further evidenced by President 
Olusegun Obasanjo's government's agreement to privatise key SOEs such as 
NITEL and NEPA (earlier slated for commercialisation) under a 12-month, 
US$Ibillion stand-by credit arrangement negotiated with the IMF in 2000 (Ibid. ). 
The IMF and World Bank believe that eliminating structural obstacles through the 
privatisation programme will enhance the revival of Nigeria's economic growth as 
well as create more jobs. Apart from direct involvement by these multilateral 
institutions, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)- a member of 
the World Bank Group involved in the promotion of foreign direct investment in 
developing countries- has also indicated its willingness to offer industrial 
guarantee and technical assistance to Nigeria and has also undertaken to help 
market Nigeria's privatisation programme globally (World Investment News, 
2000). 
In July 1999, the Obasanjo government initiated the second phase of the country's 
privatisation programme. The objective of this second phase, according to 
President Obasanjo (1999, p. 3) was "to assist in restructuring the public sector in 
a manner that will affect a new synergy between a leaner and more efficient 
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government and a revitallsed, efficient and service-oriented private sector". This 
phase of the programme (which remains an ongoing exercise due to 
implementation problems discussed below) was divided into three stages as 
follows: 
1. Phase I- which includes the privatisation of commercial and merchant banks 
and cement plants that were already quoted on the Stock Exchange; 
11 Phase 2- to include hotels and motor vehicle assembly plants; and, 
iii. Phase 3- to include NEPA, NITEL, National Fertiliser Company of Nigeria 
(NAFCON), Nigeria Airways and the petroleum refineries (National Council on 
Privatisation, 2000, p. 6). 
3.3.2. The objectives of Nigeria's privatisation 
The objectives of privatisation under successive Nigerian governments have 
remained largely the same under both military dictatorship and civil democracy. 
These objectives were earlier discussed in section 1.2.3. of chapter one. A repeat is 
therefore, unnecessary in this chapter. 
3.3.3. Implementation and problems 
The government was unable to privatise the huge, capital -intensive industries 
involved in fertiliser, paper and sugar production, vehicle assembly and steel 
production under the first phase of the privatisation programme due largely to their 
state of financial insolvency, negative worth and the government's policy 
inconsistency. Generally, there was a lack of clarity of government's policy on 
some critical issues associated with the programme, which according to Anya 
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(2000), included whether to pnvatise the SOEs 'as is' or rehabilitate them before 
privatisation, whether to relieve the SOEs' managers of their positions before or 
after privatisation, the type of regulatory framework to put in place, whether 
foreigners should be allowed to buy shares under the scheme, the valuation 
methods to be used, the role of foreign core investors in the ownership and 
management of the national economy, loss of jobs resulting from the exercise, 
income inequality arising from the ownership of privatised assets, whether to 
deregulate before or after privatisation, how to utillse the proceeds accruing from 
the exercise, whether government should own 'golden shares' in the privatised 
enterprises, and, how to ensure transparency in the implementation of the exercise. 
The government's policy inconsistency resulted in a general lack of investor 
confidence in the programme and worsened the constraints facing the second 
phase. These constraints, according to Faf6wora (1998, p. 3 5) include: 
i. The failure of government to embark on a successful pre-privatisation 
programme of economic refon-n. 
11 . Its 
failure to implement a change in the structure of incentives, particularly for 
managers of the privatised SOEs, which has encouraged an atmosphere of 
corruption and non-commitment to the growth of the enterprise by such managers. 
iii. Its failure to reform SOEs slated for privatisation, which made most SOEs 
unattractive to investors and a huge financial burden on the state. Moreover, most 
of the SOEs were under-funded, wasteful, grossly inefficient, inadequately staffed 
and subject to undue government interference. 
iv. Extensive graft and official corruption in all of these SOEs which rendered many 
of them financially unviable and unsuitable for privatisation as on-going industries 
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and commercially viable ventures. Uncertain rules, heavy state regulation and high 
discretionary powers of public officials further encouraged corruption in these 
SOEs, gave their officials exceptional powers and provided them opportunities for 
appropriating public wealth. 
v. The poor state of infrastructure available in the country as a result of which 
Nigeria's industrial sector continued to suffer frequent interruption of electricity, 
water, telecommunication, transportation, fuel and gas supply. 
3.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the environmental context of Nigeria's privatisation was appraised 
as a background to an understanding of the nature of and the context within which 
the programme was implemented. However, since the focus of the current study is 
on pnvatised SOEs in Nigeria's finance and petroleum industries, a summary of 
the key sectoral contrasts between the two industries (in terins of their economic 
centrality, ownership, product market and industrial relations characteristics and 
regulation) is essential at this stage. 
Briefly, the two sectors are contrasted in the areas of economic centrality, 
ownership, product market and competition and industrial relations characteristics. 
The key sectoral characteristics of Nigeria's finance and petroleum industries, 
although similar in certain respects, also differ markedly. In both sectors, industrial 
relations is regulated by the same set of labour laws, while the unionisation of 
junior workers is statutorily compulsory but voluntary in the case of senior 
employees, excluding top management. 
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Secondly, before privatisation, SOEs in both sectors were characterised by an 
ownership pattern in which government owned majority equity, with minority 
stakes owned by foreign interests and the Nigerian public. Thirdly, similar 
privatisation methods were employed in both industries- the government divested 
its majority equity holdings in the privatised SOEs to core investors, and allotted 
the remaining shares to the enterprises' employees and the Nigerian public. 
Finally, in both cases, the government did not put an y regulatory regime in place 
to oversee the post-privatisation conduct of the new companies that emerged. 
There are however distinguishing sectoral characteristics unique to each sector. 
For one thing, both industries and their SOEs differ markedly in the nature of their 
centrality to Nigeria's economy. As already noted in section 3.2-3, Nigeria 
depends mainly on the oil industry for a majority of her revenue. The finance 
industry, although important to the nation's economy, is not accorded the same 
stature as the oil sector. Additionally, the petroleum industry was characterised by 
high regulation by government, decentralised collective bargaining and highly 
cohesive trade unions that are the strongest and richest in the country. The finance 
industry, on the other hand, was characterised by centrallsed collective bargaining 
and trade unions (particularly NUBIFIE) which were weakened by a combination 
of intra-union crisis and increasing competition from the largely non-unionised 
'New Generation' financial establishments that emerged following the 
liberalisation of the sector in the mid-1980s. 
There are also marked differences in the ownership and control of product markets 
between both industries. Before privatisation, the product market in the finance 
industry was regulated by market forces. Although the Central Bank of Nigeria 
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supervised the market to some extent, it did not own the product. On the other 
hand, the Nigerian Federal Government controls and owns the country's oil 
deposits and gas reserves one hundred percent. Finally, the two industries differed 
markedly in ten-ns of the nature of competition faced by private companies and 
SOEs operating in each of them. While liberalisation increased the competition 
faced by the private companies and SOEs in the finance industry, market 
competition in the oil industry was not increased by the government's piece-meal 
efforts at liberalising its downstream sector. 
It is important at this stage to note the fact that these similarities and differences in 
the sectoral, characteristics of both industries portend implications for their 
respective unions and industrial relations after privatisation. Because of these 
sectoral contrasts, it valid to examine the impact of privatisation on trade unions 
and employment relations in Nigeria by evaluating the two sectors. This will be 
done in chapters four and five. 
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CHAPTER FOUR- THE FINANCE INDUSTRY CASE STUDY 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will lay out the broad picture of the impact of privatisation on 
trade unions and employment relationship in Nigeria's finance industry (against a 
background of an introduction on the sector and its pre-privatisation industrial 
relations characteristics) under five sections as follows: 
I An appraisal of the situation before privatisation through an evaluation of 
measures employer and union power (i. e. the balance of bargaining power, 
including the political and legal dimensions of power), collective bargaining, 
union membership size and finances, wages and grievance/disciplinary 
procedures; 
11 An evaluation of the situation after privatisation using similar indicators as in 
(1) above; 
III An identification of those elements of change observed in the industry that 
could be attributed to privatisation (as opposed to other factors) by relating 
them to specific strategic proposals from employers for restructuring the 
sector's privatised SOEs, i. e. the post-privatisation corporate strategies of the 
new companies. This will involve an assessment of the extent to which changes 
identified can be explained by the new companies' post-privatisation corporate 
strategies. 
IV. An analysis of those changes that appear to be related to factors other than 
privatisation, and, 
V. Finally and by way of conclusion, an assessment of the overall impact of 
privatisation on trade unions and employment relationship. 
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The analysis will involve an evaluation of trade unions and employment 
relationship at both macro and micro levels of the industry before and after 
privatisation, based on the adopted analytical variables defined in chapter one. 
4.2. An Appraisal Of The Situation Before Privatisation 
The finance sector's pre-privatisation features, its trade unions and employment 
relationship will be discussed in the first part of this section. In the second part, an 
empirical evaluation of the industry's pre-privatisation industrial relations 
characteristics will be conducted (based on measures of employer and union 
power, collective bargaining, union membership size and finances, wages and 
grievance/disciplinary procedures defined in chapter one) within a historical 
context of the period from 1978 to 1989. 
4.2.1. The finance industry before privatisation 
Ikhide (1998) identifies six categories of institutions operating in Nigeria's finance 
industry. These are the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN-the country's apex financial 
institution), commercial and merchant banks, development finance institutions, 
thrift and insurance organisations, two Stock Exchanges, a Securities and 
Exchange Commission and a virile informal financial sector. The number of 
commercial and merchant banks increased from 12 in 1960 to about 120 at the end 
of 1992, with a network of 2,391 branches of which commercial banks accounted 
for 2,275 with 774 of these branches in the rural areas (Ikhide, 1998, p. 6). 
Commercial Banks dominate the Nigerian finance industry and its banking sub- 
sector, accounting for 71.2 per cent of total credit outstanding to the private sector 
in 1993 (Ibid. ). Six Development Finance Institutions also operate in the industry, 
101 
including the Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, the Nigerian Industrial 
Development Bank, the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry, the Federal 
Mortgage Bank, the Nigerian Export-Import Bank (NEXIM) and the Urban 
Development Bank (Ibid. ). These development finance institutions are responsible 
for providing loans and industrial finance by attracting foreign resources, 
mobilising domestic savings and allocating investment funds efficiently. As at 
1993, the share of the assets of these institutions (minus NEXIM and the Urban 
Development Bank) in the total assets of all financial institutions in Nigeria was 
1.7 percent (see Table I). 
The fourth category of financial institutions are specialised banks established at 
the onset of SAP (to cater for the ever increasing credit needs of segments of the 
society not considered lucrative by the commercial and merchant banks) 
comprised of Community Banks (whose capital requirements are provided by the 
communities in which they are located) and Peoples Bank (which caters for the 
needs of small and medium scale entrepreneurs). These specialised banks provide 
credit facilities at grassroots level and promote self reliance. By 1993, there were 
271 Peoples Bank and 879 community bank branches in Nigeria (Ikhide, 1998, p. 
6). 
Thrift institutions are the fifth category and comprise of mainly insurance 
companies, pension funds and savings banks. Insurance companies dominate this 
sub-sector. This category also includes the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund 
(NSITF- formerly known as the National Provident Fund- NPF) a pensions 
institution established in 1961 as a social security scheme with contributions from 
both employers and employees and the Federal Savings Bank established in 1974 
to mobilise savings and encourage thrift, which has since been privatised. 
102 
Some young and small institutions also compete for funds and customers in the 
industry. These include finance, leasing and mortgage companies, savings and 
loans associations and venture capital companies, which came into prominence in 
the SAP era (Ibid. ). As at 1993, about 752 finance houses were in operation 
although only 310 were licensed (Ibid, p. 8). Discount houses (special non-bank 
financial institutions providing discounting/rediscounting facilities in government 
short term securities) also operate in the sector. In 1989, bureaux de change were 
granted licences by the government to broaden the foreign exchange market and 
improve the access of small transactors to foreign exchange at the onset of SAP. 
The National Economic Reconstruction Fund jointly owned by the government, 
the CBN and other foreign partners was also established to bridge the gap in the 
provision of local or foreign funds to small and medium-scale enterprises (Ibid. ). 
It is evident therefore, that Nigeria's finance industry environment was very 
competitive before privatisation. By 1992, the Federal Government had equity 
participation in 14 banks with combined assets equivalent to 51 percent of the 
banking industry's total assets (Nigeria Deposits Insurance Corporation- NDIC, 
1992, p. 47 cited in Brownbridge, 1996, p. 5; Tables 2 and 3). As Brownbridge 
(1996) notes however, the importance of public ownership diminished with the 
growth of the local private sector in the mid 1980s and the sale of the Federal 
Government's equity to the private sector in 1992/93 as part of the privatisation of 
SOEs in the sector. 
Before privatisation, the Federal Government's ownership of banks reinforced the 
controls employed by the CBN to influence resource allocation by the banking 
industry in three aspects of banking policy. First, the Federal Government almost 
entirely indigenised the management of these banks by the end of the 1980s with 
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the exception of only a few specialised posts that were still filled by expatriates. 
Second, these banks were employed by the government as veritable tools for 
ensuring the realisation of government macro-economic objective of establishing 
branches in the rural areas irrespective of profitability. Third, profit-making was 
de-emphasised as the primary motive for credit policies, which were rather 
influenced by 'policy lending', i. e. extending credit to the public sector, to locally 
owned businesses and to the priority 'productive sectors' as set out in the 
government's credit guidelines (Brownbridge, 1996). 
Despite their poor financial performance, the four largest Federal Government 
banks remained solvent and avoided the distress which afflicted many of the state 
government and private sector banks (Business Times, 25/9/95, p 3, cited in 
Brownbridge, 1996, p. 6). These four banks were able to avoid serious trouble 
(despite their bad debts and high overheads) for a number of reasons. First, they 
were run by seasoned management employees who were conscious of foreign 
shareholders' expectations and whose efforts were complemented by experienced 
professional bankers the Federal Government appointed to executive positions in 
these banks. 
Secondly, these banks' portfolio management were generally cautious. The banks 
remained very liquid, restricting loans as a share of total assets to below 40 per 
cent in most years. This had the effect of reducing the adverse impact of non 
performing loans on their balance sheets. Moreover, their size ensured that their 
loan portfolio remained well diversified (Brownbridge, 1996). Thirdly, their 
international links and their historical position as the dominant banks guaranteed 
them a base of "prime" borrowers among multinational companies operating in 
Nigeria. Additionally, competition among the large banks was limited by 
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regulatory controls over interest rates and prior to 1986, by barriers to new entry 
into the industry. These banks' access to public sector deposits (which together 
with interest rate controls that ensured that their average cost of funds was low) 
helped to offset their high overheads. However, extensive bad debts rendered some 
of the smaller federal government owned banks insolvent, although their fragility 
was concealed by a combination of public subsidy and improper accounting until 
stricter prudential standards and financial liberalisation was introduced under SAP 
in 1986 (Ibid. ). 
A combination of government interventionist policies (aimed at controlling 
resource allocation and promoting the indigenisation of the economy) and public 
sector ownership stifled competition in the industry and provided some degree of 
protection for inefficient banks. In addition, policy lending (i. e. loans granted to 
the public sector or to priority sectors in accordance with government credit 
guidelines) resulted in the build up of extensive non-perfon-ning loans in 
government portfolios (Brownbridge, 1996). Generally, before privatisation 
Nigeria's banking industry was afflicted by widespread financial fragility. By 
1995 almost half the total number of banks in operation in Nigeria was either 
distressed or potentially distressed (Ikhide, 1998). As Brownbridge (1996) notes, 
the reforms of the Nigerian financial system in the mid 1980s (i. e. liberalisation 
and privatisation, strengthening the prudential system and the take-over of some of 
the distressed banks by the CBN) were aimed at reshaping the banking markets in 
the direction of efficiency, competition and prudent management. 
Before privatisation, 87 insurance companies operated in Nigeria (in 1987) of 
which 68 were wholly indigenous and 19 were jointly owned by Nigerian and 
foreign interests. The asset share of insurance institutions in the total for all 
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financial institutions was put at 2.1 per cent in 1992 (Mide, 1998, p. 7). 
Government ownership of insurance companies however diminished with the 
privatisation of 13 major insurance SOEs (TCPC, Undated Final Report, pp. 23- 
70). The environmental context of Nigeria's finance industry portends certain 
implications for trade unionism and employment relationship after privatisation. In 
order to elicit the nature of these implications, an overview of the industry's pre- 
privatisation trade unions and employment relationship is essential. 
4.2.2. Over-view of pre-privatisation finance industry trade unionism and 
employment relationship 
Under the provisions of section 24 (1) of the 1978 Trade Unions Act as amended, 
a trade union of which persons in the employment of an employer are members 
was, on registration, guaranteed automatic recognition by the employer (Fashoyin, 
1980). Forty-two industrial unions, twenty-five senior staff associations, and ten 
employers' associations were initially registered as trade unions in the country 
(Fashoyin, 1980). Successive restructuring reduced the number of industrial 
unions to 29 by 1998. 
In the finance industry before privatisation NUBIFIE, ASSBIFI and NEABIAI 
were recognised as trade unions (Ibid. ). In this study, our focus is on the impact of 
privatisation on the NUBIFIE and the ASSBIFI. All unionised junior and senior 
workers in both private and state-owned companies in the industry were members 
of NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI respectively, while NEABIAI represented employers. 
Membership was maintained in the branch of the union at the level of the 
enterprise where the member is employed and a member reserved the right to 
resign from the union on giving a notice of such intention in writing to 
his or her 
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unit Secretary (Ibid. ). 
In both private and the public sectors of the industry, the unions' National 
Executives had responsibility for negotiating collective agreements with 
management while each domestic or branch committee had responsibility for 
negotiating certain internal items. The domestic committees acted as the 
immediate link between the union and the management and advised the unions' 
National Executive Councils (through their General Secretaries) on current 
positions of salaries, wages, fringe benefits and other conditions of service in each 
establishment. 
Collective bargaining was the accepted mode of regulating employment 
relationship in the industry while the substantive terms of the employment contract 
were negotiated jointly by NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI and NEABIAl on behalf of their 
respective members. The only exceptions were the privately-owned 'New 
Generation' banks and insurance companies that emerged in the aftermath of the 
industry's liberalisation from 1986 onwards that introduced individual 
employment contracts in their establishments. The mid 1980s thus witnessed the 
practice of two distinct styles of employment relationships (collectivism and 
individualism) operating side by side in the industry. While the public service and 
SOEs recognised trade unions and accepted collective bargaining, the 'New 
Generation' financial establishments favoured non-unionisation and individual 
employment contracts. 
Where bargaining failed, the trade unions embarked on strikes and other forms of 
industrial actions. Available data indicate that before privatisation, a majority of 
the strikes recorded resulted mainly from industrial relations matters. In the period 
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between 1963 and 1978, for instance, a majority of the strikes recorded were due 
to issues like wages, conditions of service, discipline and ten-nination (See Table 
4). 
4.2.3. An empirical measurement of pre-privatisation finance sector industrial 
relations 
A clearer picture of pre-privatisation industrial relations in the industry will 
however, be better facilitated via an empirical measurement of the sector's pre- 
privatisation industrial relations conducted on the basis of the under-listed factors: 
4.2.3.1. The balance of bargaining power 
As noted in chapter one, market factors are not very relevant for the determination 
of pre-privatisation balance of bargaining power since decisions in most SOEs are 
often-times premised on political factors. In this section, therefore, pre- 
privatisation company performance data for UNIC Insurance Plc and FBN Plc will 
only serve as background data for assessing their post-privatisation perforinance. 
For the purpose of measuring employers and unions' bargaining power in the 
industry before privatisation, our analytical focus will be on non-market factors 
like the identity of the trade unions, union membership and density, the existence 
of alternative wage for union members in the event of a temporary work stoppage, 
union political leverage, the legal context of bargaining as well as macroeconomic 
factors like the economic centrality of the industry/sector and the macro-level 
vacancy/unemployment ratio, as follows: 
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1. The firm's liquid assets 
The liquid assets of FBN Plc (privatised in 1992) between 1984 and 1992, and the 
UNIC Insurance Plc (privatised in 1990) between 1988 and 1990 respectively are 
examined here in relation to their fixed costs, in order to measure their 
hypothetical post-privatisation ability to continue to meet their financial 
obligations following a temporary stoppage. Available data indicate that in 1984, 
the FBN Plc's total assets stood at =N=4.829 million, rising to =N=7.071 million 
in 1988 and =N=8.492 million in 1989. By 1990, the bank's total assets declined 
slightly to =N=8.482 million, rising to =N=16.986 million in 1992 (See Tables 5 
and 6). 
The bank's gross earnings for the same period increased from =N=379.2 million in 
1984 to =N=2.689 billion in 1992, while profit before tax which amounted to 
=N=49.246 million in 1984 stood at a loss of =N=205 million by 1990. In 1991, 
the bank sustained an operating loss before tax amounting to =N=31 million, 
although there was an improvement in profit before tax to =N=366 million in 1992 
(Ibid. ). Profit after tax which rose from =N=29.144 million in 1984 to =N=86.625 
million in 1986, declined to a loss of =N=205 million and =N=31 million in 1990 
and 1991 respectively, but increased to =N=335 million in 1992 (Tables 5 and 6 
show details of the company's performance for the period under review). The 
bank's total liability for the period increased from =N=4.829 billion in 1984 to 
=N=16.689 billion in 1992 while actual dividends per share rose only marginally 
from 33.3 kobo in 1984 to 40 kobo in 1992, although no dividends were declared 
by the bank in 1991 (Ibid. ). 
In line with Smith's (1996) theory, with the fluctuation in the bank's liquid assets 
in relation to fixed its costs and the progressive decline in its profit margins before 
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privatisation, it was not very easy for FBN PIc to continue to meet its financial 
commitments during a temporary stoppage. The bank's bargaining power could 
therefore, be said to have been on the decline relative to the bargaining power of 
unions before privatisation. 
In the case of UNIC Insurance Plc (privatised in 1990) the company's pre- 
privatisation financial reports indicate a progressive improvement in the 
company's performance. For instance, underwriting result improved from 
=N=8.017 million in 1988 to =N=12.986 million in 1990, although this declined to 
a loss of =N=2.073 million in 1991. The company's profit before and after tax also 
increased progressively, with profit after tax increasing from =N=2.461 million in 
1988 to =N=14.328 million in 1990, although this declined slightly to =N=13.405 
million in 1991 (Table 7 shows details of the company's pre-privatisation 
performance). 
In line with Smith's (1996) theory, with the progressive improvement in UNIC 
Insurance Plc's performance up to 1990, it was becoming easier for the company 
to continue to meet its financial commitments during a temporary work stoppage. 
Its bargaining power relative to unions could thus be said to have improved. 
li. The firm's inventory 
The deposits base of FBN Plc and the net premiums of UNIC Insurance Plc 
before privatisation are appraised below since, as earlier argued in chapter one, 
inventories are more relevant in the case of manufacturing companies. FBN Plc's 
deposits increased progressively from =N=4.115 million in 1984 to =N=11.965 
million in 1992 (see Tables 5 and 6). In line with Smith's (1996) theory, such 
increase in deposit base represents an increased demand for the bank's services 
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and might induce its employees to demand higher pay settlement. It could also 
strengthen the bank's bargaining power relative to the unions by enhancing Its 
capacity to induce employees to opt for voluntary retirement/redundancy. 
In the case of UNIC Insurance Plc, net written premium rose from =N=44.437 
million in 1988 to =N=133.829 million in 1992 (see Table 7). With the 
improvement in the company's net written premiums over the years, its ability to 
survive a temporary work stoppage before privatisation (and consequently, its 
bargaining power) could be said to have progressively increased in line with 
Smith's (1996) theory. 
ill. The level of capital intensity 
Between 1984 and 1992,, FBN Plc's shareholders fund rose progressively from 
=N=: 188.075 million to =N=955 million, while return on shareholders' fund rose 
from 15 percent to 35 percent (Tables 5 and 6). As Smith (1996) notes, a high 
level of capital intensity not only leads to demand for higher wages by employees, 
it lowers a firm's bargaining power by raising rental or interest costs during a 
temporary stoppage. However, the bank's bargaining power may not be 
necessarily lowered by its high level of capitalisation in view of the overall 
improvement in its performance. 
In UNIC Insurance Plc, on the other hand, between 1988 and 1990, share capital 
remained stagnant at =N=15 million (See Table 7). In line with Smith's (1996) 
theory, this implies stagnation in bargaining power. As noted in the case of FBN 
Plc however, this may not necessarily be the case in view of the overall 
improvement in the company's performance during the period. 
III 
IV. The identity of the trade unions 
As noted in chapter one, the identity of a trade union depends on its membership 
size, reputation, finances, intra and inter-union cohesion , its relationship with 
relevant employers and its political leverage (Smith, 1996; Rainsberger, 2003). It 
is important to note that pre-privatisation sectoral data on union membership size 
in Nigeria's finance industry are not available. In this section therefore, data 
derived from interviews, company data, trade union income and their remittances 
to the NLC will be cited. 
Available data indicate that at the height of trade union glory in Nigeria between 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, membership of NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI was 
estimated at 80,000 and 30,000 respectively (Interview with union representatives, 
2002). At the time, the two unions controlled a combined estimated membership of 
over 100,000 workers. Intra and inter-union solidarity and mobilising potential 
were also very high as a result of the restructuring of the over 1000 Nigerian trade 
unions into 42 industrial unions by the federal government in 1978 with the 
Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) as the only central labour body (Fashoyin, 1980; 
FaJana, 2000). 
The 1978 restructuring of the trade unions eliminated the unhealthy rivalry and 
jurisdictional fights that hitherto characterised trade unionism in Nigeria. Shortly 
before privatisation. commenced in the finance industry in 1989 however, 
membership size of NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI declined to about 75,000 and 20,000 
respectively (Interview with the unions' representatives, 2002). Despite this 
decline and a protracted intra-union crisis in NUBIFIE, the finance sector unions 
were not taken for granted by employers and the government since their 
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bargaining power at the time derived more from inter-union solidarity and the 
support of the NLC. 
V. Union density 
Data on union density in Nigeria's finance industry are unavailable. Suffice to note 
however, that this Author's experience Indicates that before the Industry's 
liberalisation and the emergence of the so-called 'New Generation' financial 
institutions, most junior workers in all finance SOEs and private financial 
institutions were members of the NUBIFIE, while most senior employees were 
members of the ASSBIFL 
vi. The existence of alternative wage for union members 
In Nigeria's finance industry, neither state nor union-administered unemployment 
insurance existed before privatisation. The availability of alternative income to 
union members from temporary employment elsewhere or from the income of the 
striking worker's household was therefore the only other means of enhancing 
union bargaining power in the event of a temporary work stoppage. The samples 
of annual average wage (for junior and senior workers) that can be used as a 
measure of pre-privatisation 'inside option' or alternative wage (Smith, 1996) for 
members of the NUBIFIE and the ASSBIFI are indicated in Table 8. 
As Table 8 shows, there was a wage freeze between 1981 and 1987 and between 
1988 and 1990. It will be recalled that the assumption in the privatisation literature 
is that during wage freeze, trade unions are at a disadvantage. The availability of 
the alternative wage indicated in Table 8 to the two unions' members is moreover, 
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a function of their chances of securing alternative employment as represented by 
pre-privatisation macro level vacancy to unemployment ratio. 
VII. The macro level vacancy/unemployment ratio 
The indicators of vacancies and unemployment and the ratio of vacancies to 
unemployment for lower grade workers and for professionals and executives in 
Nigeria from 1970 to 1986 are indicated in Tables 9 to 11. As Table II indicates, 
the vacancy to unemployment ratio for lower grade workers (NUBIFIE members 
belong to this category) declined from 18.73 percent in 1982 to 14.63 percent in 
1989. For professionals and executives (members of ASSBFI belong to this 
category) the ratio declined from 26.13 percent in 1984 to 21.64 percent in 1989. It 
is evident from the preceding data that the unions' members had an average 
chance of securing alternative employment in the event of a temporary stoppage 
before privatisation. According to Layard and Nickell (1986) and Smith (1996) 
such a trend will have a positive effect on the bargained wage and the expected 
value of the employees 'inside option'. 
Viii. The economic centrality of the industry/sector 
The pre-privatisation finance industry was not as important as the petroleum 
industry to Nigeria's economy. As Ikhide (1998, p. 5) notes, the Nigerian banking 
system was distressed before the industry's deregulation in the early 1980s, with 
close to 42 banks severely distressed and 45 percent of loans classified as non- 
performing. The performance of major monetary and financial ratios also failed to 
show any appreciable improvement. For example, loans and advances (measured 
as a ratio of Gross Domestic Product- GDP) declined from 25.6 percent in 1986 to 
114 
14.3 percent in 1990, with the aggregate domestic credit GDP ratio, which peaked 
at 50.3 percent in 1986, halved by 1993. 
Pre-reform government intervention in banking markets left large numbers of the 
banks in financial distress as a result of which the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
liquidated 26 banks in 1998 (The Economic Intelligence Unit, 2003, p. 37). Since 
1987, the focus of financial sector reforms in Nigeria has been on elements of 
liberalisation and measures aimed at enhancing prudential regulation and tackling 
distress in the industry. According to Brownbridge (1996) government control of 
financial markets, public ownership of banks and the neglect of prudential 
regulation had detrimental effects on the banking system, especially in ten-ns of the 
quality of banks' loan portfolios, efficiency and competition. As Brownbndge 
(1996) also notes, the efficacy of financial liberalisation and other financial sector 
reforms to enhance the efficiency of inten-nediation in banking markets was 
limited, in part because of the legacy of intervention and also because some of the 
reforins were inappropriately sequenced and others were not implemented in a 
consistent manner. 
According to Ikhide (1998, p. 6) at the end of 1985, the ownership structure of 
commercial banks indicated dominance by the government (58 percent) followed 
by private share holders (22.5 percent) with foreign interests holding 18.9 percent. 
As part of the privatisation programme, the Federal Government sold most of its 
equity holdings in seven commercial banks and two merchant banks to Nigerian 
private investors by 1992/93, thereby tilting the ownership structure in favour of 
private Nigerian investors and foreign interests (see Tables 2 and 3 for details). 
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ix. The political context of bargaining 
The political experiences of the finance sector unions before prIvat1sation are not 
different from that of their counterparts in other industries. As Beckman (2002) 
validly notes, Nigerian unions were significant in national politics and had a 
history of independent organisation, shop floor militancy and political 
intervention. According to Falola and Ihonvbere (1985) however, the Nigerian 
state historically intervened in labour relations in order to promote industrial 
peace, although in reality, the rules and regulations that the state passes 
consistently promoted the power of employers over those of labour through 
periodic wage reviews, manipulation of ethnic and religious sentiments, as well as 
direct and indirect infiltration of the unions (Ibid. ). 
These experiences varied with the nature of the government in power. As Falola 
and Ihonvbere (1985) note, the military government passed several draconian 
decrees which directly banned strikes, excluded certain persons from trade 
unionism, banned the trade unions from politics and certain occupations from 
fori-ning trade unions in order to weaken the power of organised labour. For 
example, the Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) Decree 21 of 1968 and its 
1969 amendment directly banned any form of strike actions and was later replaced 
with the 1976 Trade Disputes Decree that included the 'no-work, no pay' clause. 
The autocratic character of the military government and its numerous draconian 
decrees however, did very little damage to the capacity of Nigerian unions 
(including the NUBIFIE and the ASSBIFI) to embark upon strikes and other forms 
of protest. The labour control tactics of the State under President Shagari's 
government during Nigeria's Second Republic also had very little impact on the 
power of unions (Ibid. ). 
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The period between 1979 and 1982 was the height of trade union power in 
Nigeria. For much of the military rule of the 1980s, as Falola and Ihonvbere 
(1985) and Beckman (2002) note, Nigerian trade unions confronted the State over 
minimum wage and fought a running battle over SAP. In the finance industry 
however, the political influence of NUBIFIE depreciated as a result of a 
combination of the effects of liberalisation in the industry and an intra-union 
succession crisis between the so-called 'democrats' and 'conservative' factions 
which began in the mid-1980s. Despite NUBIFIE's crisis however, the union 
continued to engage in bargaining with the NEABIAI on matters affecting the 
welfare of its members before privatisation. 
X. The legal context of bargaining 
Before privatisation, trade unionism in Nigeria's finance industry was regulated by 
the provisions of Nigeria's various labour legislations like the Trade Disputes 
(Emergency Provisions) Decree No. 7 of 1976 (complemented by the May 1976 
Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Decree No. 23) which empowers the Federal 
Government to dissolve trade unions that contravene its provisions and classified 
some duties- an-ned forces, police, immigrations and custom services, etc, as 
essential services) and the 1978 Trade Unions Act (as amended) discussed earlier 
in section 4.2.2 which made trade union recognition by employers compulsory. 
Generally, Nigeria's labour laws stipulated guidelines for the conduct of industrial 
relations and stipulated penalties for any breach by unions and employers. As 
noted by various authors (Fashoyin, 1980 and Fajana 2000, for instance) the legal 
context of bargaining moderated union-management relationship, with collective 
bargaining generally accepted by most (including finance) employers. Nigerian 
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labour laws before privatisation thus provided an arena in which unions were able 
to freely organise and bargain collectively. 
The question this stage is how can the measures of bargaining power discussed in 
the preceding paragraphs translate into actual empirical measurements of pre- 
privatisation bargaining power in the finance industry? As an empirical matter the 
challenge, as Scott M. Fuess Jr. (2001) notes, lies in developing measures for 
union bargaining power. However, as earlier noted in the literature review chapter, 
Scott's M. Fuess Jr. 's (2001, p. 8) formula for measuring bargaining power is not 
very relevant in a pre-privatisation (non-market) setting where political factors, 
rather than the interplay of market forces, determine the fortunes of SOEs. 
Suffice to note therefore, that as evidenced from the analysis in this section, 
Nigerian trade unions (including finance sector unions) were politically influential 
before privatisation, contrary to what the empirical (market) measures of 
bargaining power discussed above indicate. Political factors, as several scholars 
have argued, accounted for the unions' success in influencing, government wage 
policies and other conditions of employment to their advantage (see Fashoyin, 
1980, Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985, Fajana, 2000 and Beckman, 2002, for instance). 
4.2.3.2. Collective Bargaining 
Collective bargaining in the finance industry before privatisation was centralised, 
with collective agreements negotiated every two years by NUBIFIE /ASSBIFI 
with NEABIAl under the umbrella of the industry's Joint Negotiating Council 
(JNC). The domestic units or branch committees of both unions however, 
negotiated certain internal items at the company level (Fashoyin 1980). With the 
exception of the 'New Generation' financial establishments, employment 
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relationship in SOEs and privately-owned establishments in the industry 
(including FBN and UNIC Insurance Plc) was determined through collective 
bargaining. At the time, collective bargaining in the industry focussed mainly on 
industrial relations matters like wages, conditions of service, discipline and 
terrnination, hours of work and overtime rate, allowance and bonus, anti-union 
actions and union recognition, irregular payment of wages, refusal to bargain, 
violation of collective agreements, promotion and grading, removal of 
management, commission awards, and benefits, etc (Fashoyin, 1980). 
4.2.3.3. Union Membership size and finances 
As earlier noted in this chapter, shortly before privatisation NUBIFIE's estimated 
membership size declined from 80,000 to about 75,000 workers, while that of 
ASSBIFI's declined from 30,000 to about 20,000 (Interviews with union 
representatives, 2002). In the area of union finances, although pre-privatisation 
union revenue records were unavailable for both the NUBIFIE and the ASSBIFI, 
representatives of the two unions interviewed by this Author claimed the trade 
unions were financially buoyant up to the late 1980s. According to a representative 
of the NLC, the NUBIFIE was the second richest Nigerian trade union up to 1986 
(Interview, 2002). 
4.2.3.4. Wages 
As Beckman (2002) notes, government wage awards served as a benchmark for 
much of the Nigerian private sector (including the finance industry) in the period 
before privatisation. The government, however, encouraged employers and 
workers to try to settle wages through free and voluntary negotiations (i. e. by 
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collective bargaining) although it intervened in the process as an impartial arbiter 
(Fashoyin, 1980). In the finance industry, wages were negotiated by 
NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI and NEABIAI on behalf of their respective members. 
As Fashoyin (1980) notes however, despite the widespread use of collective 
bargaining in Nigeria's private sector, the crucial decisions about wages were 
made through government commissions and committees established to review 
wages and through debates in the political arena. Although no data is available on 
the specific impact of finance sector unions on wage increments before 
privatisation, there is evidence to indicate that NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI negotiated 
favourably on their members' behalf (Fashoyin 1980). 
4.2.3.5. Grievance/disciplinary procedures 
As Fashoyin (1980) notes, in collective agreements (including that of the finance 
sector) before privatisation, provision was made for the settlement of disputes and 
grievances arising from the interpretation of the agreements or other areas not 
included in the agreement, while section 3(l) of the 1976 Trade Disputes Decree 
required the trade unions and management to specify methods for settling disputes 
(through a grievance clause in the collective agreement). Irrespective of the nature 
of the grievance, the grievance machinery (a combination of in-plant and statutory 
procedures) provided for several stages for settling disputes between union 
members and management. 
Disputes not settled internally in the SOEs were referred to the IAP and the NIC 
for compulsory mediation, conciliation or arbitration. The Trade Disputes 
(Amendment) Decree No. 54 of 1977 (which reinforced Decree No. 7 of 1976) 
granted the Minister of Labour discretionary powers to appoint a conciliator, refer 
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a dispute to the IAP or institute a board of inquiry and made conciliation 
agreements signed by all parties to a dispute binding. 
4.2.4. Conclusion 
A summary of the key features of employment relationship in Nigeria's finance 
industry before privatisation is important at this stage as this will facilitate a 
comparison with the post-privatisation trend. As noted earlier in this chapter, 
Nigeria's finance trade unions were able to influence government wage policies 
and the terins of employment to their advantage before privatisation. Trade union 
cohesion and power at both levels of unionism were also strengthened by the 1978 
restructuring exercise. 
Despite the effects of military dictatorship on trade union power, finance unions 
remained relevant and financially buoyant, while their combined estimated 
membership of over 100,000 workers enhanced their mobilising and strike 
capacities. Moreover, the macro level vacancy/unemployment ratio favoured union 
members and enhanced their bargaining power. Union recognition by employers 
was also mandatory and there was an overwhelming support amongst both parties 
for centralised collective bargaining as the most appropriate method for mediating 
the employment relationship (except in the so-called 'New Generation' banks and 
insurance companies where individual employment contracts prevailed). 
Collective bargaining was regulated by the provisions of Nigeria's various labour 
laws, NEABIAI and NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI collectively negotiated wages and other 
terms of employment under the aegis of the Banking and Insurance Joint 
Negotiating Council (JNC) and collective bargaining focused mainly on industrial 
relations matters (Fashoyin, 1980). 
With specific reference to the case study SOEs, evidence from this study indicates 
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that collectivism was accepted in FBN and UNIC Insurance Plc, while the 
potential power of the employers or unions to unilaterally decide the rules, 
regulations and agreements of the employment relationship was curtailed by the 
terrns of the industry-wide collective agreements and the country's labour laws. 
There is evidence to indicate however that NUBIFIE and ASSBIFFs membership 
size declined before privatisation largely as a result of the effects of distress 
precipitated by pre-reform government intervention in the industry, SAP and 
liberalisation. Although union revenue records for the pre-privatisation period 
were unavailable for both NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI, evidence from this chapter 
indicates however, that the two trade unions were financially buoyant up to the late 
1980s. 
Before privatisation, arbitration was compulsory in the industry and in UNIC 
Insurance and FBN Ple, with penalties stipulated for failure to report disputes or 
strikes. Strikes and lockouts were prohibited in cases where the process of 
conciliation and arbitration were in progress. With the exception of the 'New 
Generation' financial institutions, disputes not settled internally were referred to 
the IAP and NIC for compulsory mediation, conciliation or arbitration. 
4.3. An Evaluation Of The Situation After Privatisation 
The analysis in this section will be conducted on the basis of a thorough evaluation 
of similar variables employed in section 4.2 but within the context of the period 
between 1993 and 2003, as follows: 
4.3.1. The balance of bargaining power 
As noted in chapter one, market and political factors are both relevant for the 
determination of post-privatisation bargaining power of unions and employers. In 
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this section, therefore, in addition to political factors, indicators of company 
performance like liquid assets, inventory and capital intensity between 1993 and 
2003 will be evaluated in order to empirically measure the balance of post- 
privatisation bargaining power between finance unions and employers. Other 
factors like the identity of the trade unions, union membership size and density, 
the existence of alternative wage for union members, the political and legal 
contexts of bargaining, the economic centrality of the industry/sector and the 
macro-level vacancy/unemployment ratio are also taken into consideration, as 
under-listed: 
i. The fin-n's liquid assets 
The liquid assets of FBN and UNIC Insurance Ple between 1993 and 2003 will be 
examined here in relation to their fixed costs, in order to measure their post- 
privatisation ability to continue to meet their financial obligations following a 
temporary stoppage. Between 1993 and 1995, FBN Plc's fortunes improved 
dramatically, with total assets (which stood at =N=26.2 billion in 1993) rising to 
=N=63.9 billion in 1995 (see Table 12). Between 1996 and 2003, the bank's total 
assets grew from =N=72.819 billion to =N=320.578 billion (see Tables 12 and 
13). Gross earnings increased from =N=5.39 billion in 1993 to =N=41.717 billion 
in 2002 (Ibid. ) and by another 8 percent to =N=45.055 billion in 2003 (FBN Plc, 
2003 Annual Report and Accounts) while profit before tax rose from =: N=1.196 
billion to =N=13.4 billion and profit after tax from =N=0.997 billion to =N=10.3 
billion. 
The bank's cost to income ratio declined progressively (signifying a reduction in 
overhead cost) from 77.5 percent to 70 percent, while staff productivity rose by 48 
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percent to =N=l million per staff (FBN Plc, Abridged Annual Reports and 
Accounts, 2000/2001, p. 12; 2003 Annual Report and Accounts). As at 2000, 
overheads (excluding provisions for bad and doubtful debts) stood at =N=14.6 
billion, an increase of only 5.9 percent over the 1999 overheads of =N=13.794 
billion, when compared with the 37.2 percent increase for 2001. Though overall 
operating cost went up from =N=21.7 billion in 2000 to =N=22.9 billion in 2001, 
efficiency ratio (i. e. the ratio of operating cost to earnings) stood at 75.5 percent in 
2001 compared to 77.5 percent in 2000 (Ibid. ). The bank's liability with respect to 
hiring charges on leased equipment for 2000/2001 also declined by 20 percent 
from z--: N=222 million in 2000 to =N=177 million in 2001 (FBN Plc, Annual 
Reports and Accounts, 2000/2001, p. 55). Actual dividends per share also rose 
from =N=0.70 in 1993 to =N=1.30 in 2001 (Abridged Annual Reports and 
Accounts, 2000/2001, p. 52). 
In line with Smith's (1996) theory, with the improvement in FBN Plc's 
performance and the increase in its liquid assets in relation to fixed costs, as early 
as 2000/2001, it had become easier for the bank to continue to meet its financial 
commitments during a temporary stoppage. The bank's bargaining power could 
therefore be said to have increased relative to the bargaining power of the unions. 
The economic fortune of the UNIC Insurance Plc, on the other hand, did not quite 
improve so phenomenally. Three years after its privatisation (i. e. in 1993) the 
company sustained a loss of =N=38.2 million in its underwriting operations, 
posted no profit and sustained an operating loss of =N=20.39 million. By 1994, it 
lost =N=7.5 million in its underwriting result but retained a profit of =N=7.7 
million (its first profit for several years), profit before taxation rose from 
=N=19.56 million (1994) to =N=53.13 million in 1995, =N=63.854 million in 
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1996 and =N=85.304 million in 1998. The company, however, sustained an 
operating loss of =N=59.315 million in 1999 (see Table 14). In 2000, the company 
sustained a technical loss, although income from investments led to a profit of 
=N=51.627 million (see UNIC Insurance P1c, 2000 Annual Reports and Accounts, 
p. 7). Profit after tax for the 1994 to 2000 period rose from =N= 17.198 million in 
1994 to =N=45.923 million in 2000 (Ibid. ). 
It is logical therefore, to argue, in line with Smith's (1996) theory, that with the 
improvement in the company's performance, by 2000 it was easier for the 
company to continue to meet its financial commitments during a stoppage. The 
company's bargaining power could therefore be said to have increased in relation 
to the bargaining power of the unions. 
li. The firrn's inventory 
The deposits base of FBN Plc and the net premiums of UNIC Insurance Plc are 
appraised below with a view toward measuring their bargaining power relative to 
the unions. FBN PIc's deposits base increased progressively following the bank's 
privatisation in 1992, rising from =N=55.498 billion in 1996 to =N=148.279 
billion in 2001. The bank's ability to survive a temporary work stoppage could 
therefore be said to have increased, in line with Smith's (1996) theory. Such an 
increased deposit base could be said to represent an increased demand for the 
bank's services and might induce its employees to demand higher pay settlement. 
It could also strengthen the bank's bargaining power relative to the unions by 
enhancing its capacity to induce employees to opt for voluntary 
retirement/redundancy. 
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In the case of UNIC Insurance Plc, net written premium rose from =N=0.274 
billion in 1994 to =N=0.876 billion in 2000, an increase of 219 percent (see Table 
14). This increase could be said to represent an increased demand for the 
company's services but might induce its employees to demand higher pay 
settlement. It could also strengthen the company's bargaining power relative to the 
unions by enhancing its capacity to induce employees to opt for voluntary 
retirement/redundancy (as a result of improved profits and overall performance). 
With the improvement in the company's net written premiums, its post- 
privatisation ability to survive a temporary work stoppage (and consequently, its 
bargaining power) could be said to have increased in line with Smith's (1996) 
theory. 
The level of capital intensity 
As at 2001, FBN Plc's level of capitalisation was the highest amongst private 
sector firms in Nigeria (FBN Ple, Abridged Annual Report and Accounts, 
2000/2001, p. 8). Between 1996 and 2001, its shareholders fund rose by 167.33 
percent from =N=6.394 billion to =N=17.093 billion (see Table 13), while return 
on shareholders' fund rose from 16 percent to 27 percent. Called up share capital 
also rose from =N=650 million in 2000 to =N=813 million in 2001 (FBN Ple, 
Annual Report and Accounts, 2000/2001, p. 47). 
As Smith (1996) notes, such high level of capital intensity not only leads to 
demand for higher wages by employees, it lowers a firm's bargaining power by 
raising rental or interest costs during a temporary stoppage. However, the bank's 
bargaining power may not necessarily be lowered by its high level of capitalisation 
in view of the improvement in its overall performance. 
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In UNIC Insurance Plc, on the other hand, between 1994 and 2000, shareholders 
fund rose by 426 percent from =N=138 million to =N=726 million (see Table 14). 
Share capital also increased from =N=21 million to =N=99.4 million, while capital 
reserve increased by 176.6 percent from =N=72.6 million to -N=200.8 million 
(Ibid. ). According to Smith (1996) such high level of capitalisation lowers a firm's 
bargaining power by raising rental or interest costs during a temporary stoppage. 
As noted in the case of FBN Plc however, this may not necessarily be the case. 
IV. The identity of the trade unions 
Available data indicate that NUBIFIE's membership size declined from 70,000 in 
1994 (see Table 15) to 15,000 in 2002 (NUBIFIE, 2001, p. 1). In the case of 
ASSBIFI, between 2000 and 2002, membership size declined from 18,000 to 
10,000 (Interview with ASSBIFI's Secretary- General, 2002). A reduction in 
union membership size, as Smith (1996) notes, is equivalent to a reduction in 
financial strength and bargaining power. 
Of the two unions, only ASSBIF1 appears politically stable after privatisation, with 
NUBIFIE plagued by protracted intra-union crisis and a high turnover in the ranks 
of its administrative and political leadership. Some branch executives of the union 
capitallsed on its consequent vulnerability to negotiate redundancy with their 
managements during privatisation, as was the case in UNIC Insurance PIc in 2001 
(NUBIFIE, 2001, p. 4-6). The non-cohesion of NUBIFIE implies reduced 
bargaining power, since a disunited union cannot expect to be very effective in 
negotiations with employers. 
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V. Union density 
Despite the scarcity of post-privatisation finance sector union density data, it is 
safe to conclude (based on the reduction in the post-privatisation macro-level 
membership of NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI) that union density in the industry 
declined after privatisation. It is equally safe to conclude that) consequently, the 
mobilising and strike capacities of the unions also declined. The unions would thus 
be less willing than the company might be to pursue a bargaining strategy that 
could induce work stoppage after privatisation. 
vi. The existence of alternative wage for union members 
In Nigeria's finance industry, neither state nor union-administered unemployment 
insurance exists after privatisation, The availability of alternative income ('Inside 
option wage') to union members from temporary employment elsewhere or from 
the income of the striking worker's household therefore, remains the only other 
means of enhancing union bargaining power. The samples of annual average wage 
that can be used as a measure of alternative income for union members in the 
industry after privatisation in case of temporary stoppage are indicated in Tables 8 
and 16. As already noted in this study however, the availability of such alternative 
wage to union members is a function of macro level vacancy to unemployment 
ratio. 
vii. The macro level vacancy/unemployment ratio 
The number of registered unemployed, vacancies declared and the ratio of 
vacancies to unemployment in Nigeria for lower grade workers and for 
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professionals and executives from 1970 to 2001 is shown in Tables 9 to 11. As 
Table II indicates, the vacancy to unemployment ratio for lower grade workers 
(mainly NUBIFIE members) which was 18.73 percent in 1982 declined to 7.29 
percent by 2001. For professionals and executives (mainly ASSBIFI members) the 
ratio was 26.13 percent in 1984 but declined to 0.002 percent by 2001. 
Evidence from the three Tables indicate therefore, that it was more difficult for 
members of NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI to get temporary employment (and 
consequently, alternative wage) in case of temporary stoppage in 2001 than it was 
before privatisation, although it was easier for ASSBIFI (than it was for NUBIFIE) 
members. Hence, union bargaining power could be said to have declined after 
privatisation, in line with Smith's (1996) theory. 
Vill. The economic centrality of the industry/sector 
In 1992 there were 66 commercial banks and 54 merchant banks operating in 
Nigeria. Of the commercial banks, 26 were owned by private Nigerian investors, 7 
were jointly owned by Nigerian private/foreign interests, 6 were jointly owned by 
the Federal Government/foreign investors, 2 were wholly owned by the Federal 
Government and 25 by Nigerian State Governments (Brownbridge, 1996, p. 24). 
The Federal Government completely owned 2 merchant banks and jointly owned 3 
merchant banks with foreign investors, while 41 merchant banks were owned by 
private Nigerian investors and one merchant bank had state government 
participation (see Table 3). 
In the case of the insurance industry, in 1998 there were 140 registered insurance 
companies in Nigeria. Of these, 125 were wholly indigenous while 15 were jointly 
owned (CBN, 1998, p. 63). By the end of 1998 however, the government had 
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privatised majority of its equity holding in banks and 13 major insurance SOEs, 
including the UNIC Insurance Plc (BPE, Undated Final Report, Vol. 2, p. 6). After 
privatisation, government's role became limited solely to policing the industry 
through policy guidelines issued by the CBN and the NDIC, the two government 
agencies charged with regulating the industry. Consequently, the centrality of the 
finance industry to Nigeria's economy diminished further after privatisation. 
ix. The political context of bargaining 
During privatisation in the industry, the military dictatorship employed some 
draconian measures and decrees unrelated to privatisation to muzzle the NLC to 
which the NUBIFIE is affiliated and consequently, indirectly deprived NUBIFIE 
and ASSBIFI of vital support for their struggle against privatisation between 1994 
and 1998. The conduct of leadership elections in the NLC in 1998 and the transfer 
power to a democratic ally- elected government in 1998 however, renewed the 
unions' capacity to intervene in public policy and muster broad labour support. 
There is no evidence from this study to indicate that NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI availed 
themselves of their renewed political advantage after privatisation. 
X. The legal context of bargaining 
The post-privatisation legal context of bargaining was in no way different from 
what obtained in other sectors of the Nigerian economy. Trade unionism in the 
sector remains regulated by the same set of labour laws. In 1994 however, the 
military dictatorship of General Abacha promulgated the Trade Unions 
Dissolution of National Executives Decree 9 that dissolved the national leadership 
of NLC to which the NUBIFIE is affiliated and appointed a Sole Administrator to 
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run its affairs in a politically-motivated measure unrelated to privatisation. The 
decree impaired the traditional union solidarity NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI could have 
benefited from. 
The government also promulgated the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 
of 1996, which (amongst others) laid the ground rules for the restructuring of 
Nigerian unions from 41 to 29 and granted the Minister for Employment, Labour 
and Productivity overriding powers to intervene in industrial relations to 
apprehend a trade dispute, refer it to the IAP and approve the IAP's final decision. 
These politically-motivated legislations aimed at subduing Nigerian unions were 
unrelated to privatisation. 
4.3.1.1. Empirical measurement of the balance of bargaining power 
The indicators of bargaining power evaluated above are meant to aid an empirical 
measurement of post-privatisation balance of bargaining power between finance 
sector unions and employers. In order to translate these indicators of bargaining 
power into empirical measures however, macro level post-privatisation data on 
both opening demands and settlement terms of wage negotiations in the industry 
between 1992 and 2000 for the NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI are examined below, 
based on Scott M. Fuess Jr. 's (2001, p. 5) formula discussed in chapter one. 
According to Scott M. Fuess Jr. (2001, p. 5) union leverage (? ) can be indexed as: 
?= (w1d) x 100 where w is the contract wage and d is wage demanded. 
As Table 17 indicates, NUBIFIE experienced a short term increase of 2.5 percent 
union leverage between 1992 and 1994 and by another 2.5 percent between 1994 
and 1996. 'By 1998 however, the long-term effects of privatisation were beginning 
to manifest on NUBIFIE's leverage and by extension, its bargaining power. 
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NUBIFIE's leverage for the period dropped from 27.5 percent in 1996 to 7.5 
percent in 1998. This coincides with a time when most privatised SOEs in the 
industry were undergoing restructuring. 
NUBIFIE however, experienced a surge in leverage by 2.5 percent in 2000, 
accompanied by a3 percent decline (from 10 percent in 2000 to 7 percent) in 
2002. In the case of ASSBIFI, union leverage declined by 5 percent between 1993 
and 1995 and by 30 percent between 1995 and 1997. There were no data for 1999, 
although the ASSBIR experienced a 15 percent increase in leverage between 1997 
and 2000, accompanied by a5 percent increase in leverage in 2002 (see Table 18). 
According to Scott's M. Fuess Jr. 's (2001, p. 8) theory, if unions and firms have 
routinely achieved harmony in their wage negotiations, leverage (? ) will be fairly 
steady over time. However, if consensus is realised simply by splitting their 
differences, ? == 50, meaning that unions obtained half of the amounts demanded. 
If, on the other hand, unions are not keen to press their demands, ?< 50. If union 
leverage is eroded along with the decline in union density, then ? should fall for 
the latter years of the sample. Every time contractual pay growth falls by at least 
one percent, union power is assumed to have dropped and vice versa. 
As Table 17 indicates, NUBIFIE and employers in the industry routinely achieved 
han-nony in their wage negotiations in the short term following privatisation i. e., 
between 1992 and 1994 and between 1994 and 1996. By 1998, however, the 
reverse was the case- an indication of a decline in the union's political leverage. At 
no time was there a consensus between the union and finance employers. In the 
case of ASSBIFI, wages were decided in 1993 via a consensus with employers. 
Between 1995 and 2002, however, Table 18 indicates that ASSBIFI was not too 
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keen to press its demands, probably due to a decline in its bargaining power 
arising from the decline in its membership size and finances. 
4.3.2. Collective bargaining 
As noted in chapter one, the privatisation literature assumes that SOEs are 
governed by private sector industrial relations after privatisation (see Pedersin], 
2000, for instance). Before privatisation in the finance industry however, SOEs 
were governed by a mixture of public and private sector industrial relations 
practices. NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI regarded themselves as private sector unions, 
although their membership comprised of employees of both public and privately- 
owned financial establishments as was the case in FBN Plc and UNIC Insurance 
Plc where security of employment was guaranteed until retirement. However, pre- 
pnvatisation wages and other conditions of service in the SOEs were not 
negotiated by NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI with the Public Service Joint Negotiating 
Councils. 
There is no evidence from this study to suggest that the legal framework of 
collective bargaining in the industry was modified in any way as a result of 
privatisation. However, there is evidence of a reduction in bargaining coverage. In 
FBN Plc, for instance, the entire members of NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI withdrew 
their membership in exchange for enhanced salaries, in a move related to the 
bank's post-privatisation restructuring (FBN Plc's NUBIFIE Domestic Committee, 
2001; NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI, 2001). 
There is also some evidence to indicate that collective bargaining is gradually 
being replaced with individualism in the privatised SOEs, as evidenced by the case 
of FBN Plc where individual employment contracts completely replaced industry- 
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wide collective agreements (Interview with representatives of FBN Plc. 's 
management and NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI representatives, 2002). In UNIC Insurance 
Plc, collective bargaining operates alongside individual employment contracts for 
de-unionised employees (Interviews with management and union representatives, 
2002). NUBIFIE representatives claimed that at least 200 unionised employees of 
the UNIC Insurance Plc who were retrenched during post-privatisation 
restructuring were re-engaged as non-unionised, contract workers (Interviews with 
union representatives, 2002). By March 1992, only 33 employees of the company 
were covered by the company's collective agreement with NUBIFIE (NUBIFIE 
2001; Interview with union and management representatives, 2002). 
The ASSBIFI Secretary General corroborates this claim. According to him: 
"They (managements) have now reduced the collective employment situation to 
direct employment. It is that employment letter you signed that becomes the 
contract and not a collective agreement that came through collective bargaining 
that is industry-wide" (Interview, 2002). 
The company's management representative justified the new trend as legitimate 
contracts negotiated with the employees concerned (Interview, 2002). 
Due to their new preference for decentralised collective bargaining, management 
in some of the privatised SOEs, increasingly prefer to negotiate redundancy with 
their in-house unions, despite the fact that the post-privatisation structures of the 
unions remain unchanged. For example, the redundancy agreement in UNIC 
Insurance Plc in 2000 was negotiated and signed by the management and the 
branch NUBIFIE. The agreement resulted in the reduction of the remaining 
membership of the union from 114 to 33 employees (NUBIFIE, 2001, p. 6). Prior 
to the agreement5 the national secretariat of NUBIFIE requested a negotiation of 
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the redundancy exercise with the management but the request was turned down 
and NUBIFIE picketed the company in August 2001 (Interviews with NUBIFIE 
President and UNIC Insurance Plc Personnel Manager, 2002). 
This new preference by management in the privatised finance sector SOEs for 
decentralised bargaining made post-privatisation collective bargaining in the 
industry more volatile. As ASSBIFI's Secretary General notes for instance, 
(. 4 Redundancy packages in T-NIC Insurance Company Plc were done out of 
negotiations, tough ones, especially in UNIC. It was tough" (Interview, 2002). 
ASSBIF1 Secretary-General sums up the new trend in collective bargaining in the 
industry in the following words; 
"Because of privatisation, there is competition in the industry and managements 
are inducing union members to de-unionise and thereby ignore collective 
agreements. Individualism is increasingly becoming the norm with managements 
employing divide and rule, paying non-unionised employees more and unionised 
employees less. Most of those who de-unionise end up sacked as in the case of 
Leadway Assurance Ple where ASSBIFI was eliminated and Lion of Africa 
Insurance Company as well as some banks and other insurance companies" 
(Interview, 2002). 
Privatisation however, benefited the unions in the area of negotiating redundancy 
benefits for their members affected by post-privatisation restructuring. For 
example, in FBN Plc, UNIC Insurance Plc and Royal Exchange Assurance, 
NUBIFIE and ASSBIF1 demanded for upfront payment of basic salaries and other 
allowances to their affected members (Interviews with union representatives, 
2002). 
As the ASSBIFI Secretary General notes, 
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"Because of the upsurge of this phenomenon (pnvatisation) we are now going 
beyond what we have in the collective agreement and are now asking these 
managements, depending on their abilities, to pay beyond the provisions of the 
collective agreement ... Privatisation provides us a leeway to demand for more each 
time ýye want to negotiate because it has been proven that these employers can do 
better than what we ask. So it strengthened our negotiating power. It strengthened 
our bargaining instrument" (Interview, 2002). 
NUBIFIE's General Secretary, confirmed ASSBIFI's claim. According to him: 
"If there is a change of management definitely the staff- workers there will be 
affected... And if at all there is need for them to be retrenched or rationallsed, we 
discuss their ternis and conditions of exit. We are able to negotiate the number of 
people to go, their compensation with regard to allowances, their gratuities and 
other remuneration that at least will make them feel that they have something 
substantial so that when they lose their jobs they will not be stranded or something 
like that" (Interview, 2002). 
According to the NUBIFIE President: 
"If there is a process of retrenchment in any given organisation, we (NUBIFIE) do 
go for meetings leading to that retrenchment. We try to negotiate with the 
management what becomes the position of our members, what represents their 
entitlement, and in some cases, how to avoid it if it is avoidable" (Interview, 
2002). 
Management representatives corroborated the unions' claims. In UNIC Insurance 
Plc for instance, the terminal benefits paid to staff declared redundant under the 
company's restructuring exercises were far above benefits agreed in the existing 
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collective agreement following tough negotiations by both parties. According to 
the company's Personnel Manager, 
"Redundant staff members have been earmarked for disengagement with generous 
severance packages, considerably in excess of the company's obligations under the 
collective agreement reached with the unions and paid to the affected staff' 
(Inter-view, 2002 and UNIC Insurance Plc's Press release of 5thSeptember 2001, p. 
1). 
As part of the gains of privatisation, the national organ of NUBIFIE successfully 
negotiated a minimum wage and 30 percent increase in the total emolument of its 
members (NUBIFIE, 2000a). In July 2003, NUBIFIE also agreed a 35 percent 
across-the-board increase in basic salaries and allowances for both the banking and 
insurance groups (back-dated to I't October 2002). Under article 5 of the 2003 
NUBTFIE/ NEABIAI collective agreement, both parties also agreed varying 
degrees of compensation for employees declared redundant in the industry 
(NUBIFIE and NEABIAI, 2003, pp. 2-3). 
Because of the impact of privatisation on collective bargaining, NUBIFIE and 
ASSBIFI now engage in joint industrial actions to protect their members' interests. 
For instance, the two unions (in collaboration with NLC and NUPENG) 
established a joint committee on de-unionisation in 2001 under the aegis of which 
several companies in the finance and petroleum industries (including FBN and 
UNIC Insurance Plc) were jointly picketed. The NLC and the NUBIFIE picketed 
the headquarters of FBN Plc and some of its branches in Lagos on May 21,2001 
('Thisday News', 200 1, p. 4). 
Evidence from this study however, indicates that privatisation has made dialogue, 
rather than strikes and work stoppages, the unions' preferred bargaining method. 
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According to NUBIFIE President, "The era of strike and strike and strike every 
day of the week is gone. Rather, we try to go into dialogue and consultation to see 
how we can talk about any ugly situation without necessarily going out on strike 
action direct and it is producing results where we have reasonable management" 
(Interview, 2002). 
4.3.3. Union membership size and finances 
Evidence from this study indicates a decline in the post-privatisation membership 
size of NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI. Despite evidence of long terrn nominal increases in 
the membership size of NUBIFIE (Table 19) which was due mainly to the 
unionisation of casual employees in some privately-owned banks and insurance 
companies (Interview with union representatives, 2002) there is no evidence to 
indicate any appreciable increase in the union's membership in the privatised 
SOEs. In FBN Plc for instance, post-privatisation membership size of NUBIFIE 
and ASSBIFI was reduced to zero. At the macro sectoral level, the membership 
size of NUBIFIE, as noted earlier, also declined (see NUBIFIE, 2002 and Table 
19) with the union losing about 75 percent of its membership within ten years of 
privatisation of finance SOEs and ASSBIFI only slightly better off. 
Company data substantiate the evidence of a decline in union membership size. 
The membership size of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE in UNIC Insurance Plc for 
instance, declined in proportion to the decline in the company's total workforce, 
which was 554 in 1997, remained static in 1998, experienced a progressive decline 
from 554 to 478 between 1998 and 2000 and declined to 225 workers in 2002 
(LTNIC Insurance Plc's Annual Reports and Accounts, 1998, p. 32; 1999, p. 30 and 
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2000) P. 31. Figures for 2002 obtained from 
hilp: //www. unicinsurance. com/aboutunic. htm). 
Before privatisation, 272 workers were members of NUBIFIE in UNIC P1c. By 
2002, however, this figure declined to 33 (Interview with union representative, 
2002; NUBIFIE 2001, p. 6). In FBN Plc, the number of junior staff (hitherto 
mainly members of NUBIFIE) was 3,222 in March 2000 (43 percent of the bank's 
total workforce) but reduced to 1,612 (or 26 percent of the bank's total workforce) 
by March 2001 (FBN Ple, 2001, p. 18; 2001a, p. 63). By 2002, FBN Pic was 
totally de-unionised. As a result of privatisation's impact on union membership 
and finances, the unions' membership recruitment strategies changed. Before 
privatisation, NUBIFIE, for example, was guaranteed automatic membership 
under the provisions of the 1978 Trade Unions Act. After privatisation, the unions 
became more aggressive in organising new members and picketed the premises of 
employers who denied workers the right to unionise. 
As NUBIFIE's President notes; 
"Gone are the days when members on their own were coming to join the union. It 
is now the union that is going out to reach members, to convince them that union 
right is a fundamental right. It is about job security, it is about our rights and even 
place of work. So we are the ones now going out to look for members" (Interview, 
2002). 
Despite the lack of evidence to indicate a change in Nigeria's statutory provisions 
on trade union recognition due to privatisation, the pre-privatisation perception of 
unions by finance employers as useful channels through which to deal with 
collective affairs and as means of workplace order and stability appears to have 
changed. The management of FBN Plc for example, no longer recognises 
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NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI. Although UNIC Insurance Plc management still 
recognised both unions, their significantly reduced membership size has rendered 
them ineffective in the company. 
Privatisation also adversely affected union finances. As Table 20 indicates for 
instance, between 1999 and 2002, NUBIFIE earned =N=11.8 million (1999), 
=N=14.5 million (2000), =N=13.5 million (2001) and =N=16.5 million by 
November 2002. When compared to the corresponding exchange rates of the naira 
for the same period (see Table 21) the union's finances actually declined. By 2002 
NUBIFIE was unable to meet most of its financial obligations and was unable to 
pay its employees salaries and its rent (Interview with union representatives, 
2002). 
In response to this Author's question about how prIvatisation affected NUBIFIE's 
membership size and finances, the President said; 
II You know, size is strength. And when we don't have the membership, we don't 
talk about financial buoyancy again. So the union is seriously going down in terins 
of our finances and in terms of our membership" (Interview, 2002). 
ASSBIFI's S ecretary- General responded to the same question as follows; 
"The whole concept of privatisation itself is problematic in the sense that people 
are losing their jobs and there are no provisions to accommodate them in new jobs. 
And the union, if we have to say so, is rested on how many we are- the more we 
are, the merrier. But now privatisation is reducing our membership on a 
daily 
basis. So it's a problem. It's a problem because the union's ability to make a way 
depends on the number of men and women you have in the union" (Interview, 
2002). 
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4.3.4. Wages 
There is no evidence at all from this study to indicate a reduction In wages in the 
finance industry. In UNIC Insurance Plc and FBN Plc for instance, post- 
privatisation restructuring resulted in increases in wages and other allowances of 
those staff fortunate enough survive the exercise. At the macro level of the 
industry, the sector's JNC pegged the minimum wage at =N=7,500.00 and 
=N=6,500.00 per month for the banking and insurance sub-sectors respectively on 
22 nd November 2000 (NUBIFIE, ASSBIFI and NEABIAI, 2000, p. 1). In UNIC 
Insurance Plc and FBN Plc, the new management introduced new wage packages 
with enhanced leave bonuses and allowances which were far above those agreed 
with the unions. 
Available data on the post-privatisation expenditures of UNIC Insurance and FBN 
Plc on wages and salaries will suffice to buttress this claim. In FBN Plc, although 
the average number of workers employed between 2000 and 2001 declined from 
7,550 to 6,182 the related staff costs increased from =N=5,740 million to 
=N=6,961 million (FBN Plc, 2001 a, p. 63). By the end of the 2002/2003 financial 
year when the number of staff employed by the bank increased to 6,437 there was 
a corresponding increase in the wage bill (FBN Plc, Financial Highlights, 31 
March 2003, p. 1). In UNIC Insurance Plc, wages also increased as evidenced by 
rise in the ratio of staff to wages and salaries costs (See Table 22,22A and 22B). 
As these tables indicate, despite the company's workforce reducing to 478 in 2000, 
average wages and salaries remained higher than pre-privatisation levels. 
Independent empirical data also support this finding. As Table 16 indicates, for 
instance, with the exception of 1994 when there was a decline in average wages 
and salaries in the finance industry, average wages and salaries for 
junior 
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employees in the industry increased from =N=6,530.00 in 1992 to =N=23,810 in 
1999 and in the case of senior employees, from =N: =15,142.00 in 1992 to 
=N=45,734.00 in 1999. Generally for finance sector employees, available data 
indicate that between 1992 and 1995 wages rose by 25.9 percent for junior 
employees and 4.2 percent for senior employees (Ibid. ). 
4.3.5. Grievance/disciplinary procedures 
There is no evidence to indicate a change in the legal framework moderating the 
grievance procedure as a result of privatisation. But there is evidence of change in 
the grievance and disciplinary procedures of some privatised SOEs. In UNIC 
Insurance Plc for instance, grievance and disciplinary procedures for unionised 
employees still complies with the terms of the prevailing collective agreements but 
operates alongside another procedure for de-unionised employees. In completely 
de-unionised FBN Ple, the procedures are based on the company employees' 
handbook and the terms of each employee's contract, witb final arbitration by the 
regular courts rather than the JAP and NIC (Interviews with management and 
union representatives, 2002). 
As noted in section 1.4.5 of chapter one, almost all cases of privatisation in 
developed and developing economies resulted in strike actions by unions. 
Evidence from this study suggests however, that although the incidence of strikes 
and work stoppages at the sectoral level of Nigeria's finance industry did not 
increase appreciably as a result of privatisation, industrial actions by trade unions 
in the privatised SOEs increased. 
For instance, ASSBIFI which hitherto only embarked on very few strikes in FBN 
Plc between 1982 and 1983 (for four hours) picketed the bank's premises for 
several days in 2001 in collaboration with NUBIFIE and 
NLC due to the 
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privatisation-related mass contracting-out of the bank's employees from 
ASSBIFI/NUBIFIE ('Thisday News', Monday June 11,2001, p. 1). Both unions 
also picketed the premises of UNIC Insurance Plc on 5 th September 2001 to protest 
the company's privatisation-related redundancy exercises (Interview with 
management and union representatives, 2002). 
4.3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the impact of privatisation on trade unions and employment 
relationship in Nigeria's finance industry was evaluated. Evidence from the 
chapter indicates changes in trade unionism and employment relationship after 
privatisation. Union bargaining power declined, with the balance of power tilting 
in favour of employers due to economic, trade union-specific and company- 
specific factors. On the trade unions side, the decline in union membership 
size/density and finances, the absence of altemative wage for union members, the 
declining macro-level vacancy/unemployment ratio and intra-union crisis eroded 
the unions' power and their mobilising/strike capacities while on the company 
side, privatisation resulted in an improvement in performance and consequently, 
bargaining power. 
There were also changes in the area of collective bargaining. A gradual 
replacement of collective bargaining as a norm by individual employment 
contracts was observed, although the legal framework remains unchanged. 
Privatisation however, benefited finance unions in the area of collective 
bargaining, as evidenced by their successful negotiation of redundancy benefits far 
beyond the provisions of existing collective agreements on behalf of their 
members disengaged due to privatisation-related restructuring. The unions 
however, could not prevent redundancy. 
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This suggests a variation in the power relationship in the industry based on the 
bargaining agenda and is evidence of the fact that the unions' capacity to mobilise 
their members for strike actions against privatisation-related redundancy was 
significantly eroded by workers' preference for juicy severance benefits offered by 
employers. There is evidence also to suggest a decline in the percentage of 
workers covered by collective agreements and an increasing preference for 
decentralised collective bargaining by the management of the pnvatised SOEs. 
Privatisation led to a decline in union membership size. In some privatised SOEs 
like the FBN Plc, union presence was completely eliminated, while in UNIC 
Insurance Plc, the massive decline in their membership size rendered them 
ineffective and resulted in a moderation of union militancy (with strikes 
considered as weapons of last resort) and a change in union membership 
recruitment strategies. 
Pnvatisation also resulted in a rise in wages and allowances of employees that 
survived restructuring in the privatised SOEs both in the short and the long terin. 
However, the unions made claims of wage discrimination between unionised and 
non-unionised employees in some privatised SOEs. Changes have also occurred in 
the grievance and disciplinary procedures of some privatised SOEs, with 
variations between companies where trade unions still command some presence 
and those completely de-unionised. 
Although sectoral incidence of strikes and work stoppages did not increase 
appreciably as a result of privatisation, there was an increase in union-management 
tension and union actions over the specific details of the privatised SOEs' 
restructuring. Overall, the evidence from this chapter indicates that privatisation 
impacted negatively on the unions. In the words of ASSBIFFs Secretary General: 
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"We are now negotiating in a very weak position for enhanced package for our 
members that are thrown out of jobs. And everyday, every time, we are now 
saddled with having to come to discuss the retrenchment of our members that have 
to leave employment not out of their own fault, not out of their behaviour or their 
deficiencies at work but because job is contracting, because the workplace is re- 
engineering, because limited number of people are now needed to do so many 
things, because there have been increased comp uteri sati on, increased technology, 
because of several factors that come with privatisation. ... Pnvatisation has created 
an employers' market" (Interview, 2002). 
As noted in chapter one however, not all changes observed in privatised SOEs can 
be attributed solely to privatisation. The degree to which the observed changes in 
trade unionism and employment relationship in Nigeria's finance industry 
discussed in this chapter can be attributed to privatisation is examined in section 
4.4. 
4.4. The Impact Of Privatisation 
In this section, an attempt will be made to identify those elements of change 
observed after privatisation that could be attributed to privatisation alone by 
relating them to specific strategic proposals from finance employers for 
restructuring the two finance case studies. This will involve an assessment of the 
extent to which the changes identified in Section 4.3 can be explained by the post- 
privatisation corporate strategies of the new companies that emerged. A review of 
the strategic proposals from finance employers for restructuring UNIC Insurance 
and FBN Plc and the actual restructuring measures adopted will precede our 
analysis by way of introduction. 
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4.4-1. UNIC Insurance Plc Case Study 
4.4.1.1. Introduction 
UNIC Insurance Plc was incorporated in 1965 as a result of the merger of Marina 
Agencies Limited (then a subsidiary of United Africa Company (UAC) Limited) 
and Insurance Agencies Limited (then a wholly-owned subsidiary of the 
Compagnie Franqaise De LAfrique Occidentale- CFAO). On incorporation, the 
company's share capital of 100,000 ordinary shares was held by foreign interests- 
Northern Assurance Company, London- 55 percent, CWA Holdings Limited, 
London- 30 percent and CFAO Liverpool-15 percent. 
On 30'1-1 March 1976, the federal government acquired a total of 48,800 shares- 
19.5 percent of the then 250,000 share capital and additional 195,200 shares in 
1977 bringing its total shareholding to 244,000 shares or 48.8 percent and 
increasing indigenous equity in the company to 49 percent. A further II percent of 
the company's total equity was subsequently acquired by the federal government 
and distributed to governments of three Nigerian states as follows: 
i. Kaduna State- 2 1,000 shares or 4.3 8 percent 
ii. Kano State- 17,000 shares or 3.56 percent, and, 
iii. Imo State- 15,000 shares or 3.06 percent (TCPC, Undated. Final Rýeport, 
Vol. 2, p. 23). 
Before privatisation therefore, federal and state governments jointly held 60 
percent equity, with Northern Assurance Company Limited, London 
holding 21.7 
percent, C. W. A. Holding Limited, London (a subsidiary of 
Unilever) - 12.02 
percent and C. F. A. 0. Liverpool- 6.01 percent (Ibid., p. 
24). In 1990, the Nigerian 
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federal government sold its 48.8 percent stake in the company (then called United 
Nigeria Insurance Company Limited) through the TCPC. 
4.4.1.2. The restructuring exercise 
On privatisation in 1990, the company changed its name to United Nigeria 
Insurance Company Ple and, was admitted to the Nigerian Stock. In 1994 , its name 
became UNIC Insurance Plc , its management embarked on a reorganisation 
exercise (on grounds that the company was not making profit as evidenced by 
declining underwriting result which stood at a loss of =N=7.483 million- Table 
14), computerised the company's operations and retrenched some staff on grounds 
of age, fraudulent records and non-performance. A total of 160 employees (all 
members of NUBIFIE) were retrenched after negotiations with the union and the 
signing of a memorandum of understanding by both parties on 28 December 1994 
(UNIC Insurance Plc and NUBIFIE, 1994). 
In 1999 when the company posted a not-too-impressive operating balance (with 
net total assets declining from the 1998 level of =N=766,769,000 to 
=N=700,659,000) the new management embarked on a major programme of 
restructuring. The company's new Chainnan attributed its poor performance to 
unacceptable levels of declining quality of risks written and "fierce competition, 
price under-cutting as well as credit extension to brokers" (UNIC Insurance Plc, 
Annual Reports and Accounts, 2000, p. 7). In order to reverse this negative trend, 
the management identified areas of the company's operation that required remedial 
actions, as follows: 
The company's gross premium which remained more or less stagnant between 
1998 and 2000; 
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The risk profile of the company's underwriting operations which increased 
significantly within the same period, which (when combined with increased 
corporate expenses, price undercutting and problems with receivables) resulted 
in a soft market characterised by technical losses (lbid, p. 8). 
In order to resume sustained growth, it became imperative for the management to 
improve the company's risk profile and enhance productivity. Consequently, the 
management designed a strategic development plan seeking to address and 
overcome the threats arising from the effects of oversupplied generic insurance 
products, globalisation and universal banking, with the under-listed objectives: 
i. Improving UNIC Insurance Ple. s risk portfolio by identifying and focussing on 
its most profitable clients and pricing its risk portfolios appropriately; 
Ii. Retaining the loyalty of the company's most viable clients by offering them 
first class service, 
III Developing special classes of risk, which the company can brand and price 
better than the generic products it was then offering; 
iv. Diversifying into the provision of broader based financial services; 
V. Improving the company's investment portfolio for enhanced returns; and, 
vi. Investing significantly in information technology and personnel 
infrastructure necessary to drive the above-listed plans (UNIC Insurance Plc., 
Annual Reports and Accounts, 2000, p. 8). 
In order to attain these objectives and reposition the company for sustained growth 
in the future, the new management identified the imperativeness of shareholders' 
support, while noting that "investment in personnel right sizing, acquisition of 
information technology infrastructure, and investment in new opportunities will 
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affect returns in the short term, but if properly implemented, will create a business 
value of pride to all shareholders in the medium term" (Ibid. ). The management 
also replaced the old mission statement- "to grapple with the challenges posed by 
the company's global view of repositioning"- with a new mission statement as 
follows: 
"To provide with transparent honesty and integrity unique insurance and other 
financial services to our local and international customers, promote the welfare of 
our workforce, while adding value to our shareholders' investment and 
demonstrating a high sense of social and economic responsibility" (Ibid, p. 2). 
The company's mission statement was then translated into a vision- "to be the 
largest and preferred integrated financial services company in West Africa in 
alliance with global insurers in order to also have global presence" (see 
http: //www. uiiicinsurance. com. /aboutunic/htm. ). 
Essentially, the company's new strategic focus was in recognition of the need to 
promote shareholders' interest of profit making above the political considerations 
that characterised its era of public ownership. In order to achieve its new strategic 
objectives, the Board of Directors was restructured in 2000, a new representative 
for international technical interests appointed into the board, while an American 
management expert was seconded from a management development affiliateof the 
International Finance Corporation to help develop skills relevant to the new 
strategic objectives, but for which its existing talent was limited (Ibid, pp. 8 and 9). 
The company then scrapped several departments (driving, mailing, purchasing and 
auditing), outsourced their duties to a company owned by the core investor- 
Nigerian-German Chemicals (Interview with a union representative, 2002), 
rationalised its branches (sub-offices) from 18 to 6 as a cost effectiveness measure 
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and computerised all its operations. It however, maintained some form of presence 
in the 12 former sub-offices through what it referred to as "Tied Agents" rather 
than run them as full-fledge branches thus reducing staff and overhead costs. With 
a new focus on financial marketing, the company also entered into co-marketing 
and co-branding arrangements with some banks (Interview with UNIC Insurance 
Plc Personnel Manager, 2002). 
4.4.1.3. Impact of restructuring 
The question is how does the company's post-privatisation strategic plan relate to 
the observed changes in trade unionism and employment relationship in the 
company? An attempt is made below to answer this question by evaluating the 
actual implementation of the strategic plan in relation the observed post- 
privatisation changes, as follows: 
i. Impact on bargaining power 
As earlier noted in sections 4.3 and 4.4 of this chapter, the fortunes of UNIC 
lnsurance Plc improved a few years after the post-privatisation restructuring. 
Although the company struggled in the area of profit making in the short term 
(which probably accounts for its inability to eliminate unions from its workplace 
completely) the improvements in its perforinance and written premiums over the 
years enhanced its ability to survive temporary work stoppage and its bargaining 
power relative to the unions whose post-privatisation membership, mobilising and 
strike capacities and leverage declined drastically. Moreover, at the macro level of 
the industry, the combined mobilising and strike capacities of NUBIFIE and 
ASSBIFI was seriously eroded by the huge decline in their combined membership 
size nationally. 
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There is evidence to the effect that privatisation reduced the bargaining power of 
the unions in UNIC Insurance Plc. As one union leader notes; 
"With what is happening in the industry, privatisation is killing the unions. The 
new owners don't abide by the terms of collective agreements, the union is losing 
members and union members are losing interest in the whole system of 
privatisation. Union members are no longer having faith in the union, which they 
see as incapable of protecting them. Privatisation has dealt a harsh blow to the 
unions. Privatisation has dealt with us. Now that they have given power to the 
highest investor, they ignore collective agreements and do whatever they like. And 
where they think the cost of implementing the national agreements are too high, 
they retrench before implementing the agreements" (Interview, 2002). 
Developments in the company support the trade unions' claim of a decline in their 
power relative to management. For instance, the company's Personnel Manager 
corroborated the claim by union representatives that there were no retrenchments 
in the company for fourteen years before privatisation. According to her, the five 
retrenchment exercises carried out by the company as at 2002, although negotiated 
with the unions, arose from the need to restructure in the face of fierce competition 
(Interview, 2002). 
The resultant decline in the union's membership size reduced their capacity to 
mobilise for strike actions in UNIC Insurance Plc. According to NUBIFIE's 
President, in some cases the unions do not even go on strike because; 
"The members that will embark upon the strike actions are already flushed out or 
are about to lose their jobs ... Seriously, our 
bargaining power has been reduced to 
almost nothing because, you know, size is strength and when we don't 
have the 
membership, we don't talk about financial buoyancy again. So the union is 
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seriously going down in terms of our finances and in terms of our membership. So 
our bargaining power has been greatly reduced" (Interview, February 2002). 
ii. Impact on collective bargaining 
After the restructuring exercise, both bilateral bargaining by management with de- 
unionised employees and centralised collective bargaining (between 
NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI and NEABIAI) simultaneously operated in the company. 
Trade union density and the coverage of collective agreements declined in 
proportion with the decline in the unions' membership size in the company, while 
enterprise-level collective bargaining became very volatile, with an increase in 
privatisation-related industrial actions. 
For instance, when the company's management declared redundancy in 2000 and 
2001 as part of its restructuring, NUBIFIE contested the reasons management 
adduced (NUBIFIE, 2001) as attempts to further reduce its membership size and 
dragged the management to the NIC where both parties eventually agreed to 
redundancy under terms negotiated out of court but ratified in a ruling by the court 
(NIC, 2001). Before the NIC's judgement however, ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE in 
collaboration with the NLC picketed the premises of the company on 5 
1h 
September 2001 (Interview with management and union representatives, 2002). In 
August 2002, NUBIFIE also went to court to seek an injunction to stop the 
company from carrying out another planned restructuring (Interview with the 
company's Personnel Manager, March 2002). However, despite the 
dominance of 
de-unionised workers in the company after its restructuring, the management still 
recognises the NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI. 
152 
Ill. Impact on trade union membership size and finances 
As part of its restructuring, the UNIC Insurance Plc's new management 
restructured its branches into a network of information technology-driven branches 
and 'Tied Agents' covering eighteen of the country's thirty-six states. 
Additionally, the company restructured its product market by diversifying into 
other financial businesses that were not strictly core insurance businesses, with a 
view toward "re-inventing and re-positioning the company to face the challenges 
of universal banking" and combined this with personnel rationalisation across the 
board with all categories of staff affected (Interview with the Personnel Manager, 
March 2002). 
The restructuring resulted in the retrenchment of employees considered irrelevant 
to the attainment of the company's new strategic goals as evidenced by changes in 
the number of workers employed by the company between 1997 and 2002 (see 
Table 22A). The decline in the company's total workforce led to a proportional 
decline in the membership size of its in-house unions, particularly NUBIFIE 
whose members belonged to the cadre of field staff, clerks, typists, secretaries and 
drivers most affected by redundancy. 
Before privatisation, 272 workers were members of NUBIFIE in UNIC Insurance 
Plc. Membership of NUBIFIE reduced to 114 in 2001 and 33 in 2002 (Interview 
with union representatives, 2002; NUBIFIE, 2001, p. 6). Company data 
substantiate the finding of a decline in post-privatisation union membership size. 
Between 1997 and 1998, for instance, the number of employees in tNIC 
Insurance Plc increased slightly from 544 to 556 but declined to 478 by 2000 
(UNIC Insurance Plc, 1998, p. 32; 2000, p. 3 1). 
153 
The revenue derived by the unions from the company after prIvatisation also 
declined. Although no micro-level union revenue data were available, the decline 
in NUBIFIE's membership size in the company from 272 before pri'vatisation to 
33 in 2000 indicates, for instance, a decline in revenue since the union depends 
solely on check-off dues paid by its members. 
IV. Impact on wages 
Wages in UNIC Insurance Plc increased following the company's restructuring. 
Data on the post-privatisation expenditures of the company on wages and salaries 
will suffice to buttress this argument. Available company data indicate that wages 
increased, as evidenced by the ratio of its staff to payroll cost between 1997 and 
2000. Table 20B indicates, for example that despite the company's employees 
reducing to 225 in 2002, average wages and salaries remained higher than pre- 
privatisation levels. 
V. Impact on grievance/disciplinary procedures 
The company's restructuring resulted in changes in its grievance and disciplinary 
procedure with two types of procedures emerging. The first (based on the 
company's employees' handbook) caters for de-unionised employees while the 
second procedure (based on the industry-wide collective agreement) caters 
for 
unionised employees. 
It is evident from the foregoing that the observed changes in trade unionism and 
employment relationship in UNIC Insurance Plc are 
directly related to 
pnvatisation. The important question is whether the company's case mirrors 
the 
trend in the industry. In order to answer this question, an attempt will be made in 
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the next section to elicit the impact of privatisation in the second finance industry 
case study - FBN Plc- via an evaluation of the degree to which changes observed 
in the bank can be attributed to privatisation. 
4.4.2. FBN Plc Case Study 
4.4.2.1. Introduction 
FBN Plc commenced operations in 1894 as a branch of Bank of British West 
Africa Limited (Liverpool). In 1912, the bank acted as agent to the West Africa 
Currency Board (set up in 1912) in Nigeria and performed the role of a central 
bank until 1958 when the Central Bank of Nigeria was established (T('PC, 
Undated Final Report, p. 131). The bank's name was changed to Bank of West 
Africa Limited in 1957 and thereafter to Standard Bank of West Africa Limited in 
1966 after a merger with Standard Chartered Bank of England in 1965. In 
compliance with Nigeria's Companies Decree (1968), the bank was incorporated 
as Standard Bank of Nigeria Limited in 1969. 
In 197 1, in line with government's indigenisation programme Nigeria's Federal 
Government purchased 36.1 percent equity and Nigerian investors 12.9 percent 
(Ibid. ). By 1979, government's shareholding increased to 44.76 percent while other 
local investors owned 17.24 percent as a result of the dilution of Standard 
Chartered Bank's equity holding from 51 percent to 38 percent. The bank's name 
was changed again in 1979 to First Bank of Nigeria Limited and its shares listed 
on the floor of the Nigerian stock exchange. In compliance with the requirements 
of the Companies and Allied Matters Decree (1990), the bank's name was changed 
to the FBN Plc (Ibid. ). 
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4.4.2.2. The restructuring exercise 
On Monday 16 th November, 1992, a total of 72,238,314 ordinary shares of fifty 
kobo (about 0.25 pence) each were offered to the public under the provisions of 
Nigeria's privatisation Decree No. 25 (1988). Privatisation in FBN Plc, like in 
UNIC Insurance Ple, was therefore by way of total divestment of government 
equity holding. Restructuring exercises were implemented by the bank before and 
after privatisation. In 1985 (before its privatisation) the bank's structure was 
decentralised into five regional administrations in order to reposition it and take 
advantage of the changing environment that emerged from the sector's 
liberalisation. This structure was reconfigured in 1992 (after its privatisation) to 
enhance operational efficiency. 
In 1996 (four years after its privatisation) FBN Ple introduced a comprehensive 
change process known as 'Century 11 Enterprise Transformation Project' to 
revolutionise its operations (in line with the increasingly competitive environment 
of the industry) that involved the re-engineering of its business process and the 
creation of a new marketing framework. In 2000/2001, the bank launched the 
'Century 11: The New Frontier' project which involved a comprehensive strategic 
re-direction aimed at optimising its strengths (which include large customer base, 
experience and extensive branch network) in order to tap current and emerging 
opportunities in and outside the financial services sector. The 'Century 11' project 
was also aimed at engendering the significant leap required by the bank to "truly 
provide the modern Nigerian economy with the financial leadership it requires" 
(FBN, 2001 a, pp. 2 and 18 and Interview with Management Representative, 2002). 
The project involved the "definition and execution of overarching and specific 
strategies to engender fundamental changes in all aspects" of its business, 
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underpinned by a technology-driven, re-invention programme that is people- 
focussed and customer-centric (Ibid, p. 24). 
In terms of organisational developments, the bank increased its directorates from 
six to seven and it's Strategic Business Units (SBUs) from three to four in 
reflection of its increased market orientation. The SBUs include Corporate 
Banking (which deals with large structured companies), Commercial Banking 
(which deals with medium sized structured and large semi-structured 
organisations), Consumer Banking (which deals with the retail market and the 
development of Private Banking business) and Consumer Finance. The Branch 
Network and Operations Directorate runs the entire branch operations through 
which service to the SBUs are delivered. The bank also created Strategic Resource 
Functions (SRFs) - Risk and Management Controls, Information Technology and 
Electronic Banking and Resources- all of which (except the latter) are directorates. 
In the next section, the relationship between FBN Plc's post-privatisation 
restructuring and observed changes in company-level industrial relations will be 
established. 
4.4.2.3. Impact of restructuring 
i. Impact on trade union bargaining power 
As noted in section 4.3 of this chapter, FBN Plc's performance improved 
phenomenally after privatisation. Consequently, it became easier for the bank to 
continue to meet its financial commitments during a stoppage. As equally noted, 
NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI were not as fortunate due to a combination of factors 
which eroded their bargaining power and the total de-unionisation of the 
bank's 
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employees in 2001. The latter reduced the unions' bargaining power in FBN Plc to 
zero. 
ii. Impact on collective bargaining 
The bank's new management's perception of trade unions as a useful channel for 
mediating the employment relationship and as a means of workplace order and 
stability changed after the restructuring. With the mass withdrawal of the bank's 
employees from membership of NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI, the management no 
longer recognised trade unions and no longer engaged in collective bargaining. 
Privatisation of FBN Plc therefore, resulted in a complete replacement of 
collective bargaining with individualism and a total elimination of unions. 
In response to this Author's question about what FBN Plc's official position was 
on trade unions after the bank's privatisation and restructure, the bank's Principal 
Manager (Industrial Relations) said; 
"Well you can say that since we are not unionised we have no business with trade 
unions. But what we do is we try to monitor their activities and know what they 
are doing and also know what is happening elsewhere. That's the extent of our 
relationship with them now" (Interview, 2002). 
The trade unions did not leave without a fight. In 2001, for instance, ASSBIFI and 
NUBIFIE (in collaboration with NLQ picketed the bank's headquarters to protest 
the contracting-out of their members which they believed was instigated by the 
management ('Thisday News', 200 1, op cit. ). 
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Impact on trade union membership size and finances 
The bank's restructuring and strategic redirection projects had implications for the 
workforce and trade unions members. As noted in section 4.3.3 of this chapter, the 
number of junior staff (hitherto members of the NUBIFIE) declined from 3.222 
(43 percent of the bank's total workforce) in March 2000 to 1,612 (26 percent of 
the bank's total workforce) by March 2001. Between 2000 and the end of 2001, 
NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI lost their entire members (and the entire revenue they 
generated from the bank) to post-privatisation restructuring. 
IV. Impact on wages, 
Wage negotiation in FBN Plc through collective bargaining was completely 
eliminated in 2001 as a result of total de-unionisation. Despite this, wages 
increased as evidenced by the bank's post-privatisation expenditures on wages and 
salaries discussed in section 4.3.4 of this chapter. For example, although average 
number of employees declined from 7,550 to 6,182 between 2000 and 2001, 
related staff costs for the period increased from =N=5,740 million to =N: --6,961 
million, indicating an increase in average wages (FBN Plc, Annual Reports and 
Accounts, 2000/2001, p. 63). At the end of the 2002/2003 financial year, the 
number of employees increased to 6,437 with a corresponding increase in the 
wage bill (FBN Ple, Financial Highlights, 31 March 2003, p. 1). 
The FBN Ple notes in it's 2000/2001 Annual Report (p. 25) that "On I" April 
2001, we effected aggressive new compensation policies and practices to ensure 
competitive rewards in line with current local and financial services industry trend. 
This gesture is expected to boost staff morale and stimulate optimal individual and 
collective performance in line with agreed corporate objectives. " 
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In response to this Author's question as to whether the employees of the bank still 
consider trade unions relevant, an ex-union representative in the bank declared 
inter-alia; 
"Workers in First Bank can now buy new cars and change cars. Unions are 
definitely no more relevant in First Bank. They have been overtaken by events" 
(Interview, February 2002). 
V. Impact on grievance/discip] i nary procedure 
With the total shift from collectivism to individualism, the grievance and 
disciplinary procedure in the bank became entirely based on its employees' 
handbook and the terms of each employee's contract. A disciplinary panel 
comprised of representatives of different cadres of the bank's staff replaced the 
joint committee of employers and trade unions as the organ responsible for 
resolving grievances and disciplinary matters, with final arbitration by the regular 
courts (Interview with the management representative, 2002). 
4.4.3. Conclusion 
In the preceding paragraphs, an attempt was made to identify those change 
elements that could be attributed to privatisation by relating them to the specific 
strategic proposals from employers for restructuring UNIC Insurance Plc and FBN 
Plc. Although there are variations in the privatisation experiences of the two 
companies and although no major anti-union legislative reforms accompanied 
privatisation in the industry, there is evidence of privatisation-related changes in 
union bargaining power, collective bargaining, union membership size and 
finances, wages and grievance/disciplinary procedures. 
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A number of questions however, anse from this conclusion as follows: Can all the 
observed changes be attributed to prIvatisation alone? Are there other factors 
responsible for these changes? In what ways (if any) are other factors responsible 
for the observed changes? An attempt will be made in section 4.5 to answer these 
questions. 
4.5. An Analysis Of Changes That Appear To Be Related To Factors Other Than 
Privatisation 
4.5.1. Introduction 
As noted in chapter one, one of the biggest issues in evaluating privatisation lies in 
comparing its outcome with the counterfactual (Kikeri and Nellis, 2001, p. 9). As 
Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999) note, it is difficult to isolate the effect of 
privatisation from other variables that have an influence on aggregate measures 
and this often results in the observance of certain trends, with weak causality. In 
this section,, an attempt will be made to elicit other factors that may have 
accounted for the observed post-privatisation changes identified in section 4.4, 
based on the adopted analytical variables of the current study, as follows: 
4.5.1.1. The balance of bargaining power 
As was demonstrated in sections 4.3 and 4.4, privatisation is directly responsible 
for the decline in trade union membership size, density and finances in UNIC 
Insurance Plc and FBN Plc, which, as noted in chapter one, constitute important 
determinants of bargaining power. Other factors relevant for computing bargaining 
power- the absence of alternative wage for trade union members, the low macro- 
level vacancy/un employment ratio, etc, predate privatisation and cannot therefore 
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be held accountable for the observed changes in trade unionism and employment 
relationship after privatisation. 
Despite the impact of these factors before privatisation, NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI 
exerted sufficient leverage on government wage policies and employment 
relationship in the industry to their advantage. It was in the aftermath of 
privatisation-related restructuring (as demonstrated in the case of FBN Plc and 
UNIC Insurance Plc, for example) that union bargaining power declined. Intra 
union crisis cannot also be held responsible for the decline in trade union leverage 
since it does not diminish trade unions' capacity to mobilise their members for 
industrial actions over issues like wages and redundancy. As noted in chapter one, 
union mobilising capacity varies with the bargaining agenda. 
4.5.1.2. Collective bargaining 
The observed changes in collective bargaining in the industry are entirely 
privatisation-related. Despite liberalisation and the emergence of the 'New 
Generation' financial institutions that introduced union-free workplaces and 
individual employment contracts from the mid-1980s, collective bargaining 
remained the accepted mode of mediating the employment relationship in SOEs 
and a majority of privately-owned financial establishments. It was only after 
privatisation-related restructuring of finance SOEs that the observed changes 
emerged. 
4.5.1.3. Union membership size and finances 
There is evidence from this chapter to suggest that the decline in macro-level trade 
union membership size dates back to the SAP era in the mid-1980s. As Table 23 
reveals, between 1982 and 1983 the Federal Government, state governments and 
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private sector employers retrenched 23.4 percent, 51.7 percent and 24.7 percent of 
their respective workforce. Table 23A indicates the distribution of total and 
retrenched employees by industrial sector for the period. There is evidence that 
unemployment increased between 1982 and 1984 as a result of declining capacity 
and profit. The NLC, for instance, estimates that as at 1983, a total of one million 
workers lost their jobs (FaJana, 2000, p. 68. See Tables 24 to 25 also). 
Although, some of the above-mentioned employment data can be situated within 
the finance sector's privatisation time-frame, they are not disaggregated and there 
is no direct evidence to ascribe them to privatisation. On the other hand, direct 
evidence from this chapter links the decline in employment and consequently, 
trade union membership and finances in UNIC Insurance and FBN Plc to 
privatisation-related restructuring. 
4.5.1.4. Wages 
Theoretically, general increases in wages in the finance industry cannot be 
ascribed to privatisation alone since union wage demands are premised on a 
combination of factors like cost of living, consumer price index, inflation, profits 
and productivity and increases in the price of petroleum products, etc. As Tables 
26 and 27 indicate for instance, the consumer price index for all items and 
inflation rate in Nigeria rose between 1985 and 1990. Consequently, the range of 
average wages and salaries in the public sector rose by between 77 percent and 
148 percent for junior workers, while the increase for senior workers was between 
84 and 85.5 percent (see Table 16). Despite the effects of these macroeconomic 
factors on wages generally, evidence from this chapter directly links the wage 
increases in UNIC Insurance Plc and FBN Plc to privatisation-related 
restructuring. 
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4.5.1-5. Grievance/disciplinary procedures 
There is evidence to indicate that not all of the observed cases of 
grievances/disputes in the industry after privatisation were in direct response to 
privatisation. For instance, union wage demands arising from the various increases 
in the prices of petroleum products (see Table 28) were major catalysts for strikes 
and work stoppages in Nigeria from the mid-1980s onwards. There is no evidence 
however, to ascribe the observed changes in the grievance and disciplinary 
procedure of UNIC Insurance Plc and FBN Ple to factors other than privatisation. 
4.5.1.6. Conclusion 
It is evident from section 4.5 that, although a number of other factors may have 
indirectly contributed to some of the changes observed in privatised finance SOEs, 
no evidence exists from this chapter to ascribe those changes to those other factors. 
On the contrary, there is evidence of a direct relationship between the observed 
changes in UNIC Insurance Plc and FBN Ple and privatisation-related 
restructuring implemented by their new management. A summary of the evidence 
is necessary at this stage and will be done in the next section by way of assessing 
the overall impact of privatisation. 
4.6. Assessing The Overall Impact Of Privatisation 
In this chapter, the impact of privatisation on trade unions and employment 
relationship in privatised enterprises in Nigeria's finance industry was evaluated. 
Evidence from this chapter points to privatisation-related changes in trade 
unionism and employment relationship in the privatised 
SOEs. Union bargaining 
power declined, with the balance of power tilting 
in favour of employers. Like the 
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case in some European pnvatisation exercises (see Pedersim, 2000, for instance) 
privatisation brought the pressure of competition and the importance of economic 
performance, cost- effectiveness, flexibility and profitability to the forefront of 
corporate strategic discourse in the privatised finance sector SOEs and made them 
part of the new context that both management and unions have to deal with. 
In some of the privatised SOEs like FBN Pic, collective bargaining was 
completely eliminated and replaced with individualism, although no government 
legislative reforins aimed at reducing the unions' power accompanied 
privatisation. Where collective bargaining has not been completely eliminated like 
UNIC Insurance Pic , it is gradually being replaced with individualism through 
gradual de-unionisation. Privatisation however, benefited the unions in the area of 
collective bargaining, particularly with respect to the negotiation of redundancy 
benefits for their members affected by post-privatisation restructuring. 
Although there is continuity in the statutory provisions on trade union recognition 
after privatisation, employers' pre-privatisation perception of trade unions as 
useful channels through which to deal with collective affairs and mediate the 
employment relationship appears to have changed. In some privatised SOEs like 
UNIC Insurance Pic, although unions are still recognised, their presence has 
become rather symbolic. In some other privatised SOEs like FBN Pic, trade unions 
are no longer relevant due to complete de-unionisation. 
The membership size, density and revenue of trade unions in the privatised SOEs 
also declined (although the experience of each trade union varied in relation to the 
post-privatisation skill requirements of the new management). Consequently, there 
is a moderation of union militancy in the industry, with strikes now considered 
weapons of last resort. Privatisation also led to changes in union membership 
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itment strategies. The trade uni recrui ions are now more proactive in sensitising 
potential members about the benefits of membership rather than relying on 
statutory guarantees of automatic membership, with a new focus on the 
recruitment of contract employees. 
Wages in the industry increased after privatisation. Changes have also occurred in 
the grievance and disciplinary procedures, with different procedures for unionised 
and de-unionised workers operating simultaneously. While there is no evidence to 
indicate an appreciable increase in the incidence of trade disputes and work 
stoppages at the macro level of the industry, cases of intense confrontation and 
increase in privatisation-related union actions in the privatised SOEs over specific 
details of post-privatisation restructuring were recorded. 
In conclusion, it is pertinent at this stage to reiterate the observation in chapter one 
that country, industry, sectoral and macro/micro level variations in the impact of 
privatisation have been widely recognised and documented. The findings in this 
chapter may therefore not necessarily apply to other sectors or countries. It is 
important, therefore, to evaluate privatisation's impact on another economic 
sector- Nigeria's petroleum industry (in chapter five) in order to enable us 
ascertain the extent to which the finance industry findings relate to or vary from 
the predictive impact of privatisation on unions and employment relationship in 
another economic sector. 
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CHAPTER FIVE- THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY CASE STUDY 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will lay out the broad picture of the impact of privatisation on trade 
unions and employment relationship in the petroleum industry (against a background 
of an introduction on the sector and its pre-privatisation industrial relations 
characteristics) under five sections, using the same indicators employed in section 
4.1 of chapter four. Like in chapter four, the analysis here will involve both macro 
and micro level evaluation of trade unions and employment relationship before and 
after privatisation, based on the adopted analytical variables defined in chapter one. 
5.2. An Appraisal Of The Situation Before Privatisation 
As in chapter four, the appraisal in this sub-section will be conducted in two parts. 
The first part will involve an introduction of the sector's features and its broad 
industrial relations characteristics. In the second part, an evaluation of pre- 
privatisation trade unionism and employment relationship between 1994 and 1999 
will be conducted (based on similar empirical measures adopted in chapter four). 
5.2.1. The petroleum industry before privatisation 
Nigeria is a member of OPEC and one of the world's largest oil producers, with 
estimated proven reserves of between 24 billion to 31.5 billion barrels (Johnson, 
2003, p. 2). The oil sector accounts for between 90 and 95 percent of Nigeria' export 
revenues, over 90 percent of foreign earnings and nearly 80 percent of government 
revenues (Ibid, p. 1; Tables 29,30 and 31). Between 1985 and 1995 for instance, 
crude oil sales accounted for over 90 percent of Nigeria's total exports and 
contributed 97.1 percent in 1985,97 percent in 1990,96.2 percent in 1991,97.9 
percent in 1992,96.5 percent in 1993,96.7 percent in 1994 and 96.5 percent in 1995 
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(Akinlaja 1999, p. 18). Nigeria's near-total dependence on oil is illustrated in Tables 
29 to 31. 
Government involvement in Nigeria's oil industry started with the enactment of the 
Mineral Oil Act of 1914 by the British colonial government. As MutfWang (2001) 
notes, oil concessions in the early phase of the industry were as defined by British 
colonial rule and an international oil industry dominated by the 'seven sisters' (Royal 
Dutch Shell, Exxon, BP, Gulf, Mobil, Texaco and Standard Oil) which formed 
themselves into an oligopoly for the control and exploitation of oil resources 
throughout the world. The role of the colonial state was limited to the granting of oil 
concessions to British or British-allied private investors. In 1959, the colonial 
government enacted the Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT) Act that provided for the sharing 
of oil proceeds on a 50/50 basis. 
According to Mutfwang (2001) the concessionaire era was characterised by high 
degree of control and power by the oil companies. Initially, these companies owned 
all the oil produced in their concessions and detennined the production levels. Until 
1966, they also determined the realized prices of crude oil upon which royalty and 
petroleum profit tax were based. Consequently total oil revenue earned by Nigeria at 
the time was low. In 1962, the independent Nigenan government enacted the Mineral 
Oil Act (which introduced other oil companies into the industry) and the Companies 
Act, which compelled the oil companies to incorporate Nigerian affiliates. The 
Company's Act was later complemented by the Petroleum Act of 1969 that provides 
comprehensive framework for oil activities' administration in Nigeria (Ibid. ). 
Oil revenues rose sharply and accounted for over 80 percent of total federal 
revenues, and over 90 percent of the country's export earnings by 1974 (MutfWang, 
2001, p. 10). Consequently, the government embarked on a more rigorous attempt to 
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regulate and participate in the industry via legislative and political measures aimed at 
regulating the 'excesses" of private foreign oil investors (Mutfwang, 2001). In 
pursuance of this objective, the federal government acquired 33 percent equity 
interest in Nigeria Agip Oil Corporation and 35 percent in Elf in 1971 (Lukman 
1987, p. 21; MutfWang 2001, p. 11) and established the Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation later known as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to 
engage in prospecting for, mining and marketing of oil and in all other activities 
within the petroleum industry. 
By 1973, the government extended its equity participation in the industry to Shell- 
BP, Gulf and Mobil by acquiring 35% equity interests in each of them (Muffivang, 
200 1, p. 11). Nigeria also entered into Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Multi- 
national Oil Corporations (which account for about 95 percent of the country's oil 
production) with the largest joint venture operated by Shell producing nearly 50 
percent of the nation's crude oil (Ibid. ). 
Shortly before privatisation commenced in the industry, the NNPC owned a 55 
percent stake in the Shell joint venture and 60 percent in other joint ventures 
operated by ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco (formerly two separate companies- 
Chevron and Texaco), ENFAgip (formerly Agip) and TotalFinaElf (Avuru, 1999, p. 
226, cited in MutfWang 200 1, p. 11; Johnson 2003, p. 1). As at September 1997, there 
were 13 active indigenous oil companies in the industry involved in various stages of 
exploration and development, producing 55,000 barrels of oil per day (MutfWang 
200 1, pp. I 1- 14). 
Government participation in and control of the industry is however, not limited to the 
upstream sector. In the downstream sector, the government owned 
four refineries- 
Port Harcourt I and 11, Wam and Kaduna- with a combined capacity of 438,750 
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barrels per day. Like in the upstream sector, problems of sabotage, fire, poor 
management and lack of turnaround maintenance have decreased actual output in 
this sector. overriment ownership and control also had serious implications for the 
industry. As Johnson (2003) notes, a major problem facing Nigeria's upstream oil 
sector is insufficient government funding of its JV commitments. Moreover, the 
industry is plagued by political and ethnic problems (for instance, in the Niger-Delta 
region of the country) which often disrupts oil production and supplies. 
In addition to crude oil reserves, Nigeria has an estimated 124 trillion cubic feet 
(Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves- the ninth largest in the world, 75 percent of 
which is flared due to lack of necessary infrastructure for its utilisation. The World 
Bank (cited in Johnson, 2003, p. 6) estimates, for instance, that Nigeria accounts for 
12.5 percent of the world's total gas flare. Nigeria completed a US$3.8 billion 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) project, the Bonny LNG, in September 1999, expected 
to process 252.4 billion cubic feet of LNG in its two production trains annually. The 
government (represented by NNPQ owns majority (49 percent) equity in the 
business under a consortium known as the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) 
Corporation. Other partners in the venture include Shell (25.6 percent), TotalFinaElf 
(15 percent) and Agip which owns 10.4 percent (Ibid. ). 
It is imperative to note that the liberalisation introduced in the oil industry by the 
government was a product of its failure to meet its obligations to its Joint Venture 
(JVC) partners, which amongst other factors, precipitated the crisis in the industry in 
the 1990s. For example, the 1996 budget reduced JV funding by 30 percent and 
consequently, industry operations declined by 40 percent (Mutfwang 1999, p. 167 
cited in Mutfwang 2001, p. 13). As Mutfwang (2001) notes, with the introduction of 
SAP in 1986, the government (in pursuit of its disengagement from direct 
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participation in the industry) commercialised. NNPC in 1988 and disposed of some of 
its shares in the Ws. The government later sold 20 percent of its equity in Shell to its 
LNG partners- 10 percent to Shell, 5 percent to Agip and 5 percent to Elf and 
reduced its equity participation in three oil marketing companies- NOLCHEM Plc, 
Unipetrol, and African Petroleum Plc via public sale (fbid, p. 14). 
The introduction of SAP, according to Mutfwang (2001), rolled back the frontiers of 
the state in the oil sector, although the oil sector remained the most trans-national 
sector of the economy. The proposed privatisation of NNPC and its subsidiaries 
under the second phase of the programme was however, strongly resisted by 
NUPENG/PENGASSAN and NLC, with a 'warning' two days nationwide strike by 
NUPENG/PENGASSAN in September 2002. As a result of strong trade unions' 
opposition, the government has so far been unable to privatise NNPC and its 
subsidiaries. 
5.2.2. Overview of pre-privatisation petroleum industry trade unionism and 
employment relationship 
Prior to the restructuring of Nigeria's trade unions in 1976, trade unionism in the 
country's oil industry was decentralised, with several house unions representing 
workers. After 1976 and the promulgation of the Trade Unions Act (1978), all unions 
in the industry merged to fonn what is today known as PENGASSAN and NUPENG 
(Akinlaja, 1999). Membership of NUPENG is open to all junior workers in both 
government-owned and private oil and natural gas companies, while senior 
employees and middle-level management staff are members of PENGASSAN. 
On registration as a trade union, NUPENG quickly established a militant reputationI 
as evidenced by the various strike actions it embarked upon between 1978 and 1979. 
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In each case NUPENG mobilised for national strike but the employers capitulated to 
its demands. In some of the disputes, the government intervened to ensure a quick 
resolution due to the sensitive nature of the industry and its strategic relevance to the 
nation's economy (Akinlaja, 1999, pp. 36-52) and global oil market stability. 
Following the consolidation of its power and the resolution of its internal crisis in 
1987, NUPENG organised tanker drivers (responsible for the distribution of 
petroleum products across the country) into a powerful wing of the union in 1988. 
Since then, tanker drivers have remained a formidable strategic bargaining and strike 
weapon in the union's conduct of industrial relations. 
PENGASSAN, on the other hand, was one of the 24 Senior Staff Associations 
created under the 1978 Trade Unions Act. Employees of each company in the 
industry (registered by the National Secretariat of each union) constitute a union 
domestic branch. Between 1987 and 1999, the NUPENG's branches increased from 
83 to about 100 (Akinlaja, 1999, p. 86). No data exists on the number of the 
PENGASSAN's branches before privatisation. Available data however reveal that 
the union operates in 98 branches as at 2004 (See http: //www. penassan. org). 
Negotiations in the industry before privatisation were bi-annual, except in the case of 
petrol tanker drivers where negotiations were triennial. The national leadership of the 
two trade unions co-ordinated negotiations and usually delegated authority to branch 
executives to open negotiation with management but intervened when negotiations 
run into a hitch and also at the conclusion stage to secure an agreement (Akinlaja 
1999; Interviews with NUPENG and PENGASSAN's representatives, 2002). Like in 
the finance sector, the domestic committees of the unions acted as their immediate 
link with management and advised the National Executive Councils on the positions 
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of salaries, wages, fringe benefits and other conditions of service in each 
establishment. 
Before privatisation, both unions closed ranks in most of their branches and took 
common stand on issues concerning conditions of service, retirement, arbitrarý, 
termination of employment, etc. (Akinlaja, 1999). Between 1994 and 1998, the 
military dictatorship appointed Sole Administrators to take charge of the affairs of 
PENGASSAN and NUPENG and sacked their national leadership due to their 
prolonged strike (in collaboration with the NLQ over the military government's 
annulment of the results of the June 12,1993 elections won by late Chief Moshood 
Abiola. The three unions' democratically- elected leadership was however, restored 
in 1998. 
Although pre-privatisation strike data for the oil industry are largely undocumented, 
this Author's experience as an official of NLC indicates that majority of strikes in the 
industry before privatisation were related to industrial relations matters. However, a 
major problem arose before privatisation over the failure of the government to carry 
NUPENG/PENGASSAN along in negotiations with core investors. According to 
NUPENG's General Secretary, the privatisation exercises conducted in NOLCHEM 
Plc, Unipetrol Plc, and African Petroleum ý(AP) Plc resulted in conflicts between 
NUPENG/PENGASSAN and oil industry employers due to such exclusion 
QENGASSAN BULLETIN', December 2001, p. 4). 
5.2.3. An empirical measure of pre-privatisation petroleum sector industrial relations 
As noted earlier, the evaluation in this section will be based similar empirical 
measures adopted in chapter four, as follows: 
173 
5.2.3.1. The balance of bargaining power 
As noted in chapter four, political factors are more important than market indicators 
as basis for determining the balance of bargaining power between unions and 
employers before privatisation. Consequently, pre-privatisation company 
performance data for Conoil Plc will only serve as background data for assessing the 
company's post-privatisation perfon-nance. As in chapter four, our analytical focus 
will be on factors like the identity of trade unions, union membership and density, 
the political and legal context of bargaining, the economic centrality of the 
industry/sector and macro level vacancy/unemployment ratio as measures for 
determining bargaining power between oil industry employers and unions before 
prIvatisation, as follows: 
1. The fin-n's liquid assets 
The pre-privatisation liquid assets of Conoil Plc (privatised in 2000) in relation to its 
fixed costs from 1993 to 1999 are examined in this section in order to measure the 
company's hypothetical ability to continue to meet its financial obligations following 
a temporary work stoppage by unions and consequently, its bargaining power. 
Between 1993 and 1999, Conoil Plc's performance was in decline. Although the 
company's net assets rose from =N=0.583 billion in 1993 to =N=1.853 billion in 
1996, it declined to =N=1.347 billion in 1997 but rose to =N=1.921 billion in 1999 
(See Table 32). 
Despite the 229.5 percent increase in its total assets between 1993 and 1999, the 
company's performance was not as impressive as it appears on paper, as the 
corresponding net current assets/liabilities for the period indicate (Ibid. ). The 
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company's earnings (profit after taxation) was =N=341.8 million in 1993. 
=N=892.02 million in 1994 and =N=1.232 billion in 1995. By 1996, the company's 
fortunes declined, with profit after tax reducing by 79 percent to =N=253.42 million. 
Between 1997 and 1998, the company sustained a loss (after tax) of =N=1.025 
billion and =::: N=596.72 million respectively (Ibid. ). In 1999 however, gross profit 
increased to =N=4.387 billion due to pre-privatisation restructuring, while profit 
after tax also increased to =-N=749.601 million, but declined to =N=253 million 
shortly before the company's privatisation in 2000 (Ibid. ). Between 1997 and 1999, 
no dividends accrued to the shareholders (NOLCHEM Plc, Annual Reports and 
Accounts, 1999, p. 30). 
In line with Smith's (1996) theory, with the decline in the company's fortunes in 
relation to its fixed costs between 1993 and 1999, it was difficult for it to continue to 
meet its financial commitments in the event of a stoppage. This implies a decline in 
the company's bargaining power. 
11. The firm's inventory 
Conoil Plc's traded oil volume for 1997 declined by 15 percent from 1.2 billion litres 
in 1996 to 1.04 billion litres in 1997. Turnover for its oil sector for 1997 was 
=N= 11.07 billion (a decline of 13 percent when compared to 1996 and 19 percent 
compared to 1995) while gross margin decreased by 23 percent (NOLCHEM Plc., 
1997 Annual Report and Accounts, p. 9). This implies a decline in the company's 
ability to survive a temporary work stoppage by the unions (and consequently, 
bargaining power) in line with Smith's (1996) theory. 
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M. The level of capital intensity 
The company's level of capitalisation increased between 1993 and 1998. Called up 
share capital increased from =N=56 million in 1993 to =N=171.5 million in 1998, 
but remained stagnant in 1999. Shareholding rose from 252 million (1996) to 294 
million (1997) and 343 million ordinary shares in 1998 (lbid. ). Shareholders funds 
(which rose from =N=583.4 million in 1993 to =N=1.657 billion in 1997) declined to 
=N=: 37.08 million in 1998 but rose to =N=786.69 million in 1999 due to pre- 
privatisation restructuring (see Table 32). However, earnings per share (which rose 
from =N= 1.16 in 1993 to =Nz: --3.53 per share in 1994 and =N=3.59 per share in 1995) 
declined to =N=0.74 per share in 1996. Between 1997 and 1998, the company posted 
losses of =N=2.99 and =N=1.74 per share respectively (Ibid. ). 
According to Smith (1996) high capital intensity lowers a firm's bargaining power 
by raising (rental or interest) costs during a temporary stoppage. As already noted 
however, the indicators of pre-privatisation company performance evaluated above 
are not as relevant as political factors in the determination of the pre-privatisation 
balance of bargaining power between unions and employers. Even if these factors are 
taken into account, they reveal the weakness of Conoil Plc's management before 
privatisation. 
IV. The identity of the trade unions 
The appraisal here comprises of an evaluation of the identities of PENGASSAN and 
NUPENG in terms of their background and their internal dynamics, their political 
reputation, mobilising potential and cohesion. As earlier noted in this chapter, 
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NUPENG is a militant trade union with a history of forcing employers to capitulate 
to its demands (See Akinlaja, 1999, pp. 36-52 for details). 
Collaboration between NUPENG and PENGASSAN also increased over the years, 
with both unions closing ranks over most industrial relations matters affecting their 
members (Akinlaja, 1999) as evidenced by their united opposition to the privatisation 
of NNPC and its subsidiaries for instance (See NUPENG/PENGASSAN, 2002, p. 1). 
Internal cohesion in both unions was also very strong before privatisation, while both 
unions negotiated jointly on behalf of their members with each company's 
management. Where agreements were not forthcoming, the unions mobilised their 
full (macro-level) strike arsenal in order to force agreement at the company level. 
This alliance made them a very formidable force in collective bargaining in the 
industry. 
Union density 
Data on union density in the industry are not readily available. However, with the 
exception of top management employees, most oil workers are either members of the 
NUPENG or PENGASSAN. Moreover, the trade two unions successfully unionised 
most casual workers in the industry before privatisation (See NUPENG, 
PENGASSAN, et al, 2004, for instance) suggesting high union density in the 
industry before privatisation. 
vi. The existence of alternative wage for union members 
The samples of annual average wage that can be used as a measure of 'inside option' 
wage (Smith, 1996) for members of NUPENG and PENGASSAN in case of 
temporary stoppage before privatisation are indicated in Tables 8 and 16. Their 
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ability to access alternative wage depends however, on their ability to secure 
temporary employment for the period of the strike, which in turn, depends on the 
macro level vacancy to unemployment ratio, examined below. 
vii. The macro level vacancy/unemployment ratio 
The indicators of vacancies and unemployment as well as the ratio of vacancies to 
unemployment for lower grade workers and for professionals and executives in 
Nigeria from 1999 to 2000 are indicated in Tables 9 to 11. As Table II indicates, in 
1999 the vacancy to unemployment ratio for lower grade workers (NUPENG 
members) was 8.5 percent but declined to 7.71 percent in 2000. For professionals 
and executives (members of PENGASSAN) the ratio was 0.22 percent in 1999 but 
declined by almost fifty percent to 0.11 percent in 2000. For members of both unions 
therefore, it was becoming increasingly difficult to secure alternative employment 
(and hence, alternative income) during work stoppages before privatisation. 
According to Smith (1996) such a trend will have a negative effect on union 
bargaining power. 
viii. The economic centrality of the industry/sector 
As noted in section 5.2.1, the oil industry was more important to Nigeria's economy 
than other economic sectors and was a major source of revenue for the government 
before privatisation (See Table 22 for details). As argued in chapter one, 
theoretically, employers and government in developing nations will not risk work 
stoppages in such vital sectors. Consequently, NUPENG and PENGASSAN were at 
an advantage due to the political leverage they derived from this factor. 
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ix. The political context of bargaining 
Like other Nigerian unions, NUPENG and PENGASSAN were affected by decades 
of military dictatorship. Unlike their counterparts, however, they were much more 
significant in national politics before privatisation largely due to their history of 
militancy, high level of strike mobil 1 sation/capacity, political leverage and the 
centrality of the industry to Nigeria's economy and the global market. As Falola and 
Ihonvbere (1985) note for instance, various dictatorial military regimes did very little 
damage to the mobilising and strike capacities of NUPENG and PENGASSAN. 
Government intervention in trade unionism during the civilian administration of 
Nigeria's Second Republic (from 1979 to 1983) also had very little impact on the 
power of the unions before privatisation. 
For instance, as noted in section 5.2.1 of this chapter, although NUPENG and 
PENGASSAN did not oppose privatisation of SOEs in the industry, they 
successfully opposed the privatisation of NNPC and its subsidiaries. The unions 
argued that with oil as the pivot of Nigeria's mono-cultural economy, 
" ... privatisation of any of the public concerns is tantamount to mortgaging the 
national security and interest. It will result in greater capital flight that will in tum 
deepen Nigeria's economic crisis, thereby accentuating the problems of low capacity 
utilisation, unemployment/retrenchment, high crime rate and other social vices" 
(TENGASSAN BULLETIN, December 200 1, p. 1). 
According to PENGASSAN's President, the unions opposed that aspect of 
pnvatisation because; 
179 
"Privatisation the Nigerian way has dire consequences for labour, and these include 
job threats, threat to standard of living through inability to pay commensurate wage, 
pension and gratuity, increased unemployment, capital flight, lack of respect for 
Nigerian workers, chronic exploitation, repression and loss of self-respect by 
Nigerians. Also, our concerns and fears are further heightened because all 
organisations privatised by the BPE without recourse to the in-house unions and 
involvement of experts in such organizations have ended up with the human 
resources in such organization being badly treated" (Ogbeifun, 2004, p. 3). 
The unions favoured liberalisation of the industry's downstream sector under certain 
conditions and urged the government to break the monopoly of NNPC through 
liberalisation, while threatening to paralyse the economy if the government falls to 
fulfil their conditions (Ogbodo, 2001). Consequently, NUPENG and PENGASSAN 
successfully mobillsed workers and embarked on nationwide 'warning strike' 
between September 23 and 24 of 2002, in order to force the government to rescind its 
plan (Adebayo, 2002; Interviews with -union representatives, 2002). The government 
suspended its planned privatisation of the downstream sector of the industry until all 
issues raised by workers and other stakeholders in the industry are resolved 
(Awowole-Browne, 2002; Alexander Oil and Gas Connections, 2002). This was the 
first time in the history of Nigeria's privatisation that government was forced to 
reverse its position due to trade union opposition. It therefore, underlines the strength 
of NUPENG and PENGASSAN. 
X. The legal context of bargaining 
Under the provisions of the 1978 Trade Unions Act, recognition of NUPENG and 
PENGASSAN by oil employers was compulsory. The promulgation by the General 
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Abacha military dictatorship of Decrees Nos. 9 and 10 in 1994 to curtail the powers 
of the NLC and NUPENG/PENGASSAN, which were then engaged in a political 
strike, marked a watershed in the history of these unions. Decree No. 9 of 1994, 
although not necessitated by privatisation, dissolved the executive and national 
organs of NLC and replaced its leadership with a Sole Administrator appointed by 
government, while Decree No. 10 did the same thing in NUPENG and 
PENGASSAN. 
Between 1994 and 1998 therefore, NLC and the two unions were rendered 
powerless, with their strike and mobilising capacity almost completely neutrallsed by 
military dictatorship. In 1998, these decrees were repealed by the General Abubakar 
regime and the control of NUPENG/PENGASSAN and NLC reverted to 
democratically elected labour leaders. Following the restoration of their national 
organs in 1998, NUPENG and PENGASSAN were able to reassert their political 
influence before the privatisation of SOEs in the industry commenced. 
The empirical factors evaluated in the preceding paragraphs are meant to facilitate a 
measurement of the balance of bargaining power in Nigeria's petroleum industry 
before privatisation. The question at this stage is: how can these measures of 
bargaining power translate into actual empirical measurements? As earlier noted, 
Scott M. Fuess Jr. 's (2001, p. 5) formula is not applicable for measuring bargaining 
power in a pre-privatisation non-market context within which SOEs operate. An 
empirical measurement of bargaining power in the oil industry before privatisation, 
based on Scott A Fuess Jr. 's (2001, p. 5) formula, will suffice to buttress this point. 
As Table 33 (based on empirical indicators of NUPENG's wage demands and actual 
wage increases the union was able to secure) indicates, NUPENG's bargaining 
power was 50 percent in 1999 but declined to 5.6 percent in 2000, implying that its 
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bargaining power was low relative to employers. Actual industrial relations 
developments in the industry before privatisation however, suggest that NUPENG 
exerted a much higher level of influence than these empirical factors suggest due to 
its strong political leverage as evidenced for instance, by the union's successful 
opposition of NNPC's privatisation. 
Moreover, contrary to Scott M. Fuess Jr. (2001, p. 8) conclusion that a decline in the 
percentage wage increase obtained by a union translates to a decline in leverage, the 
percentage wage increases achieved by NUPENG represents a national average 
(since collective bargaining in the industry takes place at the company level where 
salaries vary) and could be quite substantial compared to wages in other sectors as 
the oil industry pays the highest wages in Nigeria. Additionally, NUPENG may have 
requested very high increases as a bargaining strategy knowing that it was prepared 
to accept less. What this suggests therefore, is that for an empirical measure of 
bargaining power to give an accurate picture of the trend in an industry in a non- 
market, pre-privatisation context, union bargaining power, the economic centrality of 
the industry, the mode of bargaining (whether centralised or decentralised) and the 
political context of bargaining are important factors that must be taken into account. 
5.2.3.2. Collective bargaining 
The nature of pre-privatisation industrial relations in Nigeria's petroleum 
-industry 
was discussed at the beginning of this chapter. A repeat is therefore unnecessary. 
Suffice to note however, that before privatisation, collective bargaining in the 
industry was decentralised and was regulated by the provisions of various labour 
laws, with each company regarded as a domestic branch of NUPENG and 
PENGASSAN. According to Akinlaja (1999) the recourse to decentralised 
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bargaining by oil industry unions stems from the complex nature of the industry, 
comprised of multinational oil companies (backed by huge foreign reserves and the 
market power of their parent companies) and indigenous companies some of which 
rely one hundred percent on local capital. Negotiations in the industry before 
privatisation were biennial, except in the petrol tanker drivers' wing of NUPENG 
where negotiations were triennial (Akinlaja, 1999, Inter-views with NUPENG and 
PENGASSAN's representatives, 2002). 
Between 1993 and 1999, NUPENG and PENGASSAN cooperated in most of their 
branches and took common stand on issues concerning industrial relations. 
According to Akinlaja (1999) not all employers recognised both unions in the early 
days of unionism in the industry. Generally however, oil employers (including 
Conoil Plc) recognised NUPENG and PENGASSAN at all levels of bargaining and 
engaged in collected bargaining. 
5.2.3.3. Union Membership size and finances 
Available data indicate that the membership size of NUPENG increased from 22,000 
in 1984 (Akinlaja 1999, p. 65) to 22,397 in 1991 (Ibid, pp. 245-248) and 40,000 in 
1992 (Interview with NUPENG General Secretary, 2002). In 1994, the members 
declined to 30,000 (Table 15) and 7,536 by December 1999 (Table 19). Data on the 
membership size of PENGASSAN were harder to obtain. Available data however, 
indicate that in 2000, PENGASSAN had 14,000 members (PENGASSAN Info, 
vol. I, No. I, December 2000, p. 6). 
As these data indicate, the combined membership of these unions declined prior to 
1999, largely due to the effects of SAP (Fajana 2000, p. 68) and 
casualisation/contract employment. In 1991, for instance, there was an estimated 
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14,559 casual/contract junior workers in the industry as against 23.065 junior 
workers in permanent positions (AkinlaJa 1999, p. 242; Onyeonoru, 2003, p. 9). The 
situation was replicated in the SOEs. For example, Conoil (then National Oil and 
Chemicals) Plc employed 336 casual junior workers compared to 900 pen-nanent 
junior employees in 1999 (AkinlaJa, 1999, pp. 245-248). 
There is evidence from this study to indicate that the decline in trade unions' 
membership before privatisation affected their finances. For example, NUPENG 
earned about =N=3.6 million or US$163,636.36 at an exchange rate of =N=22 to US 
$1.00 in 1994 (Table 15). In 1999, the union earned =N=9.044 million or 
US$91 ý5 34.41 at an exchange rate of =N=98.80 to US $ 1.00 (Table 20. See Table 21 
for the exchange rates of the Naira for various years). Despite the decline in their 
membership size and revenue however, NUPENG and PENGASSAN controlled a 
combined estimated membership size of about 22,000 workers before privatisation 
most of whom were skilled employees that could not be replaced at short notice. 
5.2.3.4. Wages 
Before privatisation, wages in the petroleum industry were amongst the highest in 
the country (see Table 16) and were negotiated by NUPENG/PENGASSAN via 
collective bargaining with each company's management. In the case of NUPENG for 
instance, the average member's salary was about =N=40,000.00 monthly in 1999 
(Akinlaja 1999, p. 92). Between 1994 and 1998 when Sole Administrators presided 
over the affairs of NUPENG and PENGASSAN, the unions were not able to freely 
negotiate wages on behalf of their members. With the restoration of union 
democratic leadership in 1998, NUPENG was able to negotiate 75 percent wage 
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increase (see Table 33). For PENGASSAN, average minimum wage was around 
=N=50,000.00 a month in 1999 (PENGASSAN 1999, p. I). 
5.2.3.5. Grievance/disciplinary procedures 
Grievance/disciplinary procedures in the industry were moderated by Nigeria's 
labour laws and formed part of collective agreements. The procedures comprised of a 
combination of internal and external statutory processes similar to what obtained in 
the finance sector, with powers for overriding mediation, conciliation and 
adjudication vested in the IAP and NIC. In a majority of cases, both parties draw up 
a Memorandum of Agreement upon which the IAP gives a consent award (AkinlaJa, 
1999). 
By far the most important singular trigger for union grievance in the industry before 
privatisation were casualisation and contract employment, which unions regarded as 
cc a design to phase out our union" (AkinlaJa, 1999, p. 244) and a violation of section 
7 of Nigeria's Labour Decree No. 21 of 1974 that mandates an employer to absorb a 
worker into permanent employment after three months of continuous service, Since 
1991 , casualisation, outsourcing and contract employment 
led to union actions 
against practically every company engaged in the practice (in the case of the 
NUPENG for instance, about 81 companies) and remained an on-going struggle for 
both unions even after privatisation (Ibid, pp. 245-248). 
5.2.4. Conclusion 
Before privatisation, Nigeria's petroleum industry unions were very strong relative to 
employers as evidenced by their capacity to Influence government policies and the 
term s/conditions of employment to their advantage. The unions derived their power 
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from their political leverage, which was in turn a product of the economic centrality 
of the industry to Nigeria and global oil market stability that the unions exploited to 
their advantage in negotiations. NUPENG and PENGASSAN's cohesion and 
bargaining power was also strengthened by the 1976 restructuring exercise and their 
collaboration over industrial relations matters. Moreover, both unions were 
comfortable financially while their combined estimated membership of about 22,000 
highly skilled workers enhanced their mobilising and strike capacities and 
consequently, their bargaining power. Although trade union revenues declined as a 
result of the decline in their membership size, the unions remained financially 
buoyant. 
Before privatisation, collective bargaining in the petroleum industry was 
decentralised and was accepted by trade unions and employers, while grievances 
were handled in accordance with the provisions of prevailing labour laws and 
collective agreements. There is evidence from this chapter of a decline in union 
membership before privatisation, due to a combination of factors like macro level 
economic decline, SAP, casualisation and contract employment. However, NUPENG 
and PENGASSAN were statutorily recognised by most employers (including SOEs)- 
Wages were determined through collective bargaining by NUPENG/PENGASSAN 
and the management of each company. Although the unions were unable to conduct 
unrestrained wage negotiations on behalf of their members between 1994 and 1998 
due to the brutal intervention of Nigeria's military dictators, by 1999 free wage 
negotiations resumed and the unions successfully negotiated increases in wages. 
SOEs and private establishments in the industry also provided for internal grievance 
machinery in their collective agreements regulated by the 1976 Trade Disputes 
Decree (as amended). Arbitration was compulsory with penalties stipulated for 
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failure to report disputes or strikes. Strikes and lockouts were also prohibited in cases 
where the process of conciliation and arbitration were ongoing. 
In the preceding paragraphs, the characteristics of trade unionism and employment 
relationship in Nigeria's petroleum industry before privatisation were appraised in 
order to enable us compare the developments before pnvatisation with the post- 
privatisation trend. In section 5.3, an appraisal of post-privatisation trend will be 
conducted. 
5.3. An Evaluation Of The Situation After Privatisation 
The analysis in this section will cover the period between 2000 and 2004 and will 
involve a thorough evaluation based on the analytical variables adopted in section 
5.2, as follows: 
5.3.1. The balance of bargaining power 
Company performance data for Conoil Ple will be evaluated in this subsection as a 
measure of its post-privatisation performance and consequently, its capacity to 
continue to operate in the event of a temporary work stoppage. Other factors- the 
identity of trade unions, union membership size and density, the political and legal 
context of bargaining, the economic centrality of the oil industry and macro level 
vacancy/unemployment ratio will also be evaluated as important variables for 
computing the balance of bargaining power between NUPENG/PENGASSAN and 
employers in the industry's post-privatisation market setting, as follows: 
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1. The firm's liquid assets 
Shortly before its privatisation, the company's performance improved slightly. The 
company came out of losses in 1999 as a result of increased sales and profits, with 
turnover rising to =N=17.376 billion and pre-tax profit at =N=936.35 million. Profit 
after tax was =N=749.6 million, an improvement on the loss of =N=596.72 million 
for 1998. Total assets for 1999 was =N=2.503 billion, a marked improvement 
compared to =N=2.273 billion for 1998 (Thisda ', Monday, January 14,2002, p. 23; 
Table 32). 
After the company's privatisation, its performance improved phenomenally. By the 
end of 2000, total assets rose to =N=2.435 billion, rising further to =N==l 1.470 
billion in 2001 and =N=12.964 billion in 2002,, while total turnover rose from 
=N=17.376 billion in 1999 to =N=21.886 billion in 2002 (Conoil Plc, Annual 
Report, 2002) There was also an improvement in profitability with prof-it after tax 
(which declined from =N=749.602 million in 1999 to =N=527.041 million in 2000) 
rising to =N=1.022 billion in 2001, although it declined to =N=741.384 million in 
2002 (Ibid; Table 32). 
In line with Smith's (1996) theory, the improvement in Conoil Ple's performance 
between 1999 and 2002 implies that it was easier for it to continue to meet its 
financial commitments in the event of a stoppage and is an indication of an 
improvement in its bargaining power. 
ii. The firm's inventory 
In 1999, largely as a result of its 1998 re-engineering exercise (known as the 
Business Process Improvement- BPI) Conoil Plc's total turnover rose by 50 percent 
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to =N=17.367 billion compared to 1998 (NOLCHEM Plc, Annual Report and 
Accounts, 1999, p. 6) with turnover from both oil and chemical products at 
=N=16.586 billion and : --N=790.002 million respectively (NOLCHEM PIc, Annual 
Report and Accounts 2000, p. 19). After its privatisation, the company's total 
turnover rose further by 14 percent to =N=20.192 billion in 2000 (Ibid. ) with 
turnover from both oil and chemical products at =N=19.545 billion and =N=647.841 
million respectively (Ibid. ). The company's stocks (valued at a loss of =N=109.2 
million in 1999) rose to =N=1.735 billion in 2000 and =N=2.081 billion in 2002 
(Conoil Plc, Annual Repo 2002). 
With the increase in its inventory, the company's ability to survive a temporary work 
stoppage and consequently, its bargaining power could be said to have improved, in 
line with Smith's (1996) theory. As Smith (1996) notes, larger inventories should 
increase bargaining power and reduce wages and vice versa. The higher the level of 
stocks of finished goods, the greater the firm's ability to survive a temporary work 
stoppage and the greater its bargaining power, and, by extension, its ability to resist 
workers wage demands. A high level of inventories, according to Smith (1996) might 
however, be indicative of a reduced demand for the company's product and 
consequently, might induce workers to accept lower pay settlement. However, as 
noted earlier, the balance of bargaining power between management and unions is 
not dependent on the level of inventory alone but on a combination of factors. 
The level of capital intensity 
As at 2000 when the company was privatised, its market capitalisation was valued at 
=N=8.5 billion, with the company occupying the fifteenth position amongst the 
country's top twenty companies on the Lagos Stock Exchange 
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(http: //www. NiReriaBusinesslnfo. com, 2004). By 2001, the company's market 
capitalisation increased to =N=10.2 billion, with the company occupying the I 8th 
position on the list of top twenty companies (Ibid. ). According to Smith (1996) a 
high level of capital intensity lowers a finn's bargaining power by raising rental or 
interest costs during a temporary stoppage. 
iv. The identity of the trade unions 
There is no evidence of a change in the identity (and structures) of NUPENG and 
PENGASSAN due to privatisation. Collaboration between both unions over most 
issues of industrial relations also remains intact, same as their militancy as evidenced 
by their continued joint opposition to the government's attempt to privatise the 
NNPC even after the privatisation of the industry's downstream sector. 
As AkinlaJ a (1999) notes; 
c4 Over the years, both sides of the oil industry have been closing ranks and acting in 
concert. That is the reality on the ground in most branches of NUPENG and 
PENGASSAN. Although still maintaining their individual identities, they take a 
common stand on issues. It does not matter whether the issues concem retirement, 
conditions of service, arbitrary termination of employment, or expatriates taking over 
jobs for which qualified Nigerians are available. Whenever the issue of common 
welfare arises, the union (NUPENG) and the Association (PENGASSAN) pull down 
the artificial barrier erected by that separatist piece of legislation (the 1978 Trade 
Unions Act). If the matter affects PENGASSAN and the leadership of the senior staff 
association solicits NUPENG's support, an alliance quickly forms, and vice versa" 
(Akinlaja 1999, p. 93, parenthesis mine). 
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The ease with which members of NUPENG metamorphose into membership of 
PENGASSAN further cements the solidarity between the two unions. As Akinlaja 
(1999) notes; 
"NUPENG graduates automatically admitted into the ranks of the senior staff are 
finding themselves in positions of leadership inside PENGASSAN. Thus, the two 
groups have become indivisible, fighting battles together" (Ibid. ). 
The implication of this alliance for collective bargaining is not lost on employers in 
the industry. Where agreements are not forthcoming, the unions still mobilise their 
joint (macro level) strike arsenal in order to force an agreement at the company level. 
Strikes in the industry portend grave implications for oil exports and international oil 
market stability and prices- a fact that moderates both government and employers' 
response to the unions' demands to the latter's advantage. 
V. Union density 
Despite the scarcity of union density data at the macro and micro levels of Nigeria's 
oil industry, it is safe to assume on the basis of the overall decline in the post- 
privatisation membership of NUPENG and PENGASSAN (discussed below) that 
union density in the industry declined, at least in the privatised SOEs. Theoretically 
therefore, NUPENG and PENGASSAN should be the less willing than Conoil Plc's 
management to pursue a bargaining strategy that could induce a stoppage. However, 
both unions continue to maintain a formidable presence in most of the privatised 
SOEs, including Conoil Plc and continue to pursue a bargaining strategy that could 
induce work stoppage even after privatisation. 
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vi. The existence of alternative wage for union members 
In the absence of NUPENG and PENGASSAN strike funds, the availability of 
alternative income from temporary employment elsewhere or from the income of 
their striking members' household remains the only other means of enhancing both 
unions' bargaining power after privatisation. As Tables 8 and 16 indicate, the 'Inside 
option' wages available to oil workers in the event of a temporary work stoppage are 
no where near what is obtainable in the industry. Moreover, the union members' 
chances of finding alternative employment are pretty slim given Nigeria's low post- 
privatisation macro level vacancy to unemployment ratio discussed below. 
vil. The macro level vacancy/unemployment ratio 
The indicators of vacancies and unemployment as well as the ratio of vacancies to 
unemployment for lower grade workers and for professionals and executives in 
Nigeria from 1999 to 2002 are indicated in Tables 9 to 11. As Table II indicates, the 
vacancy to unemployment ratio for lower grade workers (NUPENG members) which 
was 8.5 percent in 1999 declined to 7.71 percent in 2000 and 7.29 percent in 2001. 
For professionals and executives (members of PENGASSAN) the ratio was 0.22 
percent in 1999,0.11 percent in 2000 and 0.05 percent in 200 1. 
It is evident from the three Tables that it was becoming increasingly more difficult 
for the unions' members to secure alternative employment and hence, alternative 
income after privatisation. As Smith (1996) notes, such a trend will have a negative 
effect on the bargained wage and the expected value of the employees 'inside 
option'. However, developments in post-privatisation industrial relations 
in the 
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industry indicate that the decline in macro-level vacancy/unemployment ratio had 
very little impact on the unions' bargaining power. 
Vill. The economic centrality of the industry/sector 
Oil remains Nigeria's most important economic product after privatisation. For 
example, in 2002 oil accounted for over 95 percent of revenue Nigeria generated 
from exports, over 72 percent of total trade and 173.5 percent of the balance of trade, 
while non-oil products accounted for 80.18 percent of imports, 4.73 percent of 
exports and re-exports, and 27.19 percent of total trade (See Tables 30 and 3 1). 
ix. The political context of bargaining 
NUPENG and PENGASSAN remain politically influential and are able to 'persuade' 
both government and employers in the industry to moderate their stance on industrial 
relations matters and privatisation. The unions' continue to derive political influence 
from factors like the economic centrality of the industry to Nigeria's economy and 
global oil market stability, their militancy and cohesion, their collaboration in 
collective bargaining and their mobilising and strike capacities. The fact that the 
government has so far been unable to privatise NNPC and its subsidiaries is an 
evidence of the strong political leverage exerted by NUPENG and PENGASSAN. 
X. The legal context of bargaining 
There is no evidence from this study to indicate any change in the legal context of 
bargaining in the industry after privatisation. Apart from the 1999 Privatisation and 
Commercialisation Decree which provides guidelines for implementing the 
programme but is devoid of provisions on the conduct of employers and unions, 
Nigeria's labour laws have in no way been modified to promote the objectives of 
privatisation in the industry. 
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5.3.1.1. Empirical measurement of the balance of bargaining power 
The predictive measures of bargaining power evaluated in section 5.3.1 are meant to 
facilitate an empirical measurement of the balance of bargaining power between 
unions and employers in Nigeria's petroleum industry after privatisation. As in the 
last chapter, Scott M. Fuess Jr. 's (2001, p. 5) formula will be adopted for this 
purpose, using data on both settlement terms and opening demands on wage 
negotiations after privatisation. According to Scott M. Fuess Jr. (2001, p. 5) formula, 
union leverage (? ) can be indexed as: ?= (w1d) x 100 where (w) is contract wage and 
(dý is the union's demand. 
As Table 33 indicates, union leverage for NUPENG experienced a decline from 50 
percent in 1999 (shortly before privatisation) to 5.6 percent in 2000. The union, 
however, experienced a slight increase in leverage between 2000 and 2003. As Scott 
M. Fuess Jr. (2001, p. 8) notes, if unions and firms have routinely achieved harmony 
in their wage negotiations, union leverage (? ) will be fairly steady over time. 
However , if consensus is realised simply by splitting their differences, ?= 50, 
meaning unions obtained half of the amounts demanded. If, on the other hand unions 
are not keen to press their demands, ?< 50. If union leverage is eroded along with 
the decline in union density, then ? falls for the latter years of the sample. 
According to Table 33, NUPENG's leverage (theoretically) declined over the years 
after privatisation. Moreover, Scott M. Fuess Jr. (2001, p. 8) posits that every time 
contractual pay growth falls by at least one percent, union power is assumed to have 
dropped and vice versa. As Table 33 indicates, NUPENG and employers in the 
industry routinely achieved harmony in their wage negotiations before privatisation. 
By 2000, NUPENG's leverage was on the decline. At no time during the period was 
there a consensus between NUPENG and employers. 
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However, Scott M. Fuess Jr. 's (2001, p. 5) formula cannot solely account for changes 
in bargaining power after privatisation. Available evidence from this study indicates 
for instance, that NUPENG exerts a much higher level of influence on both 
employers and government than the post-privatisation empirical data presented 
above suggests. For one thing, the percentage increase in wages achieved by the 
union after privatisation represents a national average (since collective bargaining in 
the industry, as earlier noted, takes place at the company level where salaries vary). 
Moreover, the increases agreed to by NUPENG may be quite substantial considering 
the fact that the industry pays by far the highest wages in Nigeria. The union may 
also have requested very high percentage increases as a bargaining strategy. 
This suggests that for an empirical measurement of bargaining power in a market- 
related post-privatisation context to give an accurate picture of the trend in an 
industry/sector, the economic centrality of the industry, the balance of bargaining 
power, the nature of bargaining (centralised or decentralised) and the political 
context of bargaining are important measures that need be considered alongside data 
on wage demands. 
NUPENG's General Secretary describes the trade union's power relationship with 
management of the privatised SOEs as follows; 
"You know in NUPENG we have since empowered ourselves that no manager who 
confronts us will succeed. We prefer dialogue as the first option but when 
managements are difficult we also expose the difficult aspect of our own union" 
(Interview, 2002). 
PENGASSAN's Secretary-General also notes as follows; 
"I think it (privatisation) has not affected our relationship in the sense that, of course, 
in any situation if you get what you want there is always peace, and management 
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who are also involved in the process realise that they can only make progress if they 
relate properly with the union. They may have their own business interests but I 
think along the line they also realise that they have to carry along the workforce and 
by extension, the union. So I think we've not had problems (Interview, 2002). 
5.3.2. Collective bargaining 
There is continuity in the legal framework of collective bargaining in Nigeria's 
petroleum industry. Collective bargaining also remains the accepted method of 
mediating employment relationship in the privatised SOEs, including the Conoll Ple. 
According to PENGASSAN's S ecretary- General; 
"The collective bargaining system is still there, we still renew our collective 
agreements every two years as the case may be. It (privatisation) has not affected the 
relationship between management and the union because don't forget that this is not 
a new union; we've been on the ground for quite some time. So there is no single 
management- a core investor that has come in that will not follow the processes that 
have been in place with regard to union-management relationship. So, we've really 
not had an antagonistic core investor. Most of them come into this industry with 
caution, particularly because of its unions- NUPENG and PENGASSAN. They know 
that if you come into this industry, then you must fall in line because standards have 
been laid from time. So they just fall in line. We've not had situations of "oh I 
National Oil (Conoil) has been privatised and so it has closed, you don't have 
NUPENG and PENGASSAN there any more" (Interview, 2002). 
Both unions' structures are also intact. On privatisation's impact on union structures, 
PENGASSAN's Secretary-General said; "No, we have all our structures in place" 
(Ibid. ). 
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Privatisation however, benefited NUPENG and PENGASSAN in the area of 
collective bargaining. Like their finance industry counterparts, the unions now 
negotiate beyond the terms of the existing collective agreements. For example. in 
order to resolve the strike embarked upon by the unions to protest the privatisation of 
Oando (formerly Unipetrol) Plc, NUPENG/PENGASSAN and the company's 
management (amongst others) agreed in 2000 that: 
1. Any existing vacancies or those that may arise from structural re- 
organisation shall be filled within the company, except where no capable hand 
exists from within; 
11 There shall be no further rationalisation of staff for the next five years; 
III The option of early retirement of any staff shall be negotiated and agreed 
before it is carried out; 
IV. Members of staff of Unipetrol shall be appointed into the Boards of 
Unipetrol subsidiaries and associated companies; 
V. Management and the two house unions shall be given the opportunity to 
present memoranda to Board Committees from time to time; 
Vi. No employee shall be victimised or intimidated under any guise; and, 
vii. Members of staff of Unipetrol Nigeria Plc shall be paid an ex-gratia 
allowance of three months basic salary (PENGASSAN et al, 2000, pp. 1-3). 
In some of the privatised SOEs, such negotiations created problems. In Conoil Plc 
for example, the management's voluntary severance proposal was only negotiated 
after a strike action by NUPENG and PENGASSAN (Interview with union 
representatives, 2002). According to the company's management representative, in 
order to end the action, "the company's management agreed to pay 150 percent of 
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monthly basic salary multiplied by number of years served by each affected 
employee, excluding their other normal entitlement enumerated in the company's 
policy manual" (Interview, 2002). 
There is no evidence to indicate a shift from collectivism to individualism in Conoil 
Plc and other privatised SOEs in the industry like was the case in First Bank Plc after 
privatisation. Rather, there is continuity in decentralised collective bargaining. 
According to its management representative, Conoil Plc still recognises both unions 
at all levels of bargaining (Interview, 2002). Despite privatisation, there is no total 
de-unionisation in any of the privatised petroleum industry SOEs. Rather, 
privatisation strengthened the bargaining instruments of the unions as evidenced, for 
instance, by the juicy post-privatisation severance packages they signed with the 
management of Conoil Plc, African Petroleum Ple and Oando Plc, which 
PENGASSAN's Head of Research sums up as follows; 
"What we have done is to negotiate fatter packages and conditions for our members 
to ensure that our members' working conditions of employment and remuneration 
packages are improved or sustained. And for those that cannot be retained by the 
organisation, better redundancy packages are negotiated so as to tide the effects of 
post-privatisation and the effects of redundancy that they are likely to encounter in 
this process of restructuring ... Take, for instance, the case of UNIPETROL. We had 
discussions for a special redundancy package, which was presented to the staff and 
the staff were asked to voluntarily write in to signify interest if they will like to go. 
And a lot of staff, because the package is juicy and rich, embraced this package. But 
it is not something that is forced into the throats of people. People are given an 
option to write in for redundancy. That's exactly what happened in UNIPETROL" 
(Interview, 2002). 
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These gains did not, however, come easy. As NUPENG's Senior Organising 
Secretary notes in the case of Unipetrol Plc, Conoll Plc and Oando (fon-nerly African 
Petroleum) PIc; 
"It wasn't very easy in those companies, apart from African Petroleum. Unipetrol 
was a problem in itself due to the method of the BPE and series of meetings and 
demonstrations were held by the workers. The BPE had to come to Lagos from 
Abuja to come and address the workers and allay their fears. But at the end of the 
day, there was reasoning on both sides and conditions were set out that will create 
cordial employment relationship with the core investors that bought over Unipetrol" 
(Interview, 2002). 
The reasons adduced for the unions' actions over privatisation however, varied from 
one company to another. In Oando Plc, for instance, workers wanted to buy over 
government's equity while in Conoil Plc the case was different. According to Conol I 
Plc's NUPENG representative; 
"The core investor did not initially take the workers into consideration and so there 
were strikes and demonstrations by the workers until eventually, they came up with 
an agreement, which is almost similar to that of Unipetrol" (Ibid. ). 
Conoil Plc's Industrial Relations Manager substantiated the unions' claim. 
According to him; 
"The unions were called by the management and we had several very prolonged 
discussions on how best to handle the issue. Eventually, they came to develop a 
single mind that there should be what is called ex-gratia arrangement- what they call 
voluntary severance package- for the willing staff. Eventually, the two parties 
(management and the two unions) plus other staff representatives that were elected 
by the staff sat together and they worked out a package which eventually was very 
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satisfactory to all the parties ... The unions were fully aware that some people must 
leave but they were opposed to the conditions on which the people were leaving and 
that was what informed that severance package" (Interview, 2002). 
Overall, despite privatisation, relations between unions and management in the 
industry remain cordial due to the existence of effective bipartite committees for 
resolving union-management conflicts. According to NUPENGs Senior Organising 
Secretary, "Most of the cases in the oil industry end with these committees. In the 
unlikely event that it does not end, maybe, it ends in mediation or conciliation. But 
we rarely go to NIC or for arbitration in NUPENG, rarely, only in very rare cases 
(Interview, 2002). 
NUPENG's General Secretary describes the post-privatisation relationship between 
the NUPENG and management in the industry as follows; 
44 Well, it's cordial. I would say it is cordial because we have well -established 
dialogue machinery in the oil industry- a joint consultative committee, the 
negotiating committee and the collective bargaining committee. So either of these 
organs could be invoked to deal with any crisis that arises" (Ibid. ). 
Evidence from privatised SOEs supports this claim. According to a Conoil Plc union 
representative, the unions, 
44 are still at least fully in charge of the operations and we've not been relegated. So, 
we are still needed. Our services are very much needed, so that means we are 
relevant. So as long as we are relevant, no matter the number, I don't think we have 
any problem" (Interview, 2002). 
The company's management's representative confirmed the unions' claim, 
describing post-privatisation union-management relationship in the industry as 
follows; 
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"I think it's cordial. It's cordial. I think it's very cordial" (Interview, 2002). 
In the case of PENGASSAN, one of its representatives depicted the union's 
relationship with the management as follows; 
"It was rough initially but I think we are understanding ourselves better now. But we 
are still not near where it used to be before privatisation. Everybody has to be 
convinced that the other party respects each other. That's what we are working on 
now so that we understand ourselves more, we respect our different views better. At 
least we are forging ahead in that direction" (Interview, 2002). 
5.3.3. Union membership and finances 
There is no change in Nigeria's statutory provisions on union membership. However, 
there is evidence that the macro level membership of NUPENG and PENGASSAN 
declined shortly after privatisation but rose in the long run. For example, NUPENG's 
membership size declined from 7,536 workers in 1999 to 6,266 in 2000 but rose to 
16ý 166 in 2001 and thereafter to 17,484 in 2002 (See Table 19). In the case of 
PENGASSAN, membership size which was 19,700 before privatisation (Interview, 
2002) declined to 14,000 workers in 2000 (PENGASSAN Info, vol. 1, No. 1, 
December 2000, p. 6) but rose to 20,100 workers in 2004 (www. pengassan. org. ng). 
Evidence from this study therefore, indicates a decline in trade union membership 
shortly after privatisation followed by an increase in membership in the long run. 
The long run increases in membership may not necessarily be directly ascribable to 
privatisation, since the unions intensified their efforts to unionise contract workers 
after privatisation. PENGASSAN's S ecretary- General describes the impact of 
privatisation on the union's membership strength and finances as follows; 
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"Well, of course loss of membership, and, like I said before, what we do is sal-,, age as 
many as we can and then some must definitely go because a privatised company will 
want a very trimmed workforce. ... So loss of membership and, of course loss of 
revenue for the union. If you lose members by extension your check-off is also 
affected. So I think basically, by far the most important is loss of membership. There 
is no privatised company that will not reduce staff' (Interview, 2002). 
PENGASSAN is however better off than its junior staff counterpart, the NUPENG. 
As PENGASSAN's Secretary-General notes; 
"You realise that what happens mostly is that they (employers) want certain group of 
workers to leave. As those ones leave, they also employ new hands. So there is a 
kind of balance: people go, people come. It's not as if we are plunging down with 
every privatised company. No, we are quite stable, particularly those of us in the 
senior staff level because we are mostly made up of professionals and all that- people 
who have skilled labour sort of. An the oil industry you reallse that the table has 
turned. Some years back (so many years back) what you bad was more of junior 
staff, fewer senior staff. But because of professionalism, technology and all that, you 
now have more senior staff than junior. So I think that membership-wise, if you go 
into the records you have more senior workers than junior in the oil industry now" 
(Ibid. ). 
cc For some time, maybe numbers of our members have dwindled, but over time they 
have also employed. As they employ, they come in. But that is not to rule out some 
managerial tactics by some management who would want to cage new people. They 
don't want them in the unions, so they are made to sign an undertaking not to belong 
to the union. Where we have heard such report we have also tackled it because the 
laws are there to protect every worker, you know his/her right to belong to a union" 
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(Interview, 2002). 
What this suggests is a decline in the membership of NUPENG related to the human 
resource needs of the new management of privatised SOEs, as well as variations in 
the two union's experiences in the area of membership loss. For example, in 1999, 
Conoil Plc employed 900 permanent junior employees compared to 51 permanent 
junior employees in 2001 (NUPENG, 2001, p. 3). 
The company's management representative substantiated the evidence of a decline in 
union membership in Conoil Plc. According him, as at December 2001 the company 
employed about 450 workers but the number declined to 350 workers by March 2002 
(Interview, 2002). Trade union representatives in Conoil Plc also corroborated the 
evidence of union membership decline. A representative of PENGASSAN in the 
company claimed for instance, that before privatisation, PENGASSAN had 150 
members (comprised of only permanent staff) but the number declined to 80 after 
privatisation as a result of voluntary disengagement by workers who took advantage 
of the voluntary severance package negotiated by the unions and the management in 
2001 (Interview, 2002). 
Data from Conoil Plc's 1999 collective agreement with NUPENG and interviews 
with union representatives also indicate that (excluding about 150 contract staff 
unionised by NUPENG in 2002) NUPENG's permanent members declined from 164 
in 1999 (NUPENG/NOLCHEM Plc, 1999. p. 2) to 70 in 2002 (Interviews, 2002). 
Data from company records also substantiate this conclusion. For example, 
membership strength of NUPENG and PENGASSAN in Conoil Plc declined in 
proportion to the company's total workforce. In 1996, the company employed 636 
workers comprised of 75 managerial, 262 senior and 299 junior employees. In 1997, 
the number of employees declined to 563, comprised of 63 managerial, 220 senior 
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and 280 junior employees (NOLCHEM Plc, Annual Report and Accounts, 1997, p 
25). By 1998, the number of employees declined to 294, comprised of 49 
managerial, 173 senior and 72 junior employees (NOLCHEM Plc, Annual Report 
and Accounts,, 1999, p. 2 1). 
In 1999, there were 320 workers in the company, comprised of 49 managerial staff 
206 senior and 65 junior employees (Ibid. ). After the company's privatisation in 
2000 however, its workforce declined to 303 workers, comprised of 62 managerial, 
183 senior and 58 junior staff (NOLCHEM Plc, Annual Report and Accounts, 2000, 
p. 22). In 2002, the company employed 225 workers (comprised of 22 managerial, 
195 senior and 8 junior staff) but the number increased to 264 workers, comprised of 
20 managerial, 241 senior and 3 junior staff in 2003 (Conoil Plc, Annual Report and 
Accounts, 2003, p. 23). Between 1999 and 2003 therefore, the number of managerial 
and senior employees (members of PENGASSAN) increased while the number of 
junior staff (members of NUPENG) declined. NUPENG's Senior Organising 
Secretary estimates, for instance, that between 30 percent and 40 percent of 
NUPENG's members in pnvatised petroleum SOEs were affected by redundancy 
(Interview, 2002). 
The impact of NUPENG and PENGASSAN's membership decline on the collective 
bargaining process however, appears minimal. According to a PENGASSAN 
representative in Conoil Plc; 
"Numbers do not really count when it comes to bargaining with management. It is 
the size of the company that dictates what happens. We are still at least fully in 
charge of the operations and we've not been relegated" (Interview, 2002). 
The impact has been rather pronounced at the company level in the area of union 
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mobilisation where workers were hitherto strong but where union capacity has 
reduced drastically. At the macro level of the industry however, NUPENG and 
PENGASSAN's mobilising capacity is still very much effective. Privatisation also 
precipitated a change in the unions' membership recruitment strategies with both 
unions now more pro-active in their membership recruitment drive. For example, 
NUPENG adopted a resolution in 2001 threatening to carry out political actions 
against casualisation every year. As a result, the union successfully unionised 3000 
new members that year (Interview with NUPENG's Senior Organising Secretary, 
2002). The union's General Secretary estimates that this effort resulted in the 
unionisation of 30 percent of contract workers in the industry (Interview, 2002). 
NUPENG and PENGASSAN also embark on joint actions. In November 2001, for 
instance, both unions embarked on an industrial action to demand for the 
unionisation of casual workers which resulted in an agreement by 
NUPENG/PENGASSAN and other social partners in the industry that contract 
employees who meet company recruitment standards should be given equal 
opportunity for regular employment when vacancies occur (NNPC et al, 2001, pp. I- 
2). The unions also resort to pre-emptive industrial actions in order to secure 
guarantees for their members in SOEs that are yet to be privatised as in the case of 
the NNPC and its subsidiaries discussed earlier. 
Union finances declined as a result of privatisation. As earlier noted in this study, in 
1999, NUPENG earned =N=9.044 million or US$91,534.41 (at an exchange rate of 
=N=98.80 to US $1 . 00). In 
2000, it earned =N=7.52 million or US$68,011.85 (at an 
exchange rate of =N=1 10.55 to US$ 1.00) indicating a decline in revenue. In 2001, 
the union earned =N=19.4 million or US$157,208.05 (at an exchange rate of 
=N=123.54 to US$1.00) and in 2002, its earnings declined to =N=19.23 million 
(at 
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an exchange rate of =N=130.56) i. e. US$147,303.02 (Table 20). What this suggests 
is that NUPENG's revenue declined between 1999 and 2000 but increased in 2001 
(probably due to the unionisation of contract workers rather than post-privatisation 
increases in employment) only to decline further in 2002. 
5.3-4. Wages 
No reduction occurred in the wages of employees of the privatised oil SOEs. Rather, 
wages increased after privatisation. In 2000, for example, at the macro level of the 
industry, NUPENG obtained an average of 8.5 percent increase in wages, 10 percent 
increase (2001), 12.5 percent (2002) and 16 percent increase in 2003 (see Table 33). 
Wages also increased in the industry's privatised SOEs. In Conoil Plc, for example, 
total emoluments and other allowances of workers fortunate enough survive 
redundancy increased. 
According to the company's management representative; 
"A lot of things are being put in place now as a way of employee motivation or 
welfare schemes for the employees. Quite a few things we are trying to do- what you 
may call basic travel allowance, we are trying to review it, bring it to a reasonable 
rate to enable staff to do their jobs very well. But many more other things are still in 
the pipeline. Like, for example, car-ownership scheme, increases in some other 
areas- sitting allowances and increase in salaries. This is ongoing. It is being looked 
into at this point in time. This is as a result of privatisation" (Interview, 2002). 
Company records substantiate the findings of post-privatisation wage increases. 
Conoil Plc's post-privatisation expenditure on wages and salaries Indicate, for 
example, that although the average number of the company's employees between 
1999 and 2001 declined from 320 to 303, salaries and wages costs increased from 
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=N=373.923 million to =: N-497.956 million. In 2001, salaries, wages and related 
staff costs rose to ==N=548.805 million despite the fact that about 100 employees 
(Interview with Conoll Plc's management representative, 2002) opted for voluntary 
redundancy, as proved by its =N=229.391 million severance costs for 2001. 
In 2002, the company's workforce was 225 while wages, salaries and other related 
staff costs declined to =N=479.263 million. Severance costs for 2002 "vas 
=N=448.036 million (almost equal to the wage bill for 2002 and double the 
severance costs for 2001). In 2003, the company's workforce rose to 264 while total 
staff costs more than doubled the 2002 figure at =N=1.15 billion (see NOLCHEM 
Plc, 1999, p. 28 and Conoil Plc, 2003, p. 23. Data for 2001 and 2002 downloaded 
from http: //www. conoilplc. com/about/finaiicial/reports/valueaddedstatemelit. htm). 
Generally in the industry, wages increased after privatisation (See Table 33). In the 
industry's downstream sector, wages increased by 5 percent in 2004 (Ahiuma-Young 
2002, p. 1). 
5.3.5. Grievance and disciplinary procedures 
There is continuity in the laws regulating grievance and disciplinary procedures in 
the industry. The incidence of trade disputes appears not to have increased 
significantly at the macro level as a direct result of privatisation, although not at the 
micro level where all the privatised SOEs experienced actions by unions as a direct 
consequence of privatisation. In Oando Plc, for instance, NUPENG and 
PENGASSAN embarked on six weeks strike in order to force an agreement 
guaranteeing non-termination of the employment of union members without due 
consultation for five years after privatisation (Interview, with union representatives, 
2002). 
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In African Petroleum Plc, NUPENG and PENGASSAN embarked on two days strike 
to protest the company's privatisation, while in the case of Conoil Plc, the action by 
the unions over redundancy in 2000 lasted for six weeks (Ibid. ). According to a 
union representative, the unions' action was Conoil Ple's first experience of an 
industrial action by its branch level unions (Interview, 2002). Conoil Plc's Industrial 
Relations Manager substantiated the evidence of an increase in union actions. In 
response to this Author's question on whether unions engaged in any form of action 
as a result of privatisation-related changes, he replied; 
"We had some problems with the unions ... Obviously the problem we had here was 
premised on how the staff that were willing to go will disengage. Eventually there 
was dialogue. Both sides sat down, discussed and we came to a conclusion. So 
eventually it was resolved. Thank God that NUPENG and PENGASSAN were 
behind the staff to settle the matter amicably through a fourteen-point Memorandum 
of Understanding through which the two unions and the company's management 
reached agreement on severance package, the collective agreement and a number of 
other matters" (Interview, 2002). The trade unions also embarked on 30 days work- 
to-rule action in the company in 2001 over unpaid salaries (see Table 34). 
5.3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the impact of privatisation on trade unions and employment relations 
in Nigeria's petroleum industry was evaluated. At this stage, a summary of the 
unique features of post-privatisation trade unionism and employment relationship in 
the industry is essential. Evidence from this study indicates elements of both change 
and continuity. For example, although trade union bargaining power declined slightly 
in privatised SOEs like Conoll Pic due to the reduction in union membership size and 
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density, at the macro level of the industry unions continue to exert a high level of 
leverage on both employers and the government. Additionally, trade union cohesion 
remains high, with both unions negotiating jointly with employers on all aspects of 
industrial relations. 
There is no evidence from this study to indicate a significant modification of the 
legal framework of collective bargaining in the industry as a result of privatisation. 
Privatisation has however, benefited unions in the area of collective bargaining. Like 
their finance industry counterparts, NUPENG and PENGASSAN now negotiate 
benefits beyond the terms of existing collective agreements. Sometimes the 
voluntary severance packages negotiated by the unions are so juicy that they are 
over- subscribed. 
One noticeable development in post-privatisation collective bargaining at the micro 
level of the industry is the intervention by government agencies in industrial disputes 
in order to resolve labour-management problems (a practice hitherto prevalent at the 
macro level of the industry). For example, the BPE successfully intervened in the 
work-to-rule action embarked upon by the employees of Conoil Plc to press their 
demands for an agreement on a voluntary severance package and mediated the 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding by the management and staff (BPE, 
2001a). There is no evidence to indicate a deviation from the industry's practice of 
decentralised collective bargaining nor has there been a change in union structures. 
Overall, relations between NUPENG and PENGASSAN and oil industry employers 
appear relatively cordial due to their recourse to the industry's effective bipartite 
conflict resolution committees. 
In the area of union membership size and finances, although no change in the legal 
provisions on trade union membership was recorded, there is evidence that 
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membership size of NUPENG and PENGASSAN declined shortly after privatisation 
but rose slightly in the long-run. There are however, variations in privatisation's 
impact on the unions' membership size related to changes in the human resource 
requirements of the new core investors. The NUPENG estimates, for instance, that 
between 30 and 40 percent of its members in the privatised SOEs were affected by 
privatisation-related redundancy, while the PENGASSAN, on the other hand, was 
better off. 
The effect of the decline in the membership size of the unions is more pronounced in 
the area of trade union mobilising capacity in privatised SOEs like Conoll Pic, where 
the unions' capacity to mobilise their members for industrial action has reduced 
drastically. At the macro level however, the unions' mobilising and strike capacities 
remain largely unaffected by privatisation. Despite the fluctuations in their 
membership and finances, NUPENG and PENGASSAN control an an-ny of skilled 
workers that cannot be replaced at short notice, even after prIvatisation. 
Privatisation made the unions more proactive in their membership recruitment drive. 
As a result of its impact, NUPENG and PENGASSAN now focus more attention on 
the unionisation of casual and contract workers. There is, however, no evidence of 
total de-unionisation in any of the privatised petroleum SOEs like happened in FBN 
Plc. The decline in trade union membership has also not led to a moderation of union 
militancy in the petroleum industry, as evidenced by the fact that NUPENG and 
PENGASSAN still consider strikes as weapons of first resort. There is evidence from 
this study also to indicate an increase in the post-privatisation wages of employees of 
the privatised SOEs. 
No evidence exists from this study to indicate a change in the 
law regulating 
workplace grievances or a modification of the practice in the pnvatised 
SOEs due to 
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privatisation. Additionally, the incidence of strikes and work stoppages appears not 
to have increased significantly at the macro level of the industry as a direct 
consequence of privatisation, although in privatised SOEs like Conoll Plc, there is 
evidence of an increase in union actions over the specific details of post-privatisation 
restructuring embarked upon by the new management. 
In conclusion, it is evident from the analysis in this chapter that changes have 
occurred in the nature of trade unions and employment relationship in Nigeria's 
petroleum industry largely as a result of changes in ownership and control, 
mana geri al/c orp orate strategies as well as changes in the structure and objectives of 
former SOEs arising from privatisation. Overall, privatisation has affected trade 
unions in Nigeria's oil industry negatively in the areas of membership size and 
revenue, union density and employment relationship, although its impact is more 
severe at the micro level. As a representative of NUPENG in Conoll PIc notes; 
"We don't need to deceive ourselves- it's not business usual ... If this is going to 
be a 
changed environment it may take time but it cannot be delayed. It is time up. The 
core investor is coming here to make money and he is not Father Christmas or 
something" (Interview, 2002). 
It is worthy of note however, that not all changes observed in privatised SOEs in 
Nigeria's petroleum industry after privatisation can be attributed solely to 
privatisation. The degree to which the observed changes can be attributed to 
privatisation is examined in section 5.4. 
5.4. The Impact Of Privatisation 
In this section, an attempt will be made to identify those elements that could 
be 
attributed to privatisation by relating them to specific strategic proposals 
from 
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petroleum employers for restructuring privatised SOEs, i. e. the new corporate 
strategies of the privatised SOEs. This will involve an assessment of the extent to 
which the changes identified in Section 5.3 can be explained by the new corporate 
strategy of the case study SOE- Conoll Plc. A review of the background as well as 
the strategic proposals of employers for restructuring Conoll Plc will precede our 
assessment by way of introduction. 
5.4.1. Conoil Plc Case Study 
5.4.1.1. Introduction 
Conoil Plc commenced operations in Nigeria as an oil marketing company known as 
Shell Company of Nigeria in 1927 and transferred its interests to Shell Company of 
West Africa in 1938. Incorporated as a private limited liability company in 1960, the 
Federal Government acquired 60 percent of its equity in 1975 through NNPC as a 
result of which it became known as NOLCHEM Plc. The company was registered 
with the Nigerian Stock Exchange in 1989 as a public liability company 
(NOLCHEM Plc 2000, Conoil Plc, 2003). 
The company's shareholding, which rose from 252 million to 294 million ordinary 
shares between 1996 and 1997 and 343 million shares in 1998, remained unchanged 
between 1998 and 2000. Before privatisation, the Federal Government held 40 
percent equity through the NNPC, Shell Petroleum Company of Nigeria (U. K) 
Limited held 40 percent and the Nigerian public held 20 percent (Ibid. ). Shortly 
before its privatisation however, Shell Petroleum Company of Nigeria sold its 40 
percent equity to the Federal Government, increasing the government's equity 
holding to 80 percent (NOLCHEM Plc, 2000, p. 4). 
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The ownership structure however, changed following the company's PnN, atisation in 
2000. Conpetro Limited held 205.8 million shares (60 percent), the Federal 
Government (through BPE) held 68.6 million shares (20 percent), while the Nigerian 
public held 20 percent (NOLCHEM Plc, Annual Report and Accounts 2000, p. 10). 
The company's board of directors was restructured in 2000 to reflect the new 
ownership structure, with the majority shareholder (the core investor) as the new 
chairman and other major shareholders as directors. Representatives of international 
technical interests were also appointed into the board (NOLCHEM Plc, 2000 Annual 
Report and Accounts, p. 3). 
5.4.1.2. The restructuring exercise 
The company's ownership status changed in November 2000 when the Federal 
Government privatised the company and sold 60 percent of its 80 percent equity to a 
new core investor, Conpetro Limited, while the Nigerian public and the government- 
owned BPE controlled 36 percent and 4 percent equity respectively. By 2003, the 
ownership pattern changed further as a result of a rights issue made by the company 
in 2002 when Conpetro Limited acquired 74.4 percent equity while the Nigerian 
public owned 25.5 percent (Conoil Plc, 2003, pp. 11 and 13). 
In order to resume sustained growth after privatisation, it became imperative for the 
new management to improve the company's corporate profile and enhance 
productivity. To achieve this goal, the management designed a strategic development 
plan seeking to address and overcome the threats to the company and 
further enhance 
its strengths, which the new management identified as including widest spread, 
largest storage capacities in the industry, superior quality control 
delivery 
mechanism and technical support from Flightline (Conoil Plc, 
2003). 
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Following its privatisation and "having fully settled the initial industrial relations 
issues that came with it" the company embarked on structural changes In 2000 aimed 
at preparing it for "future challenges" (NOLCHEM Plc, 2000, p. 6). The corporate 
restructuring exercise involved the under-listed measures: 
i. The decentralisation of the company's operations through the creation of six 
semi-autonomous operating Area Business Management (with each Area Manager 
empowered to act like. the Chief Executive of that area) and a Central Operating 
Unit acting as a clearing house for all commercial transactions. As part of the 
restructuring, a majority of the staff in the Head Office were deployed to the field; 
11 . In order to further strengthen its assets base, the company re-purchased its Head 
Office, the 'Eagle House' that it sold to a consortium of its employees before 
privatisation; 
iii. The company commenced the development of new range of lubricants which 
will meet international quality standards at competitive pricing; 
iv. In order to make its retail outlets "one-stop convenience centres", the company 
took initiatives in Non-Fuel Retailing (NFR) which involved tying up with market 
leaders of relevant sectors to provide quality service and convenience at its retail 
outlets (Ibid); 
In addition to the above-mentioned measures, the company formulated new market 
objectives, as follows: 
i. To be a marketer of only choice; 
ii. To provide market leadership in all its businesses- aviation, liquefied 
petroleum gas, lubricants, bitumen and retail shops; 
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M. To reclaim its customers in the international segment of the industry, and; 
iv. To provide effective and efficient services to customers (fbid. ). 
In order to implement its strategic plan and reposition the company for sustained 
growth in the future, the new management identified two key issues for the 
attainment of its objectives. These were the need for constant product availability at 
all airfields to sustain an enlarged market share and the need to ensure wider spread 
in order to further increase its market share and dominance in the industry. The 
company also formulated a future plan, which included the under-listed aims: 
1. To employ new haulage companies for efficient and loss-free distribution of its 
products; 
ii. To emphasise quality control in all operations in order to present the company 
as a quality-conscious company and obtain International Standards Organisation 
(ISO) certification; 
iii. To ensure improved service delivery of aviation fuel by well-trained and 
motivated operators using good and efficient equipment, and; 
iv. To ensure superior customer relationship management through its gospel of 
"Customer Delight" (Ibid. ). 
The management also formulated a new mission statement- "To become the flagship 
of the downstream sector, providing products and services of international standard, 
ensuring robust returns for shareholders, with total commitment to excellent staff 
welfare and acceptable environmental practices, to become the leading marketer in 
the industry, aspiring to international standards, ensuring the best for our staff, 
customers and shareholders, with full commitment to the protection of the 
215 
environment" (Ibid. ). This new mission statement was then translated I ion a vis, 
spelling out the company's obligations, as follows: 
i. To provide high quality products and services of international standards that 
give exceptional value for money at affordable prices to customers ; 
ii. To create enabling working environment that encourages hard work, 
rewards merit and guarantees job security to employees-, 
Ili. To achieve maximum yields on investments and make the company an 
investor's delight to shareholders, and; 
IV. To be an exemplary corporate citizen and the pride of the nation (lbid. ). 
In pursuant of its strategic vision, the company developed a new brand initiative, 
which includes a new name and corporate logo. In December 2002, the company 
changed its name to Conoil Pic in order "to reflect its new values, vision and mission 
and the renewed focus on sustainable operational standards that offer value to all 
stakeholders, including customers, shareholders, employees and the society at large" 
(Conoil Pic, 2003, p. 1). Its logo was also changed from "the Eagle to an icon that 
represents the company's continual commitment to acceptable practices in its overall 
business processes and to a bright and prosperous future" (Ibid. ). 
The name 'Conoil Pic' was adopted in December 2002 in view of what the company 
perceived as the restrictions and constraints inherent in the old name- 'NOLCHEM 
Pic' which the company considered inappropriate to its operations and aspirations. 
c Conoil' symbolizes the company's dynamism as a re-engineered corporate entity 
and is meant to express all that the company stands for: improved productivity, 
accountability, optimum efficiency, top quality customer service and increased 
shareholder value (Ibid. ). 
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5.4.1.3. Impact of restructuring 
An imperative question to ask at this stage is: how does this post-privatisation 
strategic plan relate to the post-privatisation changes in trade unionism and 
employment relationship in Conoil Plc? In order to answer this question, it is 
necessary that we evaluate the impact of the strategic plan on industrial relations 
within the company based on the under-listed factors: 
i. Impact on trade union bargaining power 
As observed in section 5.3.1, the performance of Conoll Plc improved phenomenally 
after privatisation (see Table 32). Consequently, between 2000 and 2002, the 
company's ability to survive a temporary work stoppage improved, thereby 
strengthening its bargaining power relative to its domestic unions by enhancing its 
capacity to induce employees to opt for voluntary severance. As Table 33 indicates, 
by 2000 NUPENG's leverage, on the other hand, was declining. Both management 
and union representatives in Conoil Ple interviewed by this Author however, claimed 
that privatisation in no way affected the balance of bargaining power between both 
parties. This suggests that the unions exert a much higher level of leverage than 
empirical indicators of power suggest, despite the decline in the unions' membership 
size in the company. 
ii. Impact on collective bargaining 
As part of Conoil Plc's restructuring, its administration was decentralised. In each of 
the six regions introduced, the company established regional 'Administrative Focal 
Points' (AFPs) which co-ordinate the industrial relations and other administrative 
functions within their region of jurisdiction on behalf of the company's Head Office. 
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The AFPs are however, only empowered to interpret existing company policies to 
the staff while anything much more serious than that is referred to the Head Office 
for advice (Inter-view with the management's representative, 2002). 
The restructuring exercise led to a number of problems in the area of collectiVe 
bargaining. For instance, as part of the restructuring, almost half of Conoll Plc's 
workforce across all cadres was offered incentives to disengage voluntarily and the 
unions were invited to negotiate the management's redundancy proposal in 2001. 
There was strong resistance by NUPENG and PENGASSAN to what they regarded 
as the management's attempt to disengage the services of their members. According 
to Conoil PIC Industrial Relations Manager, "the unions were fully aware that some 
people must leave but they were opposed to the conditions under which the people 
were leaving and that was what informed the severance package. We had some 
problems with the unions" (Interview, 2002). 
At the end of the negotiations, the affected workers were paid 150 percent basic 
salary for every year worked (in addition to their other non-nal entitlement) as 
redundancy benefits (Interview with management and unions' representatives, 2002; 
BPE, 2001a). 
As a result of the restructuring, collective bargaining in Conoil Plc assumed a rather 
volatile dimension hitherto unknown in its history. Union-management relations lost 
its traditional cordiality when the unions embarked on six weeks strike in 2001. A 
union representative notes that collective bargaining in Conoil Plc was; 
4c rough initially, but I think we understand ourselves better now. But we are still 
not near where it used to be before privatisation in terms of working on mutual 
respectability. You know before privatisation, the intimacy with management was 
assumed to be cordial. We never had any cause to serve them any notice or go on 
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strike but we have done that now. So that is why I said we are moving closer and we 
hope we'll come back together in the nearest future" (Interview, 2002). 
Impact on trade union membership and finances 
Conoil Ple's restructure into six regional AFPS in pursuant of its new strategic Nision 
had employment implications. As a result, the company declared redundancy and 
implemented a voluntary severance package negotiated with the trade unions 
(Interviews with unions' and management's representatives, 2002). According to a 
representative of PENGASSAN, the union "lost some members due to the several 
schemes that were put in place" (Interview, 2002). This union representative claimed 
that PENGASSAN had 150 members (mainly permanent staff) in Conoll Pic before 
privatisation but had only 80 members after privatisation due to X, -oluntary 
disengagement by workers who took advantage of the severance package negotiated 
by the unions and management in 2001 (Interview, 2002). 
NUPENG's representative, on the other hand, claimed that the union had about 70 
permanent members in Conoil Plc in 2002 as opposed to 164 in 1999 (Interview, 
2002). Data obtained from Conoil Plc's 1999 collective agreement with NUPENG 
and the company's 2003 annual report indicate also that the number of permanent 
junior employees (mainly members of NUPENG) declined from 164 in 1999 
(NUPENG/NOLCHEM Plc, 1999, p. 2) to 8 in 2002 and 3 junior employees by 
December 2003 (Conoil Plc, 2003 Annual Report and Accounts, p. 23). 
Company data also substantiate this evidence. For instance, Conoil Plc's annual 
reports for various years indicate reductions in its total workforce. In 1999, the 
company employed 320 workers, comprised of 49 managerial, 206 senior and 65 
junior staff (NOLCHEM Plc, 1999 Annual Report and Accounts, p. 21). After 
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privatisation in 2000, the workforce declined to 303 workers, comprised of 62 
managerial, 183 senior and 58 junior staff (NOLCHEM Plc, Annual Report and 
Accounts 2000, p. 22). In 2002, the company's workforce was 225, comprised of 22 
managerial, 195 senior, and 8 junior staff. By 2003, the number increased to 264 
workers, comprised of 20 managerial, 241 senior and 3 junior staff (Conoil Plc, 2003 
Annual Report and 
- 
Accounts, p. 23). The membership size of NUPENG and 
PENGASSAN declined in proportion to reductions in the company's total 
workforce. 
Between 1999 and 2003, the number of the company's managerial and senior staff 
(mainly PENGASSAN members) increased while the number of junior staff 
(NUPENG members) declined. Consequently, NUPENG's revenue from the 
company declined while revenue generated by PENGASSAN from the company 
increased, suggesting a variation in the membership size and financial fortunes of 
both unions, related to the post-privatisation skills requirement of the new 
management. 
IV. Impact on wages, 
Wages of the employees that survived the company's redundancy exercise increased 
following the restructuring. As observed earlier in section 5.3.4 of this chapter, 
available data on the company's expenditure on wages and salaries between 1999 
and 2003 substantiate this evidence. The data indicate that the employees' wages 
increased as evidenced by the increase in the ratio of the company's staff to payroll 
cost between 1999 and 2003. As noted in section 5.3.4, although the number of 
employees during the period declined, the company's aggregate payroll cost 
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increased substantially (see Conoil Plc, 2003 Annual Report and Accounts, p. 23, for 
instance). 
V. Impact on grievance/disciplinary procedures 
There is no evidence of a change in the company's grievance and disciplinary 
procedures after the restructuring. Union grievances recorded after privatisation 
however, increased. As already noted, the company experienced the first industrial 
action by its domestic unions during the restructuring exercise. NUBTFIE and 
ASSBIFI also embarked on 30 days work stoppage over unpaid salaries in 2001 (see 
Table 34). In May 2002, PENGASSAN gave the management seven days ultimatum 
to resolve all disagreement with workers over conditions of service, failing which the 
union threatened to embark on industrial action (Ehigiator 2002, cited in 
littp. -//allat'rica. com/stories/200205230660. litnil). 
5.4.2. Conclusion 
In this section, an attempt was made to identify those elements of change In trade 
unionism and employment relations that could be attributed to privatisation, by 
relating them to specific strategic proposals from petroleum employers for 
restructuring Conoil Plc. As argued in the preceding paragraphs, privatisation 
resulted in a decline in trade union membership size and finances in Conoll Plc, but 
had very little impact on union bargaining power. Privatisation also led to changes in 
the nature of collective bargaining in the company, but not in union structures. 
Corporate restructuring in Conoil Plc, also resulted in industrial actions by NUPENG 
and PENGASSAN hitherto not experienced by the company's management, while 
wages in the company increased after privatisation. 
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A number of questions arise from the foregoing conclusion, as follows: Can all the 
observed post-privatisation changes be attributed to privatisation alone? Are there 
other factors responsible for these changes and in what ways are these other factors 
accountable for the observed changes? An attempt will be made in section 5.5 to 
answer these questions. 
5.5. An Analysis Of Changes That Appear To Be Related To Factors Other Than 
Privatisation 
In this section, an attempt will be made to identify changes in trade unionism and 
employment relationship in Conoll Plc that appear to be related to factors other than 
privatisation, based on the under-listed factors: 
5.5.1. The balance of bargaining power 
In sections 5.3.6 and 5.4.1.3 of this chapter, it was concluded that privatisation did 
not alter the balance of power between petroleum employers and the unions, 
although union membership size declined in Conoil Plc while company performance 
improved. The mediating factors appear to be the strong political leverage derived by 
the unions from the centrality of the industry to Nigeria's economy and its 
importance to global oil market stability, the unions' militancy and their mobilising 
and strike capacities. 
There is no evidence to suggest that changes in other empirical measures of 
bargaining power like union density, alternative wage for union members and macro- 
level vacancy/unemployment ratio (which predate privatisation) affected the post- 
privatisation bargaining power of unions and employers in the company or 
the 
industry in any substantial manner. 
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5.5.2. Collective bargaining 
Changes observed in collective bargaining in Conoil Plc are entirely privatisation- 
related. For instance, the prevalence of casual and contract employment in Conoll Plc 
before privatisation did not result in major incidents in the area of collectiVe 
bargaining. On the other hand, privatisation-related restructuring increased industrial 
actions by NUPENG and PENGASSAN in Conoil Plc, as demonstrated in section 
5.2.3.2 of this chapter. 
5.5.3. Union membership size and finances 
There is (at least macro level) evidence to suggest that factors other than 
privatisation contributed to the decline in NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI membership size and 
finances before privatisation. As earlier noted in this chapter, declines in national 
vacancy to unemployment ratio, industrial capacity utilisation and SAP contributed 
to the decline in workforce levels in some oil SOEs before privatisation. After 
privatisation, there were cases of workforce reductions in a number of privately- 
owned oil companies (which were unrelated to privatisation) that equally contributed 
to the decline in the macro level membership size of NUPENG and PENGASSAN. 
For instance, Shell Petroleum Company disengaged the services of 1,500 workers 
(about 30 percent of its workforce) in 2004 (Africa Masterweb, 2004, cited in 
hltp: //www. africamasterweb. com/NewsRepoi-t6. htmi). In Mobil Producing Nigeria, 
as at 2000, not a single junior employee was a member of NUPENG as opposed to 
81 permanent junior employees who were NUPENG members in 1991 (Onyeonoru, 
2003, p. 9). 
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In the yet-to-be privatised and privatised SOEs in the industry however, a majority of 
the workforce reductions and consequently, reductions In the unions' membership 
size, resulted from privatisation-related restructuring. In 2003 for example, NNPC 
laid off 1,388 workers as part of its pre-pnvatisation restructuring (Komolafe, 
Ugwuanyi and Achonu, 2003, cited in 
http: //www. vanguardn, ý, Tr. com/articles/2002/cover/f231122003. html). 
5.5.4. Wages 
Generally, increases in wages in Nigeria's petroleum industry cannot be ascribed to 
pnvatisation alone since union wage demands in the industry and the country at large 
are premised on a combination of factors like cost of living, consumer price indices, 
inflation, profits and productivity levels and increases in the price of petroleum 
products, etc. Consumer prices and inflation rate, for instance, were rising after 
privatisation in the industry (see Tables 26 and 27). Although the rise in these 
indicators was unrelated to privatisation, wages increased in the country generally to 
reflect the rising cost of living (see Table 16). On the other hand however, wage 
increases in Conoil Plc after privatisation resulted from privatisation-related 
restructuring. 
5.5.5. Grievance/disciplinary procedures 
Not all of the incidents of post-privatisation grievance and disputes recorded in 
Nigeria's petroleum industry were directly related to privatisation. As Table 34 
indicates, other factors contributed to the macro level increase in the incidents of 
strikes and other forms of industrial actions after privatisation. A majority of these 
occurred in companies that were not even involved in privatisation. With specific 
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reference to Conoil Plc and petroleum SOEs slated for privatisation however, the 
increase in grievances in the period under review are entirely related to pri\, atisation, 
as evidence adduced in section 5.3.1.5 indicates. NUPENG and PENGASSAN. for 
example, embarked on one-day strike in NNPC on 23 July 2002 in opposition to the 
federal govemment's privatisation proposal (Oduniyi 20049 cited in 
http: //newsbiafraiiiý-yeriaworld. coin/arcli1ve/2004/mar/27/0072. html). 
5.5.6. Conclusion 
It is evident from sections 5.4 and 5.5 that nothing in this chapter links other factors 
to the changes observed in industrial relations in privatised oil SOEs like Conoll Plc. 
On the contrary, evidence from this study indicates a direct relationship between the 
observed changes and privatisation-related restructuring. It is pertinent at this stage 
therefore, to assess the overall impact of privatisation by way of conclusion. 
5.6. Assessing The Overall Impact Of Privatisation 
In this chapter, an attempt was made to demonstrate the predictive impact of 
privatisation on trade unions and employment relationship in privatised SOEs in 
Nigeria's petroleum industry using the Conoil Plc as a case study. Evidence from 
this chapter indicates both elements of change and continuity. Although union 
membership and finances at the micro level of the industry declined as a direct result 
of privatisation, union bargaining power was largely unaffected due to continuity in 
NUPENG and PENGASSAN's political leverage, cohesion and alliance, mobilising 
and strike capacities, as well as the sector's centrality to Nigeria's economy and its 
importance to global oil market stability. 
With oil as the mainstay of Nigeria's economy, any disruption of the production 
225 
chain is avoided at all cost by employers and the government. In the case of the oil 
industry management, the bottom line remains a commitment to profit making. 
Hence, management consciously avoid bargaining strategies capable of inducing 
work stoppages, reducing their companies' profit margin, Nigeria's oil revenue and 
disrupting international oil market stability. 
There are however, changes in the area of collective bargaining despite elements of 
continuity in the labour laws regulating the process. For instance, privatisation 
benefited the unions and their members with regard to the negotiation of redundancy 
benefits. Despite privatisation however, union structures were unaffected and the 
trade unions remain very much relevant in the sector's industrial relations. No case 
of complete de-unionisation was recorded in the petroleum industry after 
privatisation, unlike the case in the finance industry. Privatisation however, resulted 
in collective bargaining in the privatised petroleum SOEs assuming a volatile 
dimension hitherto unknown in some of the SOEs, like Conoil Plc for example. 
Union membership size and density also declined. In Conoil Ple, for instance, a 
reduction in workforce size and consequently, the unions' membership size and 
finances was observed. A variation in the impact of privatisation on the unions' 
membership size and revenue directly related to the skills requirement of the new 
management after privatisation was also observed. Privatisation also precipitated a 
change in NUPENG and PENGASSAN's recruitment strategies, with the unions 
focusing more on unionising casual and contract workers. The decline in union 
membership size and finances in privatised SOEs like Conoil Plc did not however, 
lead to a moderation of the unions' militancy. Evidence from this study indicates 
orms of trade union actions in privation-related increases in wages, strikes and other f 
privatised oil SOEs like Conoil Plc- 
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It is evident from this chapter therefore that employment relationship in the 
privatised SOEs in Nigeria's petroleum industry like Conoll Ple changed due to 
privatisation, although not to the same degree as in the case of the finance industry. 
This suggests a variation in the privatisation experiences of both industries and a 
need to compare these similarities and differences in chapter six, in relation to the 
two hypothesis discussed in chapter one. 
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CHAPTER SIX- THE IMPACT OF PRIVATISATION: A COMPARARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCE AND PETROLEUM CASE STUDIES AND 
CONCLUSION 
1. Introduction 
In this concluding chapter, the impact of privatisation on trade unions and 
employment relationship in Nigeria's finance and petroleum industries will be 
compared. The aim here is to put the two case studies side by side in order to tease 
out the under-listed: 
i. The common features of privatisation and its consequences for trade unions and 
employment relations in the two sectors, and, 
11 The differences in the impact of privatisation between the two sectors that will 
enable us deduce the effects of sector, economic centrality, nature of labour force, 
balance of bargaining power, etc, as factors mediating the impact of privatisation. 
The chapter is informed by the theoretical analysis of privatisation and its 
industrial relations consequences (as developed in chapter one) which look at the 
analytical questions of why privatisation (defined as change of ownership and 
control from public to private) should, in principle, make a difference to industrial 
relations behaviour, what the predicted direction of that change is and why. The 
conclusions of chapter one (as represented by the two hypotheses deduced from 
the privatisation literature) will be tested against the data derived from chapters 
four and five and presented in this chapter, first to see whether change has indeed 
occurred in the predicted directions (in both cases or in one or not at all) and 
secondly, to examine how the privatisation theory can be refined/improved to take 
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account of sectoral and other differences as revealed by the two case studies. 
Thereafter, the findings will be discussed by way of conclusion. For the purpose of 
our analysis, it is important that we recall the conclusions of the pnivatisation 
literature, via a synopsis of the theoretical consequences of privatisation. 
6.2. The theoretical consequences of privatisation 
The theoretical consequences of privatisation summansed below are drawn from 
chapter one of this study. As noted in that chapter, these include consequences 
arising from change of ownership and control, product market deregulation, 
corporate restructuring as well as changes in industrial relations and working 
conditions. Privatisation also has implications for trade union structures, 
membership strength and finances. According to the literature, privatisation 
replaces public employees' erstwhile civil servant status (characterised by life 
tenure) with an employment contract, replaces the public sector pay structure 
(linked to career paths and fori-nal qualifications, etc. ) with private sector pay 
structure and promotes the shift to a new professional requirement with respect to 
the skills and qualifications of staff, while emphasising commercial skills and 
strong customer-orientation (see Zanker, 2001, for instance). 
Two different perspectives on the impact of privatisation were identified in chapter 
one. According to Cook and Murphy (2002) the first perspective, posited by critics 
of privatisation, argues that the policy is anti-labour unions and most, if not, all 
workers, shrinks the public sector, results in layoffs and downsizing and erodes 
workers' protections or their removal from the labour codes, increases the 
repression of workers and weakens trade unions in addition to a host of other 
specific problems like the growing abuses arising from the weakening and non- 
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monitoring of labour standards. The second perspective, on the other hand, argues 
that privatisation is a solution to public sector inefficiencies, ends wasteful 
government subsidies and stimulates economic recovery and growth (Ibid. ). 
The privatisation literature concludes also that privatisation involves the 
metamorphosis of erstwhile public enterprises from the public to the private sector, 
with major effects on industrial relations and working conditions. According to 
Ferner and Colling (1991, p. 391) for instance, there are three consequences of 
privatisation for the industrial relations of former SOEs as follows: 
i. The ending of direct political control 
The creation of a regulatory framework, and, 
iii. The replacement of a 'political' orientation by a 'shareholder' 
orientation. 
According to these authors, the new competitive post-privatisation environment in 
erstwhile SOEs results in considerable diversity in both the speed and scope with 
which management pursues innovative policies, with some privatised SOEs 
expenencing massive cutback in employment, deteriorating pay and conditions 
and a worsening industrial relations climate, which are legitimised on grounds of 
the expectations of shareholders' and investors' interests. 
Additionally, the privatisation literature concludes that the increasing substitution 
of contract labour for direct labour in many privatised enterprises reduces union 
membership and control in the workplace (see O'Connell Davidson 1993, for 
instance). According to the literature, the introduction of human resource 
management practices (e. g. employee involvement schemes, team 
working/briefing, total quality management, etc. ) in most privatised enterprises 
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results in an intentional bypassing of trade unions as channels for communicating 
with employees, with management in some of these enterprises considering unions 
as irrelevant to the success of organisational strategy (See Taylor, 1994, for 
instance). 
The literature also concludes that privatisation results In substantial alteration of 
the organisation of work as well as tacit agreements reached over the wage effort 
bargain by facilitating changes to payments and work allocation by management 
that pursue flexibility through deskilling, casualising work, or 'upskilling' jobs and 
initiating integrationist labour policies. Moreover, under the canopy of 'flexibility' 
government and management in privatised enterprises engineer the growth of part- 
time employment, changes in industnal relations practices regarding contracts and 
pay deten-nination, the application of new technologies, the removal of statutory 
regulations governing the labour market and the use of legislation (amongst other 
measures) in order to reduce trade union powers (see Blyton and Morris, 1991, and 
O'Connell Davidson, 1993, for instance). 
The privatisation literature concludes that in most privatised SOEs, problems arise 
over the under-listed important dimensions of the employment relationship: 
1. The balance of bargaining power as it affects trade unions 
ii. Union recognition (or de-recognition) 
III Wage negotiations 
IV. Downsizing 
V. New disciplinary and grievance procedures 
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vi. Changes in the nature and process of collective bargaining (see Femer and 
Colling 1991, O'Connell Davidson 1993, Ogden 1994, and Taylor 1994, for 
instance) and, 
vii. Structural changes- divestment, diversification, outsourcing, sub- 
contracting, etc., (see O'Connell Davidson 1993, Parry et al, 1997, Ogden 1994, 
and Wallis et al, 2000, for instance). 
it is noteworthy however, that although downsizing and new 
grievance/disciplinary procedures are employment consequences they may not 
necessarily constitute trade union consequences of privatisation. The mere fact that 
a union has fewer members, for instance, does not mean it is a weaker union. As 
the privatisation literature suggests, the hypothetical interaction between 
privatisation and industrial relations are mediated through issues such as change in 
ownership and control, structure as well as the nature of the product market 
competition. The literature suggests however, that such macro-micro interactions 
are by no means universal but are rather mediated by a number of environmental, 
organisational and trade union factors. As noted in chapter one, this theory 
constitutes the core argument for this thesis. Essentially, this theory suggests that 
factors other than privatisation might also be responsible for producing the micro 
level changes observable in the industrial relations of privatised SOEs (see 
Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 1999, for instance). 
It is evident from the privatisation literature therefore, that there is no consensus 
on the nature of privatisation's impact on trade unions and industrial relations. As 
Ferner and Colling (1991) note, the predictive changes in the industrial relations of 
privatised enterprises are not universal, since some privatised companies 
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experience stormy industrial relations while others have a peaceful time 
negotiating changes in work practices and cuts in employment. Zanker (2001) 
notes also that the impact of privatisation and (liberalisation measures) on 
employees cannot be attributed to any single policy since each policy has an inter- 
dependent effect on others. Moreover, according to Ferrier and Colling (1991) 
changes in industrial relations are not necessarily confined to privatised enterprises 
and may not necessarily be a product of privatisation. Changes in the overall 
environment of trade unions are also by no means universal in their nature and 
implications since diverse environmental factors impact upon trade unions. 
As observed in chapter one, certain questions emerge from the privatisation theory 
that constitute the core arguments for this thesis and which the current study seeks 
to answer, as follows: 
I. Is there any obvious connection in the theory on privatisation between the 
macro-level change in ownership and control, structure of firm and the nature of 
the product market competition on the one hand and the micro-level changes in 
industrial relations on the other? 
2. Are there other factors responsible for the micro-level changes in industrial 
relations observable in privatised enterprises other than privatisation? 
As also noted chapter one, although these questions are rooted in the implications 
of privatisation for employment relationship as defined by Western literature, they 
are relevant to an understanding of Nigeria's experience and constitute the 
theoretical and analytical reference points for the current study. Two hypotheses 
(derived from the conclusions of the privatisation literature and theory (discussed 
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in chapter one) arise from the above-mentioned questions which the current study 
seeks to explore, as follows: 
The employment relationship changes in its expression and management in 
privatised enterprises as a consequence of the change in ownership and control, 
structure and product market competition arising from privatisation; and, 
2. The employment relationship in privatised enterprises changes, not necessarily 
as a consequence of privatisation, but as a consequence of changes in 
managerial/corporate strategies, national and firm-level industrial relations 
policies and other environmental factors not related to privatisation. 
As noted in chapter one, the current study seeks to test two sets of concepts arising 
from the first hypothesis. The first set of concepts, represented by the term 
4privatisation', includes changes in: 
i. Ownership 
11 Control 
III Structure of the firn-1; and, 
IV. Product market competition. 
The second set of concepts, represented by the term 'employment relationship', 
includes changes in: 
I. The balance of power between management and trade unions 
ii. Collective bargaining 
ill. Union membership size and finances 
iv. Wages; and, 
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v. Grievance and disciplinary procedures 
There are equally two sets of concepts embedded in the second hypothesis which 
the current study seeks to translate into operational terms, as follows: 
1. Changes in corporate and management strategies, the firm's industrial relations 
policies and other environmental factors not related to privatisation; and, 
11 Changes in 'employment relationship' as defined above. 
In order to test the two hypotheses that constitute the core arguments of this study, 
these sets of concepts were translated into operational terms via a cn*tlcal 
evaluation of the impact of privatisation on Nigeria's finance and petroleum 
industries in chapters four and five. As evidenced by the findings of those two 
chapters, both industries experienced varying degrees of change in trade unionism 
and employment relationship as a result of privatisation, suggesting the need for a 
comparison. 
In this chapter (six) therefore, the conclusions of chapters four and five will be 
compared with a view toward testing the two hypotheses against the data presented 
in the comparison. As earlier noted, the aim here is to see whether change has 
indeed occurred in the predicted directions (in both cases or in one or not at all) 
and secondly, to examine how the privatisation theory can be refined/improved to 
take account of sectoral and other differences as revealed by the two case studies. 
At this stage, it is important to reiterate the fact that not all the concepts identified 
above as arising from the two hypothesis are representative of the terrn 
4employment relationship', since as argued earlier, downsizing and 
235 
grievance/disciplinary procedures are employment consequences but may not 
necessarily be trade union consequences of privatisation. For any of the concept to 
be taken as representative of the term 'employment relationship' therefore, it must 
have both employment and trade union consequences. Consequently, some of the 
concepts used in the case studies like grievance procedure and union recognition 
will not be employed here as basis for comparison. This is because despite the 
existence of evidence to investigate the impact of privatisation on these concepts, 
they are not central to an understanding of its impact on trade unions and 
employment relationship in privatised SOEs. 
Moreover, the focus of this thesis is not the general consequences of privatisation 
per se but its employment relations consequences (which are only relevant if they 
have both employment and trade union consequences) as represented by changes 
in bargaining power, collective bargaining and union membership size and 
finances. The latter set of concepts are the most significant concepts on which the 
richest and most reliable data are available in the current study and constitute the 
basis for the comparison of the impact of privatisation in the finance and 
petroleum industries conducted in the next section. 
6.3. Impact of Privatisation: Finance versus Petroleum Industries 
In line with Arrowsmith's (2003) theory it is necessary, in order to compare and 
contrast the impact of privatisation in the two industries effectively, to conduct a 
synopsis of their common and differentiating features in terms of the nature of 
their privatisation, the nature of the SOEs that were privatised, the nature of the 
sector in which they operate, the protection they enjoy and the nature of their 
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product market competition etc. These factors will be used to construct a plausible 
account of the common features and differences in the impact of privatisation in 
both industries. The need for a synopsis arises from the fact that despite the 
indication by the privatisation literature that there is a single meaning to the nature 
of privatisation (i. e. the transfer of ownership and control of state assets to the 
private sector) the precise way in which this is achieved varies from sector to 
sector and from one country to another. 
The aim therefore, is to elicit similarities in privatisation's impact in both 
industries arising from a combination of trade union history, their political and 
sectoral context as well as strategic choice, while drawing attention to any key 
features that differentiates the two sectors via a comparative overview of both 
industries. However, mindful of the fact that the study so far has demonstrated the 
impact of privatisation, it is on the basis of the differences between the two sectors 
that we can deduce the nature of such impact. 
6.3.1. The finance versus petroleum industries: a comparative overview 
The distinguishing features and similarities in the privatisation experiences of 
Nigeria's finance and petroleum industries identified in this section will be used to 
clearly explain the rest of this chapter. It is evident from the findings of chapters 
four and five that four similarities are identifiable in the privatisation experiences 
of both industrial sectors, as follows: 
i. Industrial relations in both sectors is regulated by the same set of labour laws. In 
both sectors, the unionisation of junior workers is statutorily compulsory but 
voluntary in the case of senior employees, excluding top management. 
237 
ii. Prior to their privatisation, SOEs in both industries were characterised by an 
ownership pattern in which government owned a majority of the equity, with 
minority equity owned by foreign interests and the Nigerian public. 
iii. As noted in chapters one, four and five, similar privatisation methods were 
employed in both industries, i. e. through the divestment of government's majority 
equity holdings to core investors, with employees and the Nigerian public allotted 
the remaining shares. 
iv. In both industries, government did not put any regulatory regime in place to 
oversee the post-privatisation conduct of the companies that emerged. 
Despite the two industries' common experiences of privatisation however, there 
are distinguishing characteristics which account for variations in the post- 
privatisation industrial relations strategies adopted by management in the SOEs 
that were privatised in each industry, as follows: 
i. The two industries (and their SOEs) differ markedly in terms of their economic 
centrality to Nigeria. As earlier observed in chapter one, the nature of the 
industry/sector is an important variable for determining bargaining power. As also 
noted in chapter five, Nigeria depends on the oil industry for most of her revenue. 
Although the finance industry is important to the nation's economy, it is not 
accorded the same stature as the oil industry which is also of strategic relevance to 
global oil market stability. Consequently, government and employers' responses to 
industrial relations matters in both industries (and the political leverage of their 
respective unions) differ. While the petroleum industry unions derive strong 
political leverage from the centrality of oil to Nigeria's economic 
fortunes and the 
implications of any disruptions in the country's oil production and supply 
for 
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global oil market stability and price, the finance sector unions do not benefit from 
such economic advantage. 
11 . The petroleum industry is characterised by high level of regulation by 
government, decentralised collective bargaining and highly cohesive trade unions 
that are the strongest and richest unions in Nigeria. The finance industry, on the 
other hand, is characterised by low regulation, centralised collective bargaining and 
trade unions (particularly NUBIFIE) which have become weakened by a 
combination of intra-union crisis and increasing competition from de-unionised 
'New Generation' financial institutions that offer workers higher remuneration in 
exchange for non-unionisation. 
III . There are marked differences in the power relationship between unions and 
employers in both industries. While the balance of power in the finance industry 
favours the employers (represented by management), in the petroleum industry on 
the other hand, the balance of power favours the unions. 
iv. There are marked differences in the ownership and control of the product 
markets in both industries after privatisation. In the finance industry, the post- 
privatisation product market is mediated by domestic market forces. Although the 
CBN and NDIC regulate the market to some extent, the government does not own 
the product- customers deposits and insurance premiums. In the petroleum 
industry, on the other hand, the government controls and owns the product market- 
oil deposits and gas reserves- one hundred percent after privatisation, while the 
product market is mediated globally. 
v. The two industries differ markedly in terms of the nature of competition 
faced by 
private companies and SOEs operating in each of them. While a combination of 
liberalisation and privatisation resulted in an increase in the competition faced by 
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privatised SOEs in the finance industry, the nature of competition in the oil 
industry remains largely unchanged by privatisation. 
The question at this stage therefore, is: How do these similarities and differences 
in the privatisation experiences of both industries relate to the rest of the chapter? 
In the next section an attempt will be made to answer this question by 
comparatively examining the impact of privatisation in both industries. 
6.3.2. The impact of privatisation: similarities and differences 
As earlier noted in this chapter, the aim of this section is two-fold. The first is to 
put the finance and petroleum case studies side by side in order to tease out the 
common features of privatisation and its consequences for trade unions and 
employment relationship in both industries. The second aim is to tease out the 
differences in the impact of privatisation in the two sectors that will enable us 
deduce the effects of sector, economic centrality, nature of labour force, balance of 
bargaining power, etc, as factors mediating privatisation's impact. 
The analysis in this section will be informed by the conclusions of the privatisation 
literature as represented by the study's two hypotheses, which will be tested 
against the data presented in this section, first to see whether change has indeed 
occurred in the predicted directions (in both cases or in one or not at all) and 
secondly, to examine how the theory can be refined/improved to take account of 
sectoral and other differences as revealed by the two case studies, based on the 
analytical concepts earlier identified as having employment relations and trade 
union consequences - the balance of bargaining power, collective bargaining, and 
trade union membership and finances, as follows: 
240 
6.3.2.1. Impact on the balance of bargaining power 
There is evidence from chapter four to the effect that trade union bargaining power 
in Nigeria's finance industry declined after privatisation, with the balance of 
bargaining power tilting in favour of employers. Although the decline in union 
bargaining power in the privatised finance sector SOEs preceded privatisation, 
there is evidence from FBN Plc and UNIC Insurance Plc to indicate that it was 
intensified to a significant degree by privatisation. In the petroleum industry, on 
the other hand, evidence from chapter five indicates that privatisation did not 
affect union bargaining power significantly. The oil industry unions continue to 
exert a considerable amount of leverage in their negotiations with employers and 
the government even after privatisation, due largely to the industry's economic 
centrality to Nigeria and its global importance. 
Two dimensions of power help to explain this trend. Although bargaining power 
as measured by company performance and union-specific factors changed in the 
privatised petroleum SOEs, the methods adopted by the unions changed as well, as 
evidenced by the change in their redundancy and membership recruitment 
strategies for instance. In the finance industry, on the other hand, although 
NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI also changed their membership recruitment strategies, they 
did not benefit from the kind of political advantage their oil counterparts have. 
Moreover, the finance unions appear stronger in the area of negotiating post- 
privatisation redundancy benefits and wage increases than in preventing 
redundancy, unlike their oil industry counterparts that appear strong in all respects. 
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This suggests a variation in the power relationship between unions and employers 
in the two industries based on sector-specific factors like the nature of the industry, 
the bargaining agenda and the history (or reputation) of the trade unions, etc, 
identified in chapter one (see Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 1999, for instance) as 
well as economic centrality and the political context of bargaining in each sector. 
For instance, empirical data from this study suggests that union bargaining power 
declined in SOEs privatised in both industries due to the reduction in union 
membership size and density. Despite this empirical evidence, there is evidence 
from this study to suggest that, unlike their finance industry counterparts, the 
petroleum industry unions continue to exert considerable influence on both 
employers and the government. As noted earlier, union membership decline does 
not necessarily translate into loss of bargaining power, since a combination of 
factors determine the balance of power between unions and employers. 
In view of the fact that both sectors share similar experiences of privatisation, the 
variation in union bargaining power between both sectors indicated by the 
evidence from this study can only be explained in terms of their differences, i. e. 
the differences in the sectoral contexts in which the unions operate and the internal 
dynamics of the unions as well. As evident from chapters four and five, union 
cohesion is higher in the petroleum industry than it is in the finance industry. As 
also noted in chapter one, bargaining power is a reflection of the internal dynamics 
of a union as much as it is a function of its relationship with relevant employers 
(Rainsberger, 2003). Moreover, where a trade union is cohesive, aware of its 
potential bargaining power, is willing to press home its advantage, and has a 
history of having done so in the past, it tends to be in a relatively strong position in 
its negotiations with employers (Gennard and Judge, 1997). 
242 
NUPENG/PENGASSAN are more cohesive than their finance counterparts, more 
willing to press home their political advantage and have a history of having done 
so in the past even in the face of Nigeria's most extreme military dictatorships. 
The petroleum industry unions exploit the industry's unique sectoral factors 
(economic, political and global) to their advantage and are therefore, able to exert 
tremendous leverage in their negotiations with employers and government that are 
often very much unwilling to risk work stoppage in the industry, no matter bow 
temporary. The finance industry, on the other hand, is not of equal economic 
importance to the country and the global financial market, is highly deregulated 
and the sector's unions are poorer than their petroleum counterparts. The 
industry's product market is also entirely subject to market forces and not 
govemment-controlled as in the case of the oil industry. 
As noted in chapter one and in section 6.2 above, privatisation affects union 
bargaining power in a number of ways. Despite variations in trade unions' 
experiences, privatisation generally has implications for the organisation and 
solidarity of labour movements and for the forms of organization that best protect 
workers (see Cook and Murphy, 2002 and Keat, 2002 for instance). As revealed in 
this section however, the degree of such impact depends on sector and union- 
specific factors. As noted in chapter one (Smith, 1996, for instance) and 
demonstrated in chapters four and five, workers' bargaining power depends, 
amongst other factors, on features specific to the main union(s) involved 
in 
bargaining such as membership size, reputation, financial strength or information. 
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6.3.2.2. Impact on collective bargaining 
There is no evidence from this study to suggest changes in the legal framework of 
collective bargaining in Nigeria's finance industry or any significant change in 
NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI's structures as a result of privatisation. For one thing, 
collective bargaining in the industry after privatisation remains regulated by the 
country's labour laws. The petroleum industry shares some similarities with the 
finance industry as far as the impact of privatisation on collective bargaining is 
concerned, although there are also differences. Like in the finance industry, the 
legal framework of collective bargaining in the petroleum industry and 
NUPENG/PENGASSAN's structures have not been modified as a result of 
privatisation. Trade unions in the petroleum industry, like their finance 
counterparts, also remain relevant in the industrial relations process despite 
privatisation, but to a much higher degree than their finance industry counterparts. 
The finance unions still prefer centralised bargaining, while the petroleum 
industry's unions still bargain with individual employers at the company level. 
Another major element of change introduced by privatisation that is common to 
both industries is the accentuation of private sector management styles in the 
privatised SOEs through a refocusing of corporate strategy on profits and 
shareholders' interests. Like in the case of some privatised SOEs in Europe, 
privatisation brought the pressure of competition and the importance of economic 
performance, cost-effectiveness, flexibility and profitability to the forefront of 
corporate strategy in privatised SOEs in both industries and made them part of the 
new context that both management and the unions have to deal with (Pedersim 
2000). Consequently, unlike the situation under government ownership, profit 
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making replaced political considerations as the primary objectives of the new 
management of the privatised SOEs. 
Privatisation also benefited trade unions in both industries in the area of collective 
bargaining as evidenced by the fact that they now negotiate redundancy benefits 
beyond the terms of existing collective agreements on behalf of their members 
slated for privatisation-related redundancy in the new companies that emerged. For 
instance, in the petroleum industry, NUPENG/PENGASSAN signed juicy 
severance packages with the management of Conoil PIc after privatisation while 
NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI signed similar severance packages with the management of 
UNIC Insurance Plc- 
There is evidence from this study however, to suggest that the percentage of 
workers covered by collective agreements in the finance industry has reduced to a 
much higher degree than the case in the petroleum industry. As a result of the 
phenomenal, pnvatisation-related decline in union membership size and revenue in 
the finance industry, collective bargaining (which was the norin in the industry) is 
gradually being replaced by individual employment contracts. In some privatised 
SOEs, collective bargaining has been completely replaced by individualism, as 
observed in chapter four for example, in the case of First Bank Plc following total 
de-unionisation of its workforce after privatisation. In UNIC Insurance Plc, 
collective bargaining only covers a minority of employees who remain unionised 
after its privatisation and restructuring. 
On the other hand, the impact of privatisation on collective bargaining in the 
petroleum industry differs in some other respects from the case of the finance 
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industry. For instance, although evidence from chapter five suggests that the 
percentage of workers covered by collective agreements in the petroleum industry 
declined as a result of privatisation, collective bargaining remains the accepted 
mode of regulating the employment relationship in the industry's privatised SOEs. 
Moreover, unlike in the finance sector where the incidence of casualisation and 
contract employment rose as a result of privatisation, evidence from this study 
indicates a gradual reversal of the trend in the petroleum industry, largely as a 
result of the concerted action by the industry's powerful unions. 
Unlike their finance industry counterparts, NUPENG and PENGASSAN now 
resort to proactive actions in order to secure guarantees for their members' 
employment even in oil SOEs earmarked for privatisation but not yet privatised as 
in the case of NNPC. Before the privatisation of Conoll Ple, both unions were able 
to secure a guarantee from the BPE that the core investor will not be allowed by 
government to lay off workers during the first six months of transition following 
privatisation. The BPE also promised to make funds available for the workers to 
purchase 10 percent of the company's shares set aside for workers by the 
government (BPE, 2001 a). 
There are also no cases of total de-unionisation or the mass resignation by union 
members (experienced by NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI in FBN Plc) in the privatised 
petroleum sector SOEs. Additionally, unlike the case in the finance industry where 
there is a move from centralised to decentralised bargaining by employers in the 
privatised SOEs (and in some cases like FBN Plc, its total elimination) after 
privatisation, collective bargaining in the petroleum industry remains 
decentralised. 
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Overall, despite privatisation, relations between petroleum unions and employers 
remain relatively cordial, unlike the case in the finance sector where post- 
privatisation union-management relations became rather volatile, largely as a 
result of the greater impact of post-privatisation restructuring on 
NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI and their members. As a result of increasing job insecurity in 
the privatised finance sector SOEs, for instance, these unions have become 
increasingly confrontational with the new management in the sector in order to 
counter the threat of privatisation-related outsourcing, de-unionisation and 
casualisation of employment to their members and their finances. In the petroleum 
sector, on the other hand, the unions successfully signed an agreement with 
employers to regularise the appointments of contract workers. 
Privatisation led to a re-evaluation of trade unions' bargaining strategies in the 
finance industry, with the finance unions now more pragmatic in their approach to 
dialogue with employers. As observed in chapter four for instance, NUBIFIF and 
ASSBIFI now prefer dialogue to strikes and other forms of industrial actions 
because of their reduced membership size and bargaining power. In the petroleum 
industry, on the other hand, NUPENG and PENGASSAN remain very militant 
despite privatisation largely because their strong political leverage and bargaining 
power remain largely unaffected by privatisation. 
In view of the similarity in the privatisation experiences of both industries, the 
differences observed in the impact of privatisation on collective bargaining 
between both industries can only be adduced to the differences in their 
environmental, economic and trade unions contexts discussed earlier on. These 
differences made it easier for finance industry employers (strengthened by their 
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companies' post-privatisation performance and restructuring) to embark on 
measures like total de-unionisation (as in the case of First Bank Plc) and 
outsourcing and contract employment (as in the case of UNIC Insurance Plc) ', vlth 
very little or no resistance from NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI. In the petroleum 
industry, on the other hand, the centrality of oil to Nigeria's economic survival and 
its impact on global oil market stability, NUPENG and PENGASSAN's strong 
mobilising and strike capacities, their history as radical unions that do not hesitate 
in deploying their strike arsenal and the political leverage the two unions derive 
from the foregoing factors, served as moderating influences on oil industry 
employers, despite the fact that they were equally strengthened by phenomenal 
improvements in their company's post-privatisation performance. 
6.3.2.3. Impact on union membership size and finances 
There is evidence from chapters four and five to the effect that privatisation 
resulted in a decline in the membership size of unions in Nigeria's finance and 
petroleum industries. In the finance industry, privatisation resulted in a 
labour 
force comprised largely of non-unionised workers, a reduction in union density 
and collective bargaining coverage both at the macro and micro 
levels of the 
industry, although the impact varied for NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI. As noted 
in 
chapter four, NUBIFIE lost about seventy-five percent of 
its membership while 
ASSBIFI lost 44 percent of its membership within ten years of the implementation 
of privatisation in the industry. In some domestic 
branches, NUBIFIE and 
ASSBIFI were completely eliminated, as was the case in First Bank 
Plc, Savannah 
Bank of Nigeria Pic, and United Bank of Affica Plc. 
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In the petroleum industry, there is some evidence of similarity ývith the finance 
sector with respect to the impact of privatisation on union membership size. As 
noted in chapter five, for example, the membership size of NUPENG declined 
from 7,536 in 1999 to 6,266 workers in 2000 as a result of privatisation (Table 19). 
In the case of PENGASSAN, membership size declined from 19,700 workers 
before privatisation (Interview, 2002) to 14,000 workers in 2000 (PENGASSAN 
Info, vol. 1, No. 1, December 2000, p. 6). 
As noted in chapters four and five, privatisation precipitated a change in trade 
unions' membership recruitment strategies in both industries, with the trade unions 
becoming more aggressive in organising new members, focussing more on the 
unionisation of casual and contract employees. Trade unions in the finance 
industry, for instance, now approach workers to join them rather than rely on 
statutory guarantees of automatic union membership and also resort to picketing 
the premises of employers who deny workers the right to unionise. Similarly, 
unions in the petroleum industry are now more pro-active in their membership 
recruitment drive after privatisation. For example, in 2001, NUPENG resolved to 
carry out political actions against casualisation every year with effect from June 
2001 and as a result, was able to unionise 3000 new members (Interview with the 
union's representative, 2002). 
There are however, differences in the experiences of finance and petroleum sector 
unions with respect to privatisation's impact on membership size. The membership 
impact of privatisation appears worse in the finance industry both in ternis of 
numbers and the nature of the emerging labour force. Despite fluctuations in the 
membership of NUPENG and PENGASSAN, for instance, they still control an 
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army of skilled workers that cannot be replaced at short notice in the event of a 
strike given the nature of the industry and therefore still possess the capacity to 
organise damaging strikes against employers even after privatisation. In the 
finance industry, on the other hand, NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI's strike capacities 
have become substantially reduced by the massive decline in their membership 
size and density. Moreover, unlike their petroleum industry counterparts, members 
of the finance unions can be replaced much more easily from the ranks of contract 
and outsourced employees at short notice by employers in the event of work 
stoppage. 
The impact of privatisation on union finances in both industries are similar, 
although union revenues in both industries are not equally affected. As observed 
in chapters four and five, union revenue in the finance industry has been more 
adversely affected by privatisation than the case in the petroleum industry. By 
2002, for example, NUBIFIE was unable to pay arrears of its own employees' 
salaries and its rent. In the case of NUPENG, however, although revenues declined 
in real terms between 1999 and 2000 (see Table 20) the union was not as 
impoverished as NUBIFIE. 
The decline in the revenue generated by the trade unions is significant for 
bargaining power. As noted in the literature review chapter, workers' bargaining 
power depends, amongst other factors, on features specific to the main trade union 
involved in bargaining, including its financial strength (Smith, 1996). Moreover, 
healthy union finances are important determinants of union mobilising potential. 
Without a strong financial base, a union's capacity to mobilise its members for 
industrial actions becomes limited. 
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At this stage, a summary of the similarities and differences in the impact of 
privatisation between the finance and petroleum industries is essential as this ý'611 
enable us to deduce the effects of sector, economic centrality, nature of the labour 
force, the balance of bargaining power between the trade unions and management, 
etc, as factors mediating privatisation's impact on trade unions and employment 
relationship. The two hypotheses (mentioned earlier on above) that this study 
seeks to validate will thereafter be tested against the data presented in the 
summary. 
Briefly, the similarities in the impact of privatisation in both industries are as 
under-listed: 
1. Privatisation accentuated private sector management styles in the privatised 
SOEs through a refocusing of corporate strategy on profits and shareholders' 
interests. 
ii. Privatisation benefited unions and their members in the areas of redundancy 
negotiations and wages. 
iii. The trade unions' capacity to mobilise their members for strike actions to 
oppose privatisation-related redundancy was significantly eroded by their 
members' preference for juicy redundancy benefits offered by employers, 
signifying a variation in their mobilising capacity related to the bargaining agenda. 
iv. Privatisation did not result in a review of the legal framework of collective 
bargaining, which continues to be regulated by the country's labour laws nor in the 
structure of unions. 
V. The percentage of workers covered by collective agreement declined. 
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vi. The trade unions changed their bargaining strategies as a result of which 
their members' redundancy benefits now exceed the provisions of their existing 
collective agreements. 
Vii. Collaboration amongst unions in order to combat the effects of privatisation 
has become more prominent. 
viii. Privatisation resulted in an increase in the incidence of strikes and trade 
disputes recorded. 
ix. Trade union membership size declined as a result of privatisation, with an 
increase in labour redundancies, although these were negotiated and voluntary. 
X. Privatisation precipitated a change in trade union membership recruitment 
strategies, with the unions becoming more proactive and shifting their focus to the 
recruitment of new members from the ranks of casual and contract workers. 
xi. Privatisation reduced the revenues of trade unions. 
Despite the above-mentioned similarities, there are significant differences in the 
nature of privatisation's impact in the two industries as well, which are 
summarised below: 
i. The impact of privatisation on the balance of bargaining power varies for 
each industry. As noted in chapters four and five, while privatisation 
led to a 
decline in union bargaining power in the finance industry, it did not significantly 
affect union bargaining power in the petroleum industry 
due largely to sector- 
specific factors like the strategic importance of the oil 
industry to Nigeria's 
economic fortunes and global oil market stability, the nature of the unions in 
the 
industry and the strong political leverage which 
NUPENG/PENGASSAN derive 
from sectoral factors and turn to bargaining advantage. The 
finance industry, on 
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the other hand, is not of equal strategic importance to Nigeria's economy and 
global financial market. Consequently, ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE do not benefit 
from the sort of economic and political advantage that NUPENG/PENGASSAN 
enjoy. 
The impact of privatisation on collective bargaining varies for both 
industries. As noted in chapters four and five respectively, there is a change in the 
practice of collective bargaining in the finance industry, as evidenced by the 
gradual replacement of collectivism with individualism in some of the sector's 
privatised SOEs like UNIC Insurance Plc and total de-unionisation and complete 
elimination of collective bargaining in some others like FBN Plc. In the petroleum 
industry, on the other hand, collectivism remains decentrallsed and the accepted 
practice for mediating the industry's employment relationship, with no evidence of 
total de-unionisation in any of the sector's privatised SOEs. 
The variation in the impact of privatisation on collective bargaining, particularly as 
it relates to total de-unionisation in the finance industry but not in the petroleum 
industry, is attributable to the differences in the bargaining power of their 
respective unions discussed earlier on in this chapter. The change in the structure 
of collective bargaining in the finance industry, for instance, was made possible by 
a combination of the weakened state of finance sector unions and the complete de- 
unionisation that resulted from the restructuring of some of the sector's privatised 
SOEs. 
Collective bargaining in the finance industry assumed a volatile dimension 
as a result of privatisation. In the petroleum industry, on the other hand, despite the 
initial problems, relations between unions and management remain relatively 
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cordial. Unlike in the case of the petroleum industry employers and the 
government for whom the need to reach compromise with unions (In order not to 
disrupt the flow of oil from the oil wells and the refineries) was very important, 
finance sector employers do not feel any such pressure. As noted in chapter one, 
the potential relative bargaining power of a union is dependent on a combination 
of factors like the centrality of the group to the workflow, the extent of its 
organisation, its cohesiveness and solidarity. Next is the degree to which the group 
can be substituted and the extent to which substitute products or services for those 
provided by the group are available to the organisation's customers and the 
group's willingness to exercise its disruptive power, its awareness of its potential 
bargaining power, its willing to press home its advantage and its history of having 
done so in the past (Gennard and Judge, 1997). It is these attributes that the 
petroleum industry unions are able to retain despite privatisation (but which their 
finance sector counterparts lack) that help to explain the differences in the impact 
of privatisation on collective bargaining in both industries. 
IV. The negative impact of privatisation on union membership size is more 
pronounced in the finance than the petroleum industry, due largely to the nature of 
their respective unions and the variations in their bargaining power arising from 
their different sectoral contexts. As noted in chapter five for instance, the 
mobilising and strike capacities of NUPENG and PENGASSAN were unaffected 
by membership decline, unlike the case of NUBIFIE and ASSBIF1 noted in 
chapter four that lost between 75 percent and 44 percent of their members 
respectively to privatisation. 
V. In the finance industry, privatisation resulted in a reduction in the percentage 
of workers covered by collective agreements and in trade union density as well, to 
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a much larger degree than was the case in the petroleum industry because 
NUPENG and PENGASSAN were more successful in recruiting new members 
from the ranks of casual and contract employees in the petroleum industry than 
NUBIFIE and ASSBIFT were in the finance industry. Moreover, union strike 
mobilisation was more effective in the petroleum industry where unions were 
more willing to back their demands with threats of strike actions than the case of 
the finance industry where NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI became more pragmatic in their 
approach and preferred dialogue, due to their weakened state after privatisation. 
vi. The decline in the membership size of NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI led to a 
proportional decline in their bargaining power. In the petroleum industry, on the 
other hand, the bargaining power of NUPENG and PENGASSAN was not 
significantly affected by the decline in their membership size. Although as earlier 
noted in this chapter, a decline in the membership of a union does not necessarily 
translate to loss of bargaining power, in the case of NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI, the 
decline was so substantial that it had a proportional impact on their revenue, their 
capacity to mobilise their members and bargain effectively and consequently, their 
bargaining power. 
6.4. Relationship of the comparison to the conclusions of the privatisation 
literature 
So far in this chapter, the similarities and differences in the impact of pnvatisation 
on trade unions and employment relationship in Nigeria's finance and petroleum 
industries have been compared in order to test the study's two critical hypotheses 
(deduced from a review of the privatisation literature in chapter one) against the 
data presented in the comparison. The question at this stage is: how do the data 
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presented in the comparison relate to the two hypotheses? In order to effectively 
answer this question, it is essential to reiterate the two hypotheses, as follows: 
I The employment relationship changes in its expression and management in 
privatised enterprises as a consequence of the change in ownership and control, 
structure and product market competition arising from privatisation: and, 
2. The employment relationship in privatised enterprises changes not 
necessarily as a consequence of privatisation, but as a consequence of changes in 
managerial/corporate strategies, national and firm-level industrial relations policies 
and other environmental factors not related to privatisation. 
As evidenced from the findings of the current study, there were changes in the 
ownership and control of the privatised SOEs in Nigeria's finance and petroleum 
industries from government to private sector. In both sectors, ownership and 
control of SOEs were transferred to core investors who became majority 
shareholders of the new companies that emerged. Evidence from this study 
indicates that the employment relationship changed in both cases but not 
necessarily as a consequence of the change in ownership and control (which was 
common to both sectors) but due to environmental and sectoral factors unique to 
each case, as well as post-privatisation restructuring of the privatised SOEs that 
came in the wake of the change in ownership and control, as informed by the new 
focus of the emerging companies on the shareholders' perspective of profit making 
as opposed to the largely political and welfare objectives that characterised the 
SOEs under government ownership. 
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As revealed in the data presented in this chapter, there are variations between the 
finance and petroleum sectors with respect to the changes in trade unionism and 
employment relationship arising from privatisation, which suggest that other 
factors mediated the impact of privatisation apart from the change in ownership 
and control, structure and product market competition arising from privatisation. 
Given the similarities in their privatisation experiences, there is evidence from this 
study to attribute the differences in the impact of privatisation between both 
sectors to the different effects of sector, economic centrality, nature of the unions 
and the balance of bargaining power between unions and employers as factors 
mediating the impact of privatisation. As the data presented in this comparative 
chapter reveal, these factors vary markedly for both sectors and consequently, 
confer varying degrees of leverage and power on their respective unions. 
It is evident therefore, that although the findings of the current study (as 
represented by the data presented in this chapter) agree to some extent with the 
conclusions of the pnvatisation literature on the predictive impact of privatisation 
on trade unions and employment relationship as represented by the first hypothesis 
(i. e. that the employment relationship changes in its expression and management 
in privatised enterprises as a consequence of the change in ownership and control, 
structure and product market competition arising from privatisation) its findings 
differ slightly. 
The current study's conclusion in this regard is that in developing economies 
like 
Nigeria, changes in the expression and management of the employment 
relationship in privatised SOEs as a consequence of the change in ownership and 
control, structure and product market competition arising 
from privatisation, are 
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mediated by the different effects of environmental (economic and political 
developmental contexts) and sectoral factors, economic centrality of the sector, the 
nature of unions involved in bargaining and the balance of bargaining power 
between unions and the management. This conclusion indicates a need to 
substantially modify the conclusions of the privatisation literature in order to 
accommodate the mediating impact of other factors, particularly in the developing 
economies of Africa. 
This is because there are differences between developed Western economies and 
developing economies like Nigeria in a variety of ways, which should have 
implications for privatisation and how it impacts on industrial relations in specific 
economic sectors. First is the difference in their levels of economic development. 
Take the central importance of oil and petroleum products as an export product 
and a major source of revenue and foreign exchange for Nigeria, for instance (see 
Tables 29,30 and 3 1). There is no Western economy that is so dependent on a 
single commodity or economic sector for its survival. Oil production, consumption 
and pricing are regulated largely by consumers in Western (developed) economies 
and not by Nigeria or OPEC. In most developing economies, there are similar 
elements of mono-culturalism (i. e. near-total dependency on single economic 
products or sectors) unlike the case in developed Western economies and the 
newly-industrialised Asian tigers. 
In the case of Nigeria's banking sector, although the country is building a modem 
banking sector, it is not as integrated with her economy like banking is in Western 
economies. Therefore, developments in the sector do not portend similar 
implications for Nigeria's economy as is the case in developed economies. It is 
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worthy of note that the sectoral features identified in Nigeria's finance and 
petroleum sectors appraised in the current study relate specifically to Nigeria and 
her state of development. 
Second is the difference in the level of political development between developing 
and developed economies, as represented by the nature of their respective 
governments. Unlike the UX for instance, where privatisation was initiated by a 
democratic, parliamentary government, the programme in Nigeria commenced 
under military dictatorship. Despite the emergence of a democratically-elected 
government in the country since 1998, Nigeria is not a democracy in the Western 
sense since the Nigerian government operates more like an agency concerned with 
building a geopolitical I y-balanced economy rather than an integrated, perfect 
market economy. Moreover, individuals and groups in the country have differing 
notions on public ownership. Like most developing nations, Nigeria is not an 
economy where public ownership was built on a political ideology like socialism. 
Rather, the government attempts to gain control of the economic levers in order to 
alleviate plural fears and achieve geo-political economic balance. Like her 
economic context, Nigeria's political context derives from her development 
context. As noted in chapter one, the political context in which privatisation takes 
place influences the propensity of workers to resist sell-off schemes and the forms 
such resistance might take, same as the presence or absence of genuine partisan 
political competition (Cook and Murphy, 2002). 
Thirdly, there are differences in the objectives of privatisation between developed 
and developing economies, which portend different implications for industrial 
relations and different consequences for the regulation of employment. As noted in 
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section 1.2.3 of chapter one, developed and developing economies have different 
policy objectives of privatisation (see Adam et al., 1992, p. 13 for instance). The 
privatisation literature therefore requires substantial modification to take 
cognisance of both economic and political development contexts if its conclusions 
are to be applicable to a West African economy like Nigeria where the nature of 
political, social and economic factors (which in turn mediate the impact of 
privatisation) are determined largely by the country's stage of development. 
For instance, the privatisation literature in Europe hypothesises on pre-existing, 
wide and diversified market economies in which no single sector is critical to the 
countries' economic survival. Unlike the case in developed nations where 
individual sectoral. privatisation may go wrong with very little implications for the 
economy as a whole, in most developing countries this is not the case. In Nigeria 
for example, if the privatisation of the oil sector were to go wrong, the country will 
disappear as an economic entity. The privatisation literature therefore needs also to 
reflect the differences in the nature of the public sectors of developing and 
developed economies that are to be privatised. For instance, the assumption by the 
privatisation. literature that a privatised SOE will move from non-competitive to 
competitive context is not valid in the case of Nigeria's oil sector where the 
government retains 100 percent control of oil and gas resources. Differing effects 
of country-specific sectoral. and environmental factors help to explain the 
differences in the impact of privatisation. between different development contexts. 
The second hypothesis that the current study tested posits that the employment 
relationship in privatised enterprises changes, not necessarily as a consequence of 
privatisation, but as a consequence of changes in managerial/corporate strategies, 
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national and firm-level industrial relations policies and other environmental factors 
not related to privatisation. As noted in chapter one, the privatisation literature 
argues that it is difficult to isolate the effect of privatisation from other variables 
that have an influence on aggregate measures and that this often results in the 
observance of certain trends, but with weak causality (Sheshinski and Lopez- 
Calva, 1999). 
There is no evidence from the current study to support this second conclusion of 
the privatisation literature. As earlier shown in chapters four and five, the observed 
changes in trade unionism and employment relationship in privatised SOEs in 
Nigeria's finance and petroleum sectors are entirely privatisation-related. 
Moreover, there were no changes observed in official national level and fin-n-level 
industrial relations policies as a direct result of the privatisation of SOEs in both 
industries. Despite evidence to the effect that other environmental factors 
unrelated to privatisation impacted on unions in both sectors before privatisation, 
there is no evidence from this study to indicate that such factors accounted for the 
changes observed in trade unionism and employment relationship in UNIC 
Insurance, FBN and Conoil Plc after privatisation. The conclusion of the current 
study in this regard therefore, is that the employment relationship in privatised 
enterprises changes as a consequence of changes in managerial/corporate 
strategies and firm-level industrial relations strategies directly related to 
privatisation. 
The conclusions of the current study therefore, suggest the need to refine the 
privatisation theory (as represented by the two hypotheses tested in this chapter) to 
take account of environmental and other sectoral differences (i. e. the 
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developmental context in which privatisation takes place) as follows: 
I. Although the employment relationship in privatised SOEs changes in its 
expression and management as a consequence of the change in ownership and 
control, structure and product market competition arising from privatisation, the 
observed changes are mediated largely by the different effects of environment, 
sector, economic centrality, the identity of the trade unions and the balance of 
bargaining power between unions and management as determined by 
developmental context (economic, institutional and political) of the country 
involved; and, 
2. The employment relationship in privatised enterprises changes as a 
consequence of changes in managerial/corp orate strategies and firm-level 
industrial relations strategies related entirely to privatisation (i. e. as a result of 
privatisation-related corporate restructuring). 
6.5. CONCLUSION 
In this section, the conclusions of the current study are summarised in four 
sections. In the first part, the key points of the study are recapitulated followed by 
a brief statement of the theoretical perspectives of the privatisation literature. In 
the third section, the current study's contribution to the privatisation literature is 
discussed, while issues and themes for future research are highlighted thereafter. 
6.5.1. Recapitulation of key points 
So far in this study, a review of the literature on privatisation, trade unions and 
employment relationship was conducted in chapter one, followed by a discussion 
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of the study's methodology in chapter two. In chapter three, the environmental 
context of privatisation in Nigeria was evaluated, while the finance and petroleum 
case studies were analysed in chapters four and five respectively. In chapter six, 
the findings of chapters four and five were comparatively evaluated in order to 
tease out the under-listed: 
I- The common features of privatisation and its consequences for trade unions 
and employment relationship in both sectors, and, 
2. The differences in the impact of privatisation between the two sectors that 
will enable us deduce the effects of environmental and sectoral factors, economic 
centrality, nature of labour force, balance of bargaining power, etc, as factors 
mediating the impact of privatisation. 
The conclusions of chapter one (as represented by the two hypotheses deduced 
from the privatisation literature) were then tested against the data presented in 
chapter six, first to deduce whether change has indeed occurred in the predicted 
directions and secondly, to examine how the theory can be refined/improved to 
take account of sectoral and other differences revealed by the two case studies. 
6.5.2. Restatement of theoretical perspectives 
Certain research questions rooted in the implications of privatisation for 
employment relationship as defined by Westem literature (but relevant to an 
understanding of Nigeria's experience) emerged from the conclusions of the 
privatisation literature and constitute the core arguments and theoretic al/analytical 
reference points for the current study, as follows: 
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1. Is there any obvious connection in the theory on privatisation between the 
macro-level change in ownership and control, structure of firm and the 
nature of the product market competition on the one hand, and the micro- 
level changes in industrial relations on the other? 
2. Are there other factors responsible for the micro-level changes in industrial 
relations observable in privatised enterprises other than privatisation' 
The current study explored two hypotheses (derived from the above-mentioned 
questions) as follows: 
1. The employment relationship changes in its expression and management in 
privatised enterprises as a consequence of the change in ownership and 
control, structure and product market competition ansing from 
privatisation; and, 
2. The employment relationship in privatised enterprises changes, not 
necessarily as a consequence of privatisation, but as a consequence of 
changes in managenal/corporate strategies, national and firm-level 
industrial relations policies and other environmental factors not related to 
privatisation. 
The study tested two sets of concepts derived from the first hypothesis. The first 
set of concepts, represented by the term 'privatisation', includes changes in: 
1. Ownership 
11 Control 
iii. Structure of the firm, and, 
IV. Product market competition. 
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The second set of concepts, represented by the term 'employment relationship'. 
includes changes in: 
i. The balance of power between management and trade unions 
ii. Collective bargaining 
III Union membership size and finances 
IV. Wages, and, 
V. Disciplinary and grievance procedure 
There are equally two sets of concepts embedded in the second hypothesis, which 
the current study translated into operational tenns. These are: 
Changes in corporate and management strategies, the firm's industrial 
relations policies arising from privatisation-related restructuring and other 
environmental factors not related to privatisation; and, 
Changes in 'employment relationship' as defined above. 
The two sets of concepts derived from the two hypotheses were translated into 
operational terms via a critical evaluation of the impact of privatisation on 
Nigeria's finance and petroleum industries in chapters four and five. The findings 
of those two chapters revealed varying degrees of change in the nature of both 
industries' trade unions and employment relationship as a result of privatisation, 
suggesting the need for a comparison and an identification of those factors that 
accounted for the observed differences in chapter six. The findings of the 
comparisons were then tested against the study's two hypotheses. 
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6.5.3. Contribution of the current study to the privatisation literature and theory 
In addition to contributing empirical evidence of performance improvement in 
privatised SOEs, increases in wages and union membership decline in a 
developing economy context, the current study's contribution to the privatisation 
theory lies in its key findings which agree to some extent with the conclusions of 
the privatisation literature on the predictive impact of privatisation on trade unions 
and employment relationship but differ significantly from the privatisation 
literature's conclusions (as represented by the two hypotheses which the study 
tested). The findings indicate the need to modify privatisation theory to take 
cognisance of the development context (economic, institutional and political) in 
which privatisation takes place if it is to apply to a developing economy (like 
Nigeria) where the environmental and sectoral factors mediating privatisation's 
impact are in turn mediate by economic, institutional and political contexts as 
determined by the country's level of development. 
Such developing economy dimension of privatisation is important since the 
specificity of privatisation in developing countries differs significantly from its 
nature in developed economies. The consequences of privatisation for both 
economic contexts are therefore, bound to differ. Moreover, there are variations in 
the economic and political contexts of developed and developing economies, 
which, in a variety of ways, significantly determine the nature of the impact of 
privatisation. For instance, unlike developed economies where the various 
economic sectors are significantly integrated, the economic sectors in most 
developing countries are not as integrated and depend largely on single economic 
products or sectors for survival. 
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Secondly, the nature of government differs in both economic contexts. Unlike the 
case in the developed nations, most governments in developing nations are not 
democracies in the Western sense and tend to act more like agencies concerned 
with gaining control of economic levers in order to ensure plural balance. 
Additionally, individuals and political groupings in the developing nations have 
different notions of public ownership which also differ from those of developed 
nations. It is important therefore that the pnvatisation literature takes cognisance 
of these differences rather than seek to apply similar theories and conclusions to 
both development contexts. 
This is imperative because the privatisation literature in Europe and the rest of the 
developed world hypothesises a pre-existing market economy in which no single 
sector is critical to the country's economic survival like the case of Nigeria and 
most developing countries. Hence, the literature needs to reflect the difference in 
the nature of the public sectors of developing and developed nations since the 
economic centrality of a public sector in a developing nation may interfere with 
the nature of post-privatisation competition. In the case of Nigeria's oil industry 
for instance, the sector did not move from non-competitive to perfectly 
competitive context since government retains ownership of the country's oil and 
gas resources. 
There are two additional reasons why a modification of the conclusions of the 
privatisation theory and literature (as represented by the two hypotheses tested in 
this study) is necessary. As revealed in chapter six, the first reason stems from the 
differing effects that privatisation (i. e. change of ownership and control of SOEs 
from public to private sector) had on trade unions and employment relationship in 
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Nigeria's finance and petroleum sectors. Despite similarities in their privatisation 
experiences and the similar privatisation. method employed in both industries. 
environmental and sectoral differences, differences in their economic centralm', 
their level of regulation by government, the nature of bargaining, the power 
relationship between unions and employers, ownership and control of their product 
markets and the nature of their market competition (as determined by Nigeria's 
economic and political development contexts) mediated the impact of privatisation 
and produced different sectoral effects, which are in certain respects substantially 
different from the effects associated with the privatisation of Western SOEs. 
The second reason lies in the fact that, contrary to the second conclusion of the 
privatisation literature to the effect that the employment relationship in privatised 
SOEs does not necessarily change as a consequence of privatisation but rather as a 
consequence of changes in other factors unrelated to privatisation (as represented 
by hypothesis two), the findings of the current study (as revealed in chapters four, 
five and six) indicate that the observed changes in the employment relationship of 
the privatised SOEs in Nigeria's finance and petroleum industries are solely 
attributable to privatisation, i. e., they are not related to factors other than 
privatisation. 
6.5.4. Issues and themes for future research 
Although the current study does not attempt to ascribe a universal validity to its 
findings, they are significant for an understanding of the impact of privatisation in 
different sectoral and economic development contexts. Moreover, the study 
constitutes an empirical challenge for future comparative research on the impact of 
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privatisation on trade unions and employment relationship in other industrial 
sectors in Nigeria and other developing countries and also for future studies 
comparing the impact of privatisation on trade unions and employment 
relationship in developing and developed economies. The study also highlights the 
paucity of trade union data and the need to conduct research in the future aimed at 
building relevant union data base in developing nations like Nigeria. 
It is imperative at this stage to note the fact that at the outset of this study, this 
Author's aim was to comparatively evaluate the impact of privatisation and 
employment relationship in three economic sectors in Nigeria. However, due to 
constraints of time and money, the third case study involving the food, beverage 
and tobacco industry- was dropped after the first field trip. Preliminary findings 
from that sector however, indicate an unusual co-operation between unions 
(Nigerian Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Employees and Association of 
Senior Staff of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Companies) with management in the 
case study company- the Nigerian Flour Mills Plc. It would be interesting to 
follow that aspect of the research through in a future study, as the findings 
probably may lead to conclusions that are slightly different from the findings of 
the current study. 
A comparative cross-regional evaluation of the impact of privatisation on 
industrial relations in different or similar sectors of developed and developing 
economies sometime in the future is also worth pursuing in order to see if the 
findings will replicate or differ significantly from those of the current study. It will 
also be worthwhile exploring further the implications of SAP and political 
contingency for privatisation's impact on unions and industrial relations in 
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privatised SOEs in developing economies. A review of the theoretical I y-based 
expectations of how privatisation would affect employment (which was subsumed 
under union membership in this study) and industrial relations (i. e. predictions on 
privatisation's industrial relations outcomes) is also worth pursuing sometime in 
the future. 
Finally, it will also be worthwhile to see how the passage of time and changes in 
the developmental context of Nigeria or some other developing economy in the 
future will mediate privatisation's impact on industrial relations in different 
economic sectors. Such studies may further enrich the conclusions of the 
privatisation literature on the implications of different developmental contexts for 
the impact of privatisation on industrial relations and will be considered in the 
future. 
270 
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adam, C., Cavendish, W., and Mistry, P. S. 1992. Adjusting privatization: case 
studies from developing countries.. London: J. Currey. 
Adebayo, S. 2002. "PENGASSAN plans nationwide campaign against 
privatisation of refineries" in 'The Vanguard', Tuesday, February 19,2002, p. 18. 
Lagos: Vanguard Newspapers Limited. 
Africa Masterweb. 2004. "Nigerian Labour wams Shell on job cuts" (Wednesday, 
March 24ý 2004). Downloaded frýom 
http: //www. africamasterweb. com/NewsRepOt-t6. html 
Ahiuma-Young, V. 2002. "Privatisation of refineries: we are behind 
PENGASSAN in the struggle, NUPENG warns" in 'The Vanguard', Tuesday, 
February 5,2002, p. 19. Lagos: Vanguard Newspapers Limited. 
Ahiuma-Young, V. 2004. "Fuel hike: Marketers are fraudulent, liars- Akpatason, 
NUPENG President" in 'The Vanguard', Wednesday, June 02,2004. Downloaded 
from htip: //www. vanguardngr. coin/articIes/2002/business/bIO2062004. htmi 
Aidt5 T. and Tzannatos, Z. 2002. Unions and Collective Bargaining: Economic 
Effects in a Global Environment. Washington, D. C: The World Bank. 
Akhaine, S. 2001. "Privatisation: First phase yield N19 billion". The Guardian 
Online, Tuesday, February 275 2001. Downloaded from 
hltp: //www. ngTg-Liardiannews. com/news2/nn8l3 80 I. html 
Akinlaja, J. 1.1999. NUPENG: An ExaMple in Progressive Unionism. Lagos, 
Nigeria: Inspired Communication Ltd. 
Akinlaja, J. 1.2001. "Pertinent questions on casualisation/contract labour". A 
271 
paper presented at the Workshop on 'Casualisation' held from 5 th to 6 th November 
2001 at the NICON-NOGA Hilton Hotel, Abuja, Nigeria. 
Alexander, C. 2002. 'Enterprise Reform and Labour in North Africa' in Cook and 
Murphy, op. cit. 
Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections'. 2002. "Nigeria shelves planned 
privatisation of NNPU in Company News: Africa, volume 7, issue no. 22, 
Wednesday, November 13ý 2002. Downloaded from 
http: //www. gasandoll. com/goc/company/ýcna24685. htm 
Anya, 0. A. 2000. "Privatisation in Nigeria". Paper presented at the Nigeria 
Economic Summit held at the Netherlands Congress Centre, The Hague. The 
Hague: The Nigerian Embassy. Downloaded from 
http: //www. ni. gei-ianembassy. nl/Prof. `/ý2OAnya. htm 
Arrowsmith, J. 2003. "Post-privatisation industrial relations in the UK rail and 
electricity industries", Industrial Relations Journal 34: 2, pp. 150-161. Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
Avuru, A. 1999. "Funding and Partnership Option for the Nigerian Economy in 
the Next Millennium" in Kpandiok, M. (ed. ). 1999. Energy Crisis in Nigeria: 
Causes, Effects and Solutions. Lagos: PENGASSAN-NNPC, p. 226. Cited in 
Mutfwang 200 1, p. 11). 
Awowole-Browne. 2002. "Government dumps NNPC privatisation" in 'Daily 
Champion', October 17,2002. Downloaded from 
htlp: //allafrica. com/sustainable/stories/200210170147. html 
Bala, J. J. 1995. 'The impact of privatisation on distributional equity in Nigeria', in 
272 
Ramanadhan, V. V. Privatisation and Equit . London and New York: Routledge. 
Beckman, B. 2002. "Trade unions and institutional reform: Nigerian experiences 
with South African and Ugandan Comparisons", Transformation, 48 (2002) ISSN 
0258-7696. 
Bing-hung, P. 1993. Chanjging public sector industrial relations: a case study of the 
privatisation of British Rail. M. A thesis, Coventry: Warwick Business School, The 
University of Warwick. 
Blaikie, N. 1993. Approaches to Social Enquiry. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell. 
Blyton, P. and Morris, J. 1991. 'A flexible future: aspects of the flexibility debates 
and some unresolved issues', in Blyton, P. and J. Morris (eds. ). A Flexible Future? 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter cited in O'Connell Davidson, 1993, op cit, p. 128. 
Boardman, A., Laurin, C., and Vining, A. R. 2000. "Privatisation in Canada: 
Operating, Financial and Stock Price Performance with International 
Comparisons", working pape , University of British Columbia, Vancouver. 
Bourbakri, N. and Cosset, Jean-Claude. 1997. "The financial and operating 
performance of newly pnvatised firms: Evidence from developing countries", 
mimeo, Universite Laval, cited in Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 1999, op cit. 
Bourbakri, N. and Cosset, Jean-Claude. 1998. "The financial and operating 
performance of newly privatised firms: Evidence from developing countries", 
Journal of Finance, Vol. LIII, No. 3, pp. 1081-1110, cited in Sheshinski and 
Lopez-Calva, 1999, op cit. 
273 
Brickley, J. A., and Van Horn, R. L. 2000. "Privatisation in Transition Countries. " 
Post Soviet Affairs, Vol. 16, pp. 257-286 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). "World Bank quits Nigerian 
privatisation". BBC News, Tuesday, 22 May 2001,19.05 GMT. Downloaded from 
hllp: //www. news. bbc. co. uk/hi/englisli/newsid-1345000/1345508. stm 
Brown, R. 1988. "The employment relationship in sociological theory", in D. 
Gallie (ed. ). Employment in Britain. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, cited in O'Connell 
Davidson, J. 1993, op. cit. 
Brownbridge, Martin. 1996. 'The impact of public policy on the banking system 
in Nigeria'. Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Working _Pape 
3 1, June 1996. 
Bureau for Public Enterprises. 2000. National Council on Privatisation: 
Privatisation Handbook (2 d Edition). Abuja: BPE, May 2000. 
Bureau for Public Enterprises. 2001. Presidential Review of the Privatisation 
Pro)zramme: Presentation by Bureau for Public Ente! prises. Abuja: BPE, July 9, 
2001. 
Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. 1979. Sociological Paradigms and Organisational 
Analysis. London: Heinemann. 
Campbell-White. 0. and Bhatia, A. 1998. PrivatIsation in Africa. Washington DC: 
IBRD. 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). 1986. Annual Reports and Statement of Accounts, 
31 December 1986. Lagos, Nigeria: CBN. 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). 1998. "Developments in the Insurance Industry in 
Nigeria" in CBN Economic and Financial Review, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 
54-76,1998 
274 
Chisari, 0., Estache, A., and Lafont, J. J. 1997b. "The needs of the poor in 
infrastructure privatisation: The role of universal service obligations", mimeo. The 
World Bank. Cited in Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, op. cit. 
Clarke, P. 1987. 'The argument for privatisation', in J. Neuberger (ed. ). 
Privatisation: Fair shares for all or Selling the Family Silver? London: Papermac. 
Clegg, H. A. 1979. The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, cited in Ogden, S., 1994, op cit, p. 70. 
Colling, T. 1987. Water works- keep it public: the trade unions response to the 
threat of privati-sation in the water industr . M. A thesis, Coventry: Warwick 
Business School, University of Warwick. 
Colling, T. 1991. 'Privatisation and the management of Industrial Relations in 
electricity distribution', Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer, pp. 
117-129. 
Colling, T. and Ferner, A. 1995. 'Privatisation and Marketization' in P. Edwards 
(ed. ), Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice in Britain, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Conoil Plc. 2003.2003 Annual Repo . Lagos: Conoil 
P1c. 
Cook P. and Kirkpatrick, C. 1988. "Privatization in Less Developed Countries: An 
Overview" in Cook, P. and Kirkpatrick, C. (eds. ). 1988. Privatisation in Less 
Developed Countries. Hemel Hempstead and New York: Wheatshef. 
Cook, L. J. and Murphy, C. 2002. Privatisation and Labour: responses and 
consequences in global perspective. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers. 
Cox, A. Harris5 L. and Parker, D. 1999. Privatisation and supply chain 
management : on the effective alignment of purchasing and supply after 
-privatisation. London: Routledge, 1999. 
275 
D'Souza, J. and Megginson, W. 1998. "The financial and operating perfon-nance 
of privatised finns during the 1990s" mimeo, Department of Finance, Terry 
College of Business, The University of Georgis, Athens, GA. Cited in Sheshinski 
and Lopez-Calva, op. cit. 
Damachi, U. 1986. "Industrial Relations: A development dilemma", in Damachi, 
U. and Seibel, H. D, 1986, op cit, p. 120. 
Damachi, U. and Seibel, H. D. 1986. Management Problems in Africa. London: 
McMillan. 
Davis, J., Ossowski, R., Richardson, T. and Barnett, S. 2000. "Fiscal and 
Macroeconomic Aspects of Privatisation", IMF Occasional Pape No. 194. 
Washington, D. C: IMF. 
Dewenter, K. L. and Malatesta, P. H. 1997. "Public Offerings of State-Owned and 
Privately-Owned Firms: An International Comparison", Journal of Finance, Vol. 
52, pp. 1659-1679, cited in Kikeri and Nellis, 200 1, op cit, p. 10. 
Eckel, C., Eckel, D., and Singhal, V. 1997. "Privatisation and Efficiency: Industry 
effects of the sale of British Airways", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 43, 
pp. 275-298. Cited in Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, op. cit. 
Ehigiator, K. 2002. "PENGASSAN Gives Seven-Day Ultimatum" in 'The 
Vanguard', May 23,2002. Downloaded from 
http: //allaftica. com/stories/200205230660. html 
El-Rufai, N. A. 2001. "Government's objectives in the privatisation of NITEL 
NEPA and Petroleum Sector Enterprises and the approach to labour and social 
issues". Paper presented at the Nigeria Labour Congress Workshop on 
Privatisation held at the Lafia Hotel, Moor Plantation, lbadan, Nigeria, November 
276 
12,2001. 
Faf6wora, 0.0.1998. "Privatisation of Nigerian public utilities: barriers and 
constraints" in MODUS International Law and Business Quarterly, 3(4), 
December 1998, pp. 33-38. Lagos, Nigeria. 
Fairbrother, P. 2000. Trade unions at the crossroads. Employment and work 
relations in context series, London: Mansell. 
Fairbrother, P., Paddon, M., and Teicher, J. (eds. ) 2002. Privatisation, 
globalisation, and labour: studies from Australia. Annandale, NSW: Federation 
Press. 
Fajana, S. 2000. Industrial Relations in Nigeria: Tbeory and Features (Second 
Edition). Lagos, Nigeria: Labofin and Company. 
Falola, T. and Ihonvbere, J. 1985. The rise and fall of Nigeria's Second Republic 
London: Zed Books Limited. 
Fashoyin, T. 1980. Industrial Relations in Nigeria: Development and Practice. 
London: Longman Group Limited. 
Federal Office of Statistics (FOS). 1998. Facts and figures about Nigeria. Lagos: 
FOS. 
Ferner, A. and Colling, T. 1991. "Privatisation, Regulation and Industrial 
Relations", in British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 29(3), pp. 391-409. 
First Bank of Nigeria Plc. 2001. Abridged Annual Reports and Accounts. Lagos, 
Nigeria: FBN Plc. 
First Bank PIc- 1998. Five-year Financial Summary. Lagos, Nigeria: First Bank. 
Downloaded from http: //www. nigeriabusinessinfo. com/firstbankofniveriaplc. htni 
277 
First Bank Plc. 2001 a. Annual Reports and Accounts 2000/2001. Lagos, Nigeria: 
FBN Plc. 
First Bank Plc. 2003. Financial Highlights for the year ended 31 March 2003. 
Downloaded from http: //www. firstbanki-ii_veiia-con-iiaboutus/abf hi storV. print. htm 
Fogarty, Michael P. 1986. Trade unions & British industrial development. 
Research report, London : Policy Studies Institute. 
Frydma-n, R., Gray, C. W., Hessel, M. and Rapaczynski. A. 1999. "When does 
privatisation work? The impact of private ownership on corporate performance in 
transition economies", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 114: 4, pp. 1153-1191. 
Fuess, Scott M. 2001. "Union bargaining power: A View from Japan". In. stitute for 
the Study of Labour QZA) Discussion Pape , No. 393. Bonn: IZA, November 
2001. Downloaded 
hqp: //papers. ss com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstract id=290604 mI 
from 
Galal, A. 1990. "Public Enterprise Reform: A challenge for the World Bank. 
World Bank, Policy, Planning and Research", Paper 400, cited in Adam, C., 
Cavendish, W., and Mistry, P. S. (1992) op cit, p. 66. 
Galal, A., Jones, L., Tandon, P., and Vogelsang, 1.1994. The welfare 
consequences of selling public entS!, Mrises. Oxford University Press for the World 
Bank, cited in Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, op. cit. 
Gennard, J. and Judge, G. 1997.. Employee Relations. London: IPD. 
Gupta, S., Schiller, C., Ma, H., and Tiongson, E. 2003. Trivatisation, Labour, and 
Social Safety Nets'. Washington D. C: IMF, downloaded from 
httv: HR-ru. Worldbank. or, fý/Documents/Privatisation Labor Safety Nets. Doc 
Hailemariam, S., von Eije, H., and van der Werf, J. 2000. "Is there a 'privatisation 
. 2- 
78 
trap'? The case of the Manufacturing Industries in Eritrea", downloaded from 
1-i! ip: //www. ub. rug. nl/e. doe/som/a/02AO4. pdf 
Heald, D. and Morris, G. 1984. 'Why public sector unions are on the defenslý-e'. 
Personnel ManaRement, May, pp. 30-34. 
Hodge, G. 2000. "Reviewing the Effectiveness of Privatisation as Enterprise 
Sales" , in Privatisation: An International Review of Performance, Melbourne: 
Westview Press. 
Hulsink, W. 1999. Privatisation and liberalisation in European 
telecommunications: comparing Britain, the Netherlands and France. London: 
Routledge 
Hurl, B. 1995. Privatization and the Public Sector (3 d Edition), Heinemann. 
England. 
Ikhide, S. 1.1998. Financial Sector Reforms and Monetary Policy in Nigeria. 
Institute of Development Studies Working Pýpe , No. 68, University of 
Sussex, 
Brighton, U. K, April 1998. 
Imoisili, 1. C. 1984. "Collective Bargaining in the Nigerian Private Sector", 
Labour and Society, 9 (4), October-December 1984: 375-387. 
Imoisili, 1. C. 1987. "Management Policies towards labour: The unionisation of 
Nigerian employers", Nigeria Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 1, December 
1987, Lagos, Nigeria: Nigeria Industrial Relations Association. 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). 1987. Wages: a workers education 
manual. Geneva: ILO. 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). 1997. Labour and social dimensions of 
rivatization and restructuring - Public utilities 
Water, gas, electricity. Part 1: 
Africa . Geneva: 
ILO. 
279 
Ishikawa, T. 1998. The privatisation of Japanese national railways. New 
York/London: Continuum International Publishing Group. 
Jerome, A. 2003. "Technical Efficiency in Some Privatised Enterprises in 
Nigeria", Paper Presented at the Eight Annual Conference on Econometric 
Modelling for Africa held at Stellenbosch University, South Africa, 1-4 July 2003. 
Downloaded from 
httv: //www. sun. ae. za/intemet/academic/economy/economics/ýcoiiferenceý/oapers/iei, 
ome. pdf. 
Jiyad, A. M. 1996. "Privatisation in the Arab countries: programmes, 
achievements and lessons". Paper presented at the Conference on Development 
Economics held at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business 
Administration, Bergen, Norway, November 27-28,1995, downloaded from 
http: //www. fou. ulb. no/fd/1996/f/712003/index. htm 
Johnson, E. 2003. Country Analysis Briefs: Nigeria, downloaded from 
http: //www. eia. doe. gov/emeu/cabs/niý, yeria. html 
Joint Negotiating Council (JNC). 2000. "Memorandum of Agreement", dated 22 
November 2000, Lagos: JNC- 
Jones, L. P., Jamal, Y. and Gogkur, N. 1998. "Impact of privatisation in Cote 
d1voire: Draft Report", Boston, USA: Boston Institute for Development 
Economics. 
Katz, H. C. and Kochan, T. A. 1992. An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and 
Industrial Relations. New York: McGraw-Hill, cited in Singh and Dannin, 2002, 
op cit, p. 5. 
Kay, J. (ed. ). 1986. Privatisation and regulation: the UK experience. Oxford: 
280 
Clarendon. 
Kikeri, S. and Nellis, J. 2001. "Privatization in competitive sectors: The Record so 
far", Private Sector Advisory Services, World Bank, October 29,2001, 
Washington D. C: The World Bank. 
Kole, S. R. and Mulhenn, J. 1997. "The government as a shareholder: A case from 
the United States", Journal of Economics, vol. 40, pp. 1-22. 
Komolafe, F., Igbikiowubo, H., and Ahiuma, V. 2003b. "Shelve =N=-1.50k fuel 
tax, TUC tells FG" in 'The Vanguard' Wednesday, December 31,2003, 
downloaded from 
http: //www. vanguardiiý-), r. com/articles/2002/ýcover/'f2311.22003. htnil 
Komolafe, F., Ugwuanyi, E., and Achonu, R. 2003. "NUPENG, PENGASSAN 
Ask FG to Repair Refineries Before Sale" in 'The Vanguard', December 10,2003. 
Downloaded from http: //allaftica. com/stories/2003 12100483. html 
LaPorta, R. and Lopez-De-Silanes, F. 1998. "The benefits of privatisation: 
Evidence from Mexico", NBER Working Paper 6215, cited in Sheshinski and 
Lopez-Calva, op. cit. 
LaPorta, R. and Lopez-De-Silanes, F. 1999. "The benefits of privatisation: 
Evidence ftom Mexico", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, No. 4, pp. 
1193-1242 
Letwin, 0.1988. Privatising the World: A study of international privatisation in 
theory and practice. London: Cassell Education Limited. 
Littlechild, S. C. 2000. Privatisation, competition and regulation: twenty-ninth 
Wincott Memorial Lecture at Bishop Partridge Hall, Church House, Westminster, 
on Thursday, 14 October 1999. Occasional paper 110, Wincott memorial 
lectures-, 
29, London: Institute of Economic Affairs for the Wincott Foundation, 2000. 
281 
Lukman, R. 1987. "The place of the Petroleum Industry in the Nigerian economy" 
(Text of a lecture delivered at the Command and Staff College, jaJ1, Nigeria, 
September 14,1987). Jaji, Nigeria: Command and Staff College. 
Macedo, R. 2000. "Privatisation and the Distribution of Assets and Income in 
Brazil", Working Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington, D. C. 
Majundar, S. K. 1996. "Assessing Comparative Efficiency of The State-Owned, 
Mixed, and Private Sectors in Indian Industry", Public Choice, 96, pp. 1-24. 
Marchat, J. M., Nasir, J., Ramachandran, V., Shah, M. K., Tyler, G., and Zhao, L. 
2002. Results of the Nigeria Firm Survqy (Final Version- November 2002). 
Washington: Regional Program on Enterprise Development, Africa Private Sector 
Group, The World Bank. 
Martin, R. and Thomson, A. 1992. Bargaining Powe . Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, cited in Singh and Dannin 2002, op cit, p. 5. 
Martin, S. and Parker, S. 1997. The impact of Privatisation: Ownership and 
Corporate performance in the U. K. London: Routledge. 
Megginson, W. L. and Netter, J. M. 2001. From State to Market: A Survey of 
Empirical Studies on Privatisation. Journal of Economic Literature, June 2001. 
Megginson, W. L., Robert, C. N., and van Randenborgh, M. 1994. "The financial 
and operating performance of newly privatised firms: an international empirical 
analysis", The Journal of Finance, Vol. 49, No. 2, June 1994, pp. 403-502. 
Miller, R. 1992. A union in change: a case study of the National Communication 
Union: Privatisation and Organisational Change. M. A thesis, Coventry: Warwick 
Business School, The University of Warwick. 
282 
Muller-Jenstch, W. 1998. "Industrial relations theory and trade union strategy", 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Vol. 4, 
No. 3, pp. 177-190, cited in Fairbrother, 2000, op cit, p. 5 
MutfWang, P. 1999. "The State, oil and socio-economic transformation in Nigeria: 
A critical appraisal", in M. Kpandiok (ed. ), Energy Crisis in Nigeria: Causes, 
Effects and Solutions, Lagos: PENGASSAN-NNPC. 
MutfWang, P. 2001. NNPC: Privatisation or Commercial i sation? National Interest 
Versus Economic Viability, paper presented at the workshop on 
Privatisation/Commercialisation programme in Nigeria: Challenges for labotir- 
Management Relations". Lagos, Nigeria: PENGASSAN-NNPC. 
Mutume, G. 2001. "Nigerian privatisation venture co-operation falls". 
Misanet. com/ -International 
Press Services (IPS). 2001. Downloaded from 
http: //www. afrol. com/News200I/iiiý4006-airline-privat. htm 
Nambudiri, C. N. S. and Iyanda, 0.1986. "Multinational Corporate Strategies: 
The Case of Nigeria", in Damachi, U. G. and Seibel, H. D. (eds. ). 1986, Op. cit. 
National Industrial Court (NIC). 2001. "Terins of Settlement of Suit Number 
NIC/ 13/2001 between NUBIFIE and UNIC Insurance Plc, Lagos, Nigeria: NIC. 
National Manpower Board. 1983. "Distribution of total and retrenched staff by 
employers, October 1982 to October 1983", cited in Fajana, S., 2000, op cit, p. 69. 
National Oil and Chemicals Marketing (NOLCHEM) Plc. 1997. Annual Report 
and Accounts, Lagos, Nigeria: NOLCHME Plc. 
National Planning Commission (NPC). 1998. "Macroeconomic framework for 
1998-2000 Rolling Plan and 1998 Budget", Memo 3, Annex I of 1998. Abuja, 
Nigeria: NPC- 
283 
Nichols, T. 1986. The British Worker Question. London: Routledge. 
Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC). 2004. "Unionisation of workers in the banking 
industry". NLC letter to 56 Nigerian banks dated February 23,2004. Downloaded 
from http: //wwW. nlcng. orgýbanks/lettertobanks. htm 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), PENGASSAN, NUPENG, etc. 
2001. "Resolutions adopted at the end of the oil industry seminar on 'Casualisation 
and Contract Employment in the Nigerian Oil Industry' held at the NICON Hilton 
Hotel, Abuja, Nigeria, on the 5 th and 6t" of November 2001. 
Noland, M. 1999. "The new protectionists: the privatisation of US trade policy", in 
Studies in trade and development; no. 3, London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 
Trade and Development Unit, 1999. 
NOLCHEM Plc- 1999. Annual Report and Accounts, 1999, Lagos, Nigeria: 
NOLCHEM Plc- 
NOLCHEM Plc. 2000. Annual Report and Accounts, 2000, Lagos, Nigeria: 
NOLCHEM Plc- 
NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI. 2001. Press release of 9'hApnl 2001, Lagos, Nigeria: 
NUBIFIE/ASSBIFI. 
NUBIFIE and NEABIAL 2003. Review of collective agreement between Nigeria 
Employers Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied Institutions (NEABIAI) 
and National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions Employees 
(NUBIFIE) held at NEABIAI Secretariat form 15 th January to II th July 2003. 
Lagos, Nigeria: NUBIFIE and NEABIAL 
NUBIFIE Domestic Committee (First Bank Plc). 2001. Letter of withdrawal from 
NUBIFIE membership, dated16 March 2001, Lagos, Nigeria: NUBIFIE. 
284 
NUBIFIE, 2000(a): Communiqu6 of the 7'h Quadrennial Delegates Conference. 
Lagos, Nigeria: NUBIFIE. 
NUBIFIE. 2001. "NUBIFIE representation to the Executive Secretary, NEABIAI 
on various burning issues that had afflicted the union and suggestions for 
repositioning/growth of the union". Lagos, Nigeria: NUBIFIE, November 15, 
2001. 
NUBIFIE. 2002. "Wage discrimination system". NUBIFIE Letter to the Managing 
Director of Lion Bank Plc dated January 22,2002, Lagos, Nigeria: NUBIFIE. 
NUPENG and National Oil and Chemicals (NOLCHEM) Plc- 1999. "Collective 
Agreement". Lagos: NUPENG/NOLCHEM Plc- 
NUPENG and PENGASSAN. 2002. "Communiqu6 issued at the end of the joint 
meeting of the National Executive Councils of the National Union of Petroleum & 
Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and the Petroleum & Natural Gas Senior Staff 
Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) held on 4th September 2002 at Savannah 
Hotel Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria". Lagos: NUPENG and PENGASSAN. 
NUPENG, PENGASSAN, Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity, NNPC, 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources, and the Department of Petroleum Resources. 
2004. "Communiqu6 issued following the mediatory meeting held with NUPENG, 
PENGASSAN, Ministry of Petroleum Resources, Department Of Petroleum 
Resources, NNPC and other stakeholders in the oil and gas sector at the instance 
of the Federal Ministry of Labour And Productivity in the SGF Conference Hall, 
on the 15 TH January 2004", downloaded from www. pengassan. org. 
NUPENG. 2001. "The evil menace of contract/casual labour) victimisation of 
union officials and anti-union posture of Nigerian employers". Bulletin of 27 
th 
April 2001. Lagos: NUPENG. 
2 85 
O'Connell Davidson, J. 1993. Privatisation and Employment Relations. London 
and New York: Mansell Publishing Limited. 
Obasanjo, 0.1999. "The imperative of privatisation. " Statement by President 
Olusegun Obasanjo on the occasion of the inauguration of the National Council on 
Privatisation at the Presidential Villa, on 20 July 1999. Abuja: Nigeria. 
Downloaded from 
Info miat ion/privati sation/imperative. htm 
http: //'ýN, %ý, -ý-, ý, -. nopa. net/UsefLil- 
Oduniyi, M. 2004. "Fresh Fuel Crisis Looms" in 'ThisDay News', March 27, 
2004. Downloaded 
http: //newsbiafranigeriaworld. com/archive/2004/maý-/27/0072. html 
from 
Ogbeifun, L. 2004. "PENGASSAN'S Road Map for Privatisation of Refineries", 
Lagos, Nigeria: PENGASSAN. Downloaded from http: //www. penuýassan. oi- 
Ogbodo, John-Abba. 2001, "NUPENG lists terins for deregulation" in The 
Guardian Online, Friday, April 135 20015 downloaded from 
http: //n, f4rý4uardiannews. com. Lagos: Guardian Newspapers Ltd. 
Ogden, S. 1990. "The impact of privatisation on industrial relations in the water 
industry", unpublished paper presented to the Cardiff Business School Annual 
Conference, September, cited in O'Connell Davidson, J. 1993, Op. cit. 
Ogden, S. 1994. 'The reconstruction of industrial relations in the privatised water 
industry', in British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 25(l), pp. 67-84. 
Ogidan, A. 2001. "Workers may shut utilities over privatisation". The Guardian 
Online, Monday 26 February 2001. Downloaded from 
,, riýuardiannews. com/news2/nn8l3719. 
html http: //www. n, g 
286 
Onyeonoru, 1.2003. "Trade unions and neo-liberal reforms: globalized trends and 
emergent patterns of contestation", being text of a paper prepared for the South 
African 
. Sociological Association (SASA) Congress on 'Resistance, 
Reconstruction and Democracy in Post-colonial Africa' held in Durban, South 
Africa forrn 29 June to 2d July 2003. 
Open World Conference of Workers. 2002. "Africa Appeal For an Independent 
International Conference to Stop the Murderous Course Threatening the very 
Existence of Workers and Peoples in Africa", adopted at the June 16th 2002 
conference of the International Labour Conference held in Geneva. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 1997. 
Privatisation of utilities and infrastructure : methods and constraints. Centre for 
Co-operation with the Economies in Transition. Paris: OECD. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2000. 
Privatisation, competition and regulation, Pans : OECD, 2000. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in Europe (OECD). 
1993. Methods of Privatising Large EnteEprises, Pans: OECD. 
Parker, D. 1997. Privatisation and regulation: some comments on the U. K 
experience, London: Chattered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy. 
Parker, D. 2004. "The UK's privatisation experiment: The passage of time permits 
a sober assessment", CESIFO Working Pgper, No. 1126, Category 9: Industrial 
Organisation, February 2004, presented at the CESIFO Conference on 
'Privatisation Experiences in the EU', November 2003, downloaded from 
http: \\www. CESifo-de 
Pedersini, R. 2000. Privatisation and industrial relations. DSS PqPers SOc 2-00. 
European industrial Relations Observatory, downloaded from 
287 
http: //www. eiro. eurofound. le/1 999/12/study/index. html 
Pelzman, S. 1971. "Pricing II ises: Electric Utilities i in Public and Private Enterpri iii in 
the United States", Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 14, pp. 109-147. 
Pendleton, A. 1999. "Ownership or Competition? An Evaluation of the Effects of 
Privatisation on Industrial Relations Institutions, Processes and Outcomes", Public 
Administration, Vol. 77, No. 4, pp. 769-791. 
PENGASSAN, NUPENG and Unipetrol Plc. 2001. "Agreement reached between 
the management of Unipetrol Nigeria Plc and the two Unipetrol branch unions of 
the Petroleum and Natural Gas Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) and the 
National Union Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) regarding the 
package to be applied for members of staff wishing to voluntarily separate from 
the company with effect from I October 2001", Lagos, Nigeria: PENGASSAN, 
NUPENG and Unipetrol. 
PENGASSAN, NUPENG and Unipetrol Plc. 2000. "Resolutions of Management 
and Unions of Unipetrol Nigeria Ple with the Core Investor". Lagos, Nigeria: 
PENGASSAN, NUPENG and Unipetrol Nigeria Plc- 
PENGASSAN, NUPENG, et al., 2004. "Communiqu& issued following the 
mediatory meeting held with NUPENG, PENGASSAN, Ministry Of Petroleum 
Resources, Department Of Petroleum Resources, NNPC and other stakeholders in 
the oil and gas sector at the instance of the Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Productivity in the SGF Conference Hall, this 15TH day of January, 2004. Abuja, 
Nigeria: PENGASSAN et al., 2004, downloaded from http: //www. pengassan. o 
PENGASSAN. 1999. "Negotiated Salaries and allowances for various oil 
companies, 1997-1999". Lagos, Nigeria: PENGASSAN. 
288 
PENGASSAN. 2001. PENGASSAN BULLETIN, 2001. Lagos, Nigeria: 
PENGASSAN. 
PENGASSAN. 2003. "Pros and Cons of Privatisation of Refineries under focus" 
in PENGASSAN BULLETIN, 2003, Lagos, Nigeria: Research and Development 
Department, PENGASSAN. 
PENGASSAN. 2003b. Communiqu6 issued at the end of a mediatory meeting held 
with PENGASSAN, NUPENG, NNPC, BPE, Federal Ministry Of Petroleum 
Resources, PPRA and DPR at the instance of the Federal Ministry Of Labour and 
Productivity in the Honourable Minister's Conference Hall, this 29"' Day of 
December 2003, downloaded from http: //www. pentýassan. or 
Politt, M. G. 1999. A survey of the liberalisation of public enterprises in the U. K. 
since 1979. U. K: University of Cambridge. 
PriceWaterhouse. 1989. Privatisation: the facts. London: Price Waterhouse. 
Rainsberger, P. K. 2003. "Behavioral Factors Influencing Union Bargaining 
Power", downloaded from http: //web. missouri. edu/-Iabored/CBBehaviorial. html 
Ramanadhan, V. V. (ed. ). 1989.1'rivatisation in developing countries. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Ramanadhan, V. V. 1995. "The impact of privatisation on distributional equity" in 
Ramanadhan, V. V. (ed. ). Privatisation and Equity, op. cit. 
Richard Hemming and Ali Mansoor. 1988. Is Privatization the Answer? " Finance 
& Development. The World Bank & IMF. September 198 8. Vol. 2 5, No. 3. pp. 31- 
33, cited in Jiyad, op. cit. 
289 
Robertson, N. and Thomas, J. L. 1968. Trade Unions and Industrial Relations. 
London: Business Books Limited. 
Rollinson, D. 1993. Understanding Employee Relations. Suffolk: Addison-Wesley 
Publishers Limited. 
Rudestam, K. E. and Newton, R. R. 1992. Surviving Your Dissertation: A 
Comprehensive Guide to Content and Process. Newsbury, etc: Sage. 
Runkel, P. 1990. Casting nets qnd testing specimens: Two grand methods of 
psychology. New York: Praeger, cited in Stake, 1995, op cit, p. 36. 
Sheshinski, E. and Lopez-Calva. 1999. "Privatisation and its benefits: Theory and 
Evidence". Consultimz Assistance on Economic Reforms 11 (CAER) Discussion 
Paper No. 35, January 1999, Harvard Institute for International Development, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Singh, G. and Dannin, E. J. 2002. "Law and Collective Bargaining Power: Results 
of a Simulated Study", California Western School of Law and the College of 
Business Administration, San Diego State University, July 31,2002. 
Smith, J. C. 1996. "Bargaining power and local labour market influences on wage 
determination". Economie et Prevision, 126, pp. 1-17. 
Stake, R. E. 1995. The Art of Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks, California, 
London, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Steel, D. R. and Heald, D. A. 1982. "Privatising Public Enterprises: An Analysis 
of the Government's Case", Political Quarterl , 
July 1982, pp. 333-349. 
Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation, Undated Final 
Report, Vol. 2 (Privatisation). Abuja, Nigeria: Government Press. 
290 
The Bureau of Public Enterprises. 2001 a. "Minutes of the meeting between BPE 
and staff of National Oil Head Office, Marina on the 16 th of February, 2001. 
Abuj a: BPE. 
The Economic Intelligence Unit. 2003. Nigeria: Country Profile 2003, London: 
The Economic Intelligence Unit, downloaded from hltp: //www. eiu. com/schedule 
The Nigerian Stock Exchange. 1990. 
_1989/90 
Fact Book. Lagos, Nigeria: The 
Nigenan Stock Exchange. 
The Nigerian Stock Exchange. 1994.1994 Fact Book. Lagos, Nigeria: The 
Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
Thisday News. 2001. "Labour vs. First Bank", Lagos, Nigeria: 'Thisday News', 
Vol. 7, No. 2230, Thursday, May 31,2001, pp. 1,2 and 4. 
Thisday News. 2001b. "39 Firms listed for phase 11". This Day News, Lagos, 
Nigena, downloaded 
htlp: //www. thisdayonline. com/news/20010322newsO4. html 
from 
Thisday News. 2002. "NOLCHEM's annual profit may increase by 100 percent", 
Lagos: 'Investment Watch', Thisday News, Monday, January 14,2002. 
Thompson, P. 2000. "Management in Nigeria" in Warner, M. (2000) op cit, pp. 
206-213. 
Tian, G. L. 2000. "State Shareholding and Corporate Performance: A Study of a 
Unique Chinese Data Set", Working Pape , London Business 
School, London. 
Trade Union Congress (TUC). 1966 and 1967. The evidence of the TUC to the 
Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations. London: TUC. 
UNIC Insurance Plc and NUBIFIE. 1994. "Memorandum of Understanding dated 
28 December 1994", Lagos, Nigeria: UNIC Insurance Ple and NUBIFIE. 
291 
LNIC Insurance Plc. 1997. Five-year Financial Summqry. Lagos, Nigeria: UNIC 
Insurance PIC5 downloaded from 
http: //www. niReriabusinessinfo. com/firstbankofnigeria-olc. htm 
UNIC Insurance Plc. 1998. UNIC Rpport and Accounts, Nineteen Ninety-Eight. 
Lagos, Nigeria: UNIC Insurance P1c. 
UNIC Insurance Plc. 1999. Annual Report and Accounts, 1999. Lagos, Nigeria: 
UNIC Insurance Plc. 
UNIC Insurance P1c. 2000. Annual Report and Accounts, 2000. Lagos, Nigeria: 
UNIC Insurance Plc. 
UNIC Insurance PIc. 2001. Annual Report and Accounts, 2001. Lagos, Nigeria: 
UNIC Insurance Plc. 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). 2003. 
"Employment, wages and related indicators by industry, at current prices, selected 
years", downloaded from 
hltp: //www. unido. org/data/Countrý/Stats/StaTableE. cfm? ShowAll=Yes&c=NIR 
Vickers, J. and Wright, V. (eds. ). 1989. The Politics of Privatisation in Western 
Europe: pressures, problems and paradoxes. London and New York: Frank Cass 
and Company. 
Visser, J. 2000. Trends in unionisation and collective bargaining. Geneva: 
International Labour Office, September 2000. 
Warner, M. (ed. ). 2000. Management in Emerging Countries. Australia, Canada, 
etc: Thompson Learning. 
Warren, W. W. 1966. 'Urban Real Wages and the Nigerian Trade Union 
Movement, 1939-60', Economic Development and Cultural Change, xv, 1, 
October 1966, pp. 24-35 (cited in Fashoyin 1980, op cit, p. 117). 
292 
Webb, S. and Webb, B. 1964. The History of Trade Unionism. London: Longman 
Green and Company. 
World Bank. 1995. Bureaucrats in Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
World Investment News. 2000. "Privatisation" (the electronic edition of the 
special country report on Nigeria published in Forbes Global, 12 June 2000 Issue), 
downloaded from bqp: //www. winne. com/c-privatisation-htm 
Wnght, P. 2003. Liberalising Upstream Oil and Gas: The UK Experiepce and Its 
Implications. Sheffield, UK: The University of Sheffield, April 2003. 
Yesufti, T. M. 1962. An Introduction to Industrial Relations in Nigeria. London: 
Oxford University Press. Cited in Fashoyin, T. 1980, Op. cit. 
Yesufu, T. M. 1991. "Emerging Trends in Public Sector Collective Bargaining: 
Implications for Industrial Relations in the 1990s", National Institute for Labour 
Studies (NILS), Annual Public Lecture Series No. 2. Ilorin, Nigeria: NILS. 
Zanker, C. 2001. "The privatisation and Liberalisation of the Post and 
Telecommunications Sector- its impacts on employees and trade unions". Paper 
presented at the Union Network Intemational/Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung/Vereinte 
Dienstleistungsgewerkcaft seminar on 'The future of trade unions in the global 
economy' held in Berlin from 28 August to 02 September 2001. 
293 
TABLES 
Table I -Assets of the Main Financial Institutions 1980-1993 (=N=mllllon) 
Type of Institution 1980 
CBN 
Con-u-nercial Banks 
1993 % 
40,860 (33.1) 113,029 (46.4) 
71)358 (57.7) 88,457 (36.4) 
Merchant Banks 4,402 (3.6) 21,844 (8.9) 
DFIs 2,865 (2.3) 4,220 (1.7) 
Insurance Companies 1,266 (1.0) 4,850 (1.9) 
Hire Purchase/Finance Companies 4,725 (1.9) 
Other 2ý873 (2.3) 5,605 (2.8) 
Total 123,624 (100.0) 242,730 (100.0) 
Source: Ojo (1994b, p. 256) cited in Brownbridge, M. 1996, op. cit. p. 24: constant 
1990 prices. 
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Table 2- Number and Ownership Structure of Conu-nercial Banks: 1960-1992 
Year State FGN FGN/ Foreign Private/ Private Miscellaneous Total 
Govt Foreign Foreign 
1960 1731 12 
1970 67 15 
1980 10 721 20 
1985 14 72 
1992 25 267 26 
Source: Brownbridge, M. 1996, op. cit. p. 24 
*Note: FGN means Federal Government of Nigeria 
29 
66 
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Table 3- Number and Ownership Structure of Merchant Banks: 1960-1992 
Year FGN* FGN/ Foreign Foreign/ Private Miscellaneous Total 
Foreign Foreign 
1960 
1 07n 
1980 23 
1985 23 
1992 23 
I 
Source: Brownbridge, M. 1996, op. cit. p. 25 
Private 
1 
52 
7 41 I 
1 
6 
12 
54 
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Table 4- Stnkes and Issues Involved, 1966-78 
ssues 5 1975 76 1976 7" 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1973/74 1974/7- - 197-t-S 
Wages 18 20 3396 11 23 3-1 
Conditions of service 99 10 9 25 21 26 19 
Discipline/termination 7613 15 11 5823 
Hours of work/overtime 55-218366 
Allowance/bonus 5436 57 11 8 20 
Anti -union/recognition 63144987 
hTCgUlar wage payments 10 3 12 285 8 
Refusal to bargain I11444 
Violation of agTeement 412 10 
PTOMOllon/grading 2212326 
Removal of management 58 
Commission awaTd 
Benefits 
Otbers (vanous) 
TOTAL 
221 
485435 
2 24 88 
6564 
315563 
70 61 29 32 
Source: Tayo Fashoyin, op. cit, p. 79 
87 133 90 90 152 
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Table 5- First Bank Financial Summary, 1984-1988 
1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 
=N=5000 =N=5000 =N=: )000 =N=ý000 =N=. 000 
Cash, 31286,885 3)248201 25645,195 258455917 2,461,99-5 
bank 
balances 
and bills 
discounted 
Fixed 204ý515 167ý228 141,778 116ý125 104,359 
Assets 
Total 7,071)807 6,7765874 5,995,762 55052,994 4,829,178 
Assets 
Financed 
By: 
Deposits 5,646,396 55010ý455 49412,745 4J349070 4ý I 15ý546 
Sharehold 4345618 373,463 311)248 2265434 188,075 
ers Funds 
Other 893,700 1ý339,591 1 ý200,234 
654ý134 498,659 
Liabilities 
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Total 71071,807 6,776,874 5,995,762 51052,994 4.829.178 
Liabilities 
Dividend 175339 39fi46 605103 30ý408 20,785 
Gross 8605274 6925723 5715484 448ý 196 379,216 
Earnings 
Profit 1245375 1065013 145,848 825944 49,246 
before 
taxation 
Taxation 79ý339 39,646 605103 305408 20,785 
Profit after 74)224 68,013 865625 53 ý404 29,144 
taxation 
Equity 3.3 3.0 5.7 4.6 2.9 
Dividend 
Cover 
(times) 
Returns on 17% 18% 28% 24% 15% 
shareholde 
rs funds 
Earnings 89.2K 81.5K 104.6K 63.4K 3 3.3 K 
299 
per 
ordinary 
share 
(adjusted) 
(Kobo)* 
Source: The Nigerian Stock Exchange Fact Book, 1989/90, p. 66 
300 
Table 6- First Bank Financial Summary, 1989-1993 
1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 
=N=, 000 =N=)000 =N=1000 =N=, 000 =N=, 000 
Cash, bank 16,949 11 ý316 7)114 4,550 31955 
balances and 
bills 
discounted 
Fixed Assets 851 671 562 376 294 
Total Assets 23ý552 165986 11 ý319 8,482 8ý492 
Financed By: 
Deposits 16,439 11,965 85287 6,585 51785 
Shareholders 1 ý494 955 457 300 534 
Funds 
Other 22ý058 16)031 10,862 8J82 7,958 
Liabilities 
Total 23,552 16ý689 115319 8,482 8ý492 
Liabilities 
Gross 45306 25689 1,575 15433 15151 
101 
Eamings 
Profit/(Loss) 932 366 (31) (205) 163 
before 
taxation 
Taxation 388 31 57 
Profit after 584 335 (31) (205) 106 
taxation 
Returns on 38% 35% - - 20% 
shareholders 
funds 
Earnings per 272 40 2.50 15.00k 
ordinary 
share 
(adjusted) 
(Kobo)* 
Dividend per 70 40 2.50 15.00k 
share- actual 
(Kobo) 
Source: The Nigerian Stock Exchange Fact Book, 1994, p. 81 
Note: *Kobo is Nigeria's least currency denomination. 100 Kobo equals one Naira (=N=) 
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Table 7- UNIC Insurance Plc. Financial Summary, 1988-1992 
1992 
=N=-ý00 
0 
1991 
=N=5000 
1990 
=N=500 
0 
1ý8-9 
=N=300 
0 
-1988 
=N=, 00 
0 
Premium income less 
reinsurance 
133ý829 109,393 92,310 69ý705 44,437 
Underwriting result (25073) 8,051 12,986 91421 8,017 
Investment Income 17ý788 115054 9,842 6ý830 6,567 
Profit before taxation 
and adjustment for 
prior year item 
15ý715 19,105 22,828 16)251 14,584 
Profit after taxation 
and adjustment for 
prior year item* 
10,797 13,405 14ý328 91609 2ý461 
Contingency Reserve 4,015 35821 4,565 3ý250 1ý590 
Asset Replacement 
Reserve 
- 1ý500 15500 - - 
Dividend 6ý500 6ý500 6ý000 3ý, 850 2,750 
Profit/(Loss) retained 282 11584 263 25509 (1,879) 
Statutory Deposit 150 150 150 150 150 
Investments 160ý511 73,795 65,805 57,097 53,863 
Fixed Assets 795661 42,651 39,825 385701 9,967 
Current Assets 78,604 134,857 1335478 111,379 88,247 
103 
Other Assets 6,770 71270 85420 10J 15 10ý510 
Less: Liabilities and 
provisions* 
(147,50 
0) 
(128,259) (125,85 
4) 
(115,35 
5) 
(107.04 
5 
Total Assets 
Employed 
178ý196 130A4 1211824 102,087 55,045 
Financed By: 
Share Capital 20)000 15ý000 15ý000 151000 15ý000 
Capital Reserve 62ý163 29)016 29)016 2%016 - 
Asset Replacement 
Reserve 
3,000 3ý000 11500 - 
Revenue Reserve - 2ý582 55998 3)735 
Reserve for Bonus 
Issue 
5)000 - - - 
Profit and Loss 
Account 
- - - - 1,226 
insurance Funds 57,025 46ý737 455002 335594 21 ý327 
Contingency Reserve 33,144 2% 129 25,308 201742 17ý492 
Total 1785196 1301464 1215824 102,087 55,045 
STATISTICS 
Earnings Per Share 
(Kobo) 
26.99 44.68 47.76 32.03 8.20 
Earnings Per Share 
(Kobo) (adjusted) 
- 33.51 35.82 24.02 
6.15 
Dividend per share 16.25 21.67 20.00 12.83 9.17 
104 
(Kobo) 
Dividend per share 16.25 15.00 9.62 6.87 
(Kobo) (adjusted) 
Dividend Cover 1.66 2.06 2.39 2.50 0.89 
(times) 
Net Assets per share 4.45 4.35 4.06 3.40 1.83 
(=N=) 
Net Assets per share - 3.26 3.05 2.55 1.38 
(=N=) (adjusted) 
Source: The Nigerian Stock Exchange 1994 Fact Book, op cit, p. 331 
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Table 8- Range of Average Wages and Salaries in the Public Sector, 1980 - 1997 (=N= 
[Annum) 
Year Juni or 
1980 1,560- 3,132 
1981 1,860- 3,132 
1982 1,860- 3,354 
1983 1,860- 3,354 
1984 1,860- 3,354 
1985 1,860- 3,354 
1986 1,860- 3,354 
1987 1,860- 3,354 
1988 3,293- 8,327 
1989 3,293- 8,327 
1990 3,293- 8,327 
1991 5,631 - 11,583 
1992 11,099- 17,583 
1993 16,483- 25,420 
1994 17,963- 29,780 
1995 18,739- 36,965 
1996 18,739- 36,965 
1997 18,739- 36,965 
Senior 
3.708- 15,144 
3,708- 15,144 
4,050- 15,960 
4,050- 15,960 
4,050- 15,960 
4,050 - 15,960 
4,050- 15,960 
4,050- 15,960 
7,453- 29,599 
7,453 - 29,599 
7,453- 29,599 
12,202- 43,158 
26,828 - 63,008 
28,598 - 63,162 
33,503 - 78,060 
41,586 - 84,444 
41,586 - 84,444 
41,586 - 84,444 
Source: Central Bank of Nigena Statistical Bulletin, Volumel 1, No. 2 (December 2000), 
212 
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Table 9: Registered Unemployed and Vacancies Declared (Lower Grade Workers) 1970- 
2001 
Year Old Reg*. Fresh Reg*. Re-Reg*. Total Vacs Declared" Placements 
1970 11732 1533 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
- -- 
1982 15688 70157 
1983 25131 55339 
1984 30670 50108 
1985 27926 36039 
1986 27210 31273 
1987 33967 79718 
1988 66625 30003 
1989 52737 26128 
1990 55043 20355 
1991 77769 19896 
1992 66812 3449 
1993 69463 2492 
1994 68930 2052 
1995 76658 3085 
1 /-. DVD 1 DZU 
13302 1870 
15196 2829 
20694 4061 
23239 3989 
20860 5864 
14663 6373 
18661 5410 
256623 34947 
188438 58204 
51570 106496 19943 47557 
32118 112588 18310 7394 
40167 120945 14612 3865 
32615 96580 11156 2139 
26675 85158 13050 2378 
31399 145084 16502 4988 
19534 116162 14154 2506 
17190 96055 14052 3474 
14354 89752 7637 1917 
12848 110513 14529 2924 
4882 75143 3864 985 
3432 75387 3735 1251 
1295 72277 3786 859 
1990 81730 4182 1119 
307 
1996 79897 3580 1964 85441 7873 2020 
1997 81546 3099 1187 85832 7831 2134 
1998 82094 1804 829 84727 6895 1352 
1999 82313 2584 1127 86024 7313 1611 
2000 82959 1662 747 85368 6583 923 
2001 83388 2006 527 85921 6284 1856 
Note-. (1) There was no breakdown of total registration for 1970-1981 
(2) There were no placements recorded between 1970- 1981. 
*Reg. means Registration; **Vacs Declared means vacancies declared 
Source: Central Bank Of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin, Volume 11, No. 2 (December 2000), 
208 
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Table 10- Registered Unemployed and Vacancies Declared (Professionals and Fxecutives) 
Year Old Fresh Re- Vacancies Place- 
Reg] strati on Reg] strati on Registration Total Declared ments 
1970 518 80 
1971 382 63 
1972 271 113 
1973 301 92 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
224 12 
-5 
179 172 
166 180 
151 312 
135 198 
1983 
1984 706 
1985 1234 
1986 2295 
1987 2116 
1988 9031 
1989 10287 
1990 6436 
1991 10253 
1992 21324 
1324 484 
2038 992 
2514 657 26 
1993 100234 6880 
1994 27191 
1995 31202 1259 
4165 748 145 
1499 6123 606 148 
2067 15100 444 175 
3616 16293 591 281 
1449 14281 3091 678 
893 10182 3695 986 
298 12624 3989 164 
138 22206 3088 10 
1039 108153 12605 79 
275 28123 3307 8 
482 32942 3708 49 
2329 
10917 
3646 
2545 
2853 
2073 
744 
657 
309 
1996 66235 673 
1997 65864 588 
1998 99133 243 
1999 60117 3550 
2000 104588 372 
2001 63821 * 227 
344 67252 250 91 
9 66461 83 2 
- 99376 38 1ý 
2 63669 138 7-5 
- 104960 115 110 
3 64051 34 3 
Note: (1) There was no breakdown of total registration between 1970 and 198 1. 
(11) There were no placements recorded between 1970 and 198 1. * Estimates 
Source: Central Bank Of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin, Volume 11, No. 2 
(December 2000), p. 209 
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Table 11: Ratio of Vacancies/Unemployment 1982-2001 (%) 
Year Lower Grade Workers Professionals and Executives 
1982 18.73 
1983 16.26 - 
1984 12.08 26.13 
1985 11.55 17.96 
1986 15.33 9.90 
1987 11.37 2.94 
1988 12.19 3.63 
1989 14.63 21.64 
1990 8.51 36.29 
1991 13.15 31.59 
1992 5.14 13.91 
1993 4.95 11.66 
1994 5.24 11.76 
1995 5.12 11.25 
1996 9.22 0.37 
1997 9.12 0.13 
1998 8.14 0.04 
1999 8.5 0.22 
2000 7.71 0.11 
2001 7.29 0.05 
Source: Complied by this author from Tables 9 and 10 
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Table 12- First Bank Financial Summary, 1993-1995 
1995 1994 1993 
ASSETS =: N='m =N='m =N='m 
40,897 25,002 19,296 
Cash, Bank 
balances and bills 
discounted 
151 91 67 
Investments 
12,666 6,164 3,235 
Loans and advances 
6,135 4,277 2,673 
Other assets 
345 69 32 
Equipment on lease 
3,678 1,228 883 
Fixed assets 
63,872 36,831 26,186 
TOTAL ASSETS 
LIABILITIES 
43,464 25,022 17ý864 
Deposits 
- 342 486 , ý64 
Current Taxation 
Deferred taxation 
467 241 161 
Dividend 
13,335 8,872 5,984 
Other liabilities 
57,608 34,621 245473 
3 12 
6,059 2,049 15616 
SHAREHOLDERS' 
FUNDS 
205 161 97 
Minority Interests 
63,872 36,831 26,186 
8,980 5,914 5,390 
Gross earnings 
1,238 1,179 1,196 
Profit before 
taxati on 
1,009 756 741 
Profit after taxation 
Dividend 
377 215 151 
Ordinary shares 
174k 157k 315k 
Earnings per share- 
actual 
93k 81k 81k 
Earnings per share- 
adjusted 
70k 50k 70k 
Dividend per share- 
actual 
36k 21k 14k 
Dividend per share- 
adjusted 
2.50 3.10 4.50 
Dividend cover 
(times) 
313 
Note: Earnings and dividend per share are based on profit after tax and 
1,040,616,251 Ordinary shares of 50 kobo each 
Source: Downloaded from 
http: //www. nigeriabusinessinfo. com/firstbankofnigeriVIc. htm 
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Table 13- First Bank Plc. Financial Summary, 1996-2002 
Year ended March 15 months to 31 Mar. Year 
31 ended 
31 Dec. 
2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1996 
ASSETS =N=m =N='m =N='m =N='m =N='m 
=N='m 
145,924 126,457 71,420 51,041 47,048 
Cash, Bank 186,978 
balances and bills 
discounted 
501 491 445 432 178 
Investments 700 
46,111 34,981 31,668 26,047 16,144 
Loans and advances 61,918 
12,855 10,933 19,549 12,606 5,059 
Other assets 8,664 
202 244 340 389 324 
Equipment on lease 190 
7,308 7,447 6,081 4,706 4,066 
Fixed assets 7,826 
212,901 180ý553 129,503 95,221 72,8199 
TOTAL ASSETS 266,356 
LIABILITIES 
148,279 127,230 84,531 66,202 55,498 
Deposits 168,175 
1 
ý740 
1,103 910 821 309 
Current Taxation 1)176 
453 - - - - 
Deferred taxation 694 
315 
2,114 1 1,626 1,041 1,169 437 
Dividend 2,642 
43,222 36,075 31,714 17,794 10.181 
Otber liabilities 78,564 
195,808 166,034 118,196 85,986 66.425 
248,609 
175093 14,519 11,307 9,235 6.394 
SHAREHOLDERS' 17,747 
FUNDS 
212,901 180,553 129,503 95,221 72,819 
TOTAL 266,356 
LIABILITIES 
29,098 26,855 17,767 13,808 10,030 
Gross earnings 41,717 
6,201 5,112 3,711 2,323 1,155 
Profit before 15,731 
taxation 
4,676 45221 2,943 1,649 997 
Profit after taxation 3,979 
2,114 15626 1,041 1,041 377 
Dividend 2,642 
27% 29% 26% 18% 16% 
Return on NA 
sbarebolders fund 
288k 324k 283k 159k 148k 
Earnings per sbare- NA 
actual 
130k 125k 100k 100k 56k 
Dividend per share- NA 
actual 
130k 100k 64k 64k 23k 
-adjusted NA 
2.21 2.60 2.83 1.58 2.64 
Dividend cover NA 
316 
(times) 
Note: Earnings and dividend per share for 1996-2001 are based on profit after tax and 
1,625,965,913 ordinary shares of =N=0.50 each. 
Source: FBN PLC, Annual Report and Accounts 2000/2001,2001/2002. Figures for 2002 
obtained from 'BusinessDAY', July 8-14 2002, p. 2 1. 
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Table 15- Union Monthly Dues and Membership, 1994 
UNION MONTHLY MEMBERS UNION MONTHLY NIENIBERS 
DUES PAID HIP DUES PAID HIP 
Agriculture and =N=1,200 6,000 NURTW- Road =N=14,000 70,000 
Allied Workers Transport 
Union Workers 
Amalgamated =N= 17,400 87,000 NUSDE- Shop =N=3,000 15,000 
Union of Public and distributive 
Corporations employees 
Maritime =N=9,200 46,000 NUTGTE-Textile =N= 14,500 72-500 
Workers Union Employees 
Medical & Health =N=2,400 12,000 NCSU- Civi I =N=14,000 70,000 
Workers Union Service 
NANNM- Nurses =N=3,400 17,000 NUCSTSH - N=5,000.00 25,000 
and Midwives Hotel employees 
National Union of =N=2,000 10,000 NUJ- Journalists =N=3,000.00 
15,000 
Air Transport 
Workers 
National Union of =N=4,000 20,000 
NULGE- Local =N= 10,000 50,000 
Chemical, Govt. employees 
Footwear and 
Rubber Products 
Employees 
325 
NUBIFIE =N= 14,000 70,000 N_UMW- Mines =N=900 4.500 
National Union of =N=4,000 20,000 NUP- Pensioners =N=3,750 18,71 50 
Electricity 
Workers 
National Union of =N=7,624 38,120 NUR- Railways =N=2,600 13,000 
Food, Beverage employees 
and Tobacco 
Employees 
NUPSE- union of =N=2,800 14,000 NUT- Teachers =N=36,000 180,000 
public sector 
employees 
NUCEFW-Union ýN=7,400 37,000 NASU- Non- =N=10,000 50,000 
of Construction academic staff 
Workers 
NUPENG =N=6,000.00 30,000 RATTAWU- =N=1,000 5,000 
Radio, TV and 
Theatre workers 
N-UPTE -Post and =N=4,200-00 21,000 
SEWUN- Steel =N=8,150 40,750 
Telecommunicati and Engineenng 
ons employees workers 
NUPPPROW- =N=2,400.00 12 '000 
ALL UNIONS 1,069,620 
Paper products s 
Source: Compiled by this Author from NLC Financial Records. Union 
membership calculated based on =N=0.20 per member per month. 
326 
Table 16- Average Minimum Wages and Salaries in Major Sectors of the Nigerian Economy 
for Junior and Senior Employees (1992-1999) 
(=N=/ ANNUM) 
SECTORS 
Agriculture 
Manufactunng 
Building & Construction 
Financial Institutions 
Ministries & Department 
Transport & Communication 
Trading & Business Serv. 
Mining & Quarrying 
Others 
1992 1993 1994 1995 
JNR SNR JNR SNR JNR SNR JNR SNR 
3700 7371 5096 9211 3869 9696 5365 1? '17 ?1 
2400 8261 3692 12389 3840 11885 3900 15952 
6003 19945 6525 21674 7016 23559 7385 24799 
6530 15142 8244 19200 4245 13532 8222 15779 
1408 6632 1977 11787 2397 5780 2500 7929 
3027 7275 3187 7658 3355 8062 3753 10150 
3195 14168 4971 19247 5000 13667 6966 18000 
9620 19203 10689 21336 11252 21552 22149 33804 
1319 4061 1389 4275 1463 
Table 16 (continued) (=N=/annum) 
1996 
SECTORS 
1997 1998 1999 
JNR SNR JNR SNR JNR SNR JNR SNR 
Agriculture 5798 13038 
Manufacturing 4450 16437 
Building & Construction 6869 25363 
Financial Institutions 8780 26242 
Ministries & Department 2668 8065 
Transport & Communication 4646 14085 
Trading & Business Serv. 6983 15900 
Mining & Quarrying 23649 51302 
Others 2118 4364 
6231 13355 8801 12431 14476 
5000 16923 5184 5375 33601 
6741 25928 7774 8965 29284 
9338 36706 14911 23810 45734 
3837 8200 5996 9370 13137 
5540 18019 9061 14820 13849 
7000 13800 7200 15492 7406 17392 
25150 68800 30110 100850 36048 147830 
2736 3800 4195 8400 6432 18568 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin, Volume I I, No. 2 (December 
2000), p. 211 
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Table 17- NUBIFIE Wage Demands, Actual Raises and Bargaining Power in Nigeria's 
Finance Industry (1990-2003) 
YEAR RAISE ACTUAL UNION 
DEMANDED (%) RAISE (%) (w) POVvTR. (? ) 
(d) 
1990 N/A N/A N/A 
1992 200 45 22.5 
1994 200 50 25 
1996 200 55 27.5 
1998 200 15 7.5 
2000 300 
2002 500 
30 10 
35 
Source: Compiled from data obtained from NUBIFIE 
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Table 18 - ASSBIFI Wage Demands, Actual Raises and Bargaining Pow'er in 
Nigeria's Finance Industry (1990-2002) 
YEAR RAISE ACTUAL UNION POWER* 
DEMANDED(%) RAISE 
(d) (w) 
1990 N/A N/A N/A 
1993 100 50 50 
1995 100 45 45 
1997 100 15 15 
1999 N/A N/A N/A 
2000 100 30 30 
2002 100 35 35 
Source: ASSBIFI. Union power compiled from demanded wage and actual raise data 
obtained from ASSBIFI 
-I-)g 
Table 19- Trade Union Membership 1999- NOVEMBER 2002 
S/-N UNION 1999 2000 2001 
2002 
I. AAWUN 608 4,850 16,709 30,805 
2. AUPCTRE 10ý382 30,282 64,691 72,467 
3. MARITME 145 81986 24,076 83,479 
4. MED & HEALTH 1,848 4,550 9,610 16,649 
5. NANNM 1,292 1,930 12,375 28,4323 
6. NUATE 3,040 3,057 1,718 8,820 
7. NUBIFIE 9,803 12,100 11,289 15,060 
8. NUCFRLANMPE 6,002 11,116 5785 32,121 
9. NUCCEW 14,353 12,058 27,349 17,099 
10. NUEE 3,324 8351 6,684 
11. NUFBTE 3,632 12,590 27,500 71,273 
12. NUHPSE 3,064 2)531 4,138 3,613 
13. NUPENG 7,536 6,266 16,166 17,484 
14. NUPTE 4,871 9,407 10,000 14,364 
- 15. - NUPPROW - 2,673 4,255 3,431 6,623 
16. NURT 800 1,675 1,670 15,455 
17. s 1,607 2,000 3,436 4,628 
18. NUTGTWIN 34ý267 38,550 81,425 82,000 
- 19. NCSU 15,526 20,948 25,095 31,469 
- 20. NUCSTSAS 602 1,866 8,912 10,949 
- 21. NUJ 44 109 21017 1,444 
- 22. NULGE 1,789 3,475 6ý524 24,434 
23. NUMW 141 716 1,517 
2,739 
330 
24. NUP 1,295 1,667 1,698 2,727 
25. NUR 260 667 2j67 1 - 
26. NUT 9j776 56,071 127,229 192,662 
27. NASU 3,359 10,668 42,218 67,462 
28. RATTAWU 530 133 879 
29. SEWUN 9,498 13,286 16,733 223318 
30. NLC 152ý068 284,161 563,038 880,078 
Source: Computed by this Author from industrial unions' remittance to the NLC 
from 1999 to Nov. 2002 based on ==N= 10.00 per member per month (i. e. average 
monthly union remittance to the NLC divided by 10). 
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Table 21 - Naira Exchange Rate (=N= 1.00 to US$1.00), 1987-2002 
YEAR PARALLEL 
MARKET 
OFFICIAL RATES 
1987 4.601 N/A 
1988 6.048 N/A 
1989 10.530 N/A 
1990 11-607 N/A 
1991 13.425 N/A 
1992 22.802 19-65 
1993 N/A 21-88 
1994 N/A 22.0 
1995 N/A 21-89 
1996 82-300 78.94 
1997 83.8 75.30 
1998 86.000 89.40 
1999 98.150 98.80 
2000 102.02 110.55 
2001 132.6 123.54 
2002 N/A* 130.56 
Source: Federal Office of Statistics., Abuja, Nigeria, Annual Abstracts of 
Statistics for various years. CBN Rates for 2001-2002 obtained from Nigeria 
Factsheet, 2003 , op. cit. *N/A= Not Available 
Table 22- UNIC Insurance Plc: Number of employees and aggregate payroll costs, 
1997-2000 
Year Number of persons employed Aggregate payroll cost 
=N=million 
1997 554 105.287 
1998 556 115.924 
1999 556 141.241 
2000 478 136.624 
Source: Compiled from UNIC Insurance Plc, Annual Report and Accounts for 
1998,1999 and 2000. See also Appendix 111- UNIC Insurance Ple's letter of 
November 14,2001 on Remuneration to staff). 
Table 22A: Changes in staffing levels in UNIC Insurance Plc, 1997-2002 
Year Number of persons employed 
1997 554 
1998 556 
1999 556 
2000 478 
2002 225 
Source: Compiled from tNIC Insurance Plc, Annual Report and Accounts for 1998,1999 and 
2000. Data for 2002 obtained from htlp: //www. unicinsurance. com/aboutunic. htm 
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Table 22B: UNIC Insurance Plc- Number of employees and aggregate payroll 
costs, 1997-2000 
Year Number of persons employed Aggregate payroll cost 
=N=million 
1997 554 105.287 
1998 556 115.924 
1999 556 141.241 
2000 478 136.624 
2002 225 N/A 
Source: Compiled from UNIC Insurance Plc, Annual Report and Accounts 
for 1998 and 2000, pp. 32 and 31 respectively. 2002 figures obtained from 
http: //www. unici-nSLiraiice. coin/aboutuiilc. htm. See also the UNIC Insurance Plc's 
letter of November 14,2001 on Remuneration to staff. 
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Ta! 23- Distribution of Total and Retrenched Staff by Employers (October 1982 To 
-)ctob(, i 
1983) 
Ern, 'Jover Federal State 
Govemment Govemment 
(Civil and (Civil and 
Parastatals) Parastatals) 
Private Sector All Employers 
Percentage 23.4 51.7 24.7 100.0 
share of total 
employees 
Percentage 2.8 25.9 71.3 100.0 
share of 
retrenched 
staff 
Source: National Manpower Board, 1983, cited in Fajana, S. 2000, op cit, p. 69. 
337 
Table 23b - Distribution of Total and Retrenched Employees by Industrial Sector (October 
1982 To October 1983) 
Industry Percentage share of total Percentage share of retrenched 
employees 
ConStrLICtJOn 3.4 
Commerce 2.6 
Manufacturing and processing 11.2 
Electricity, Gas and Water 1.4 
Agn, culture 4.9 
staff 
37.3 
6.0 
24.7 
0.2 
2.4 
Transport and Communications 18.1 2.9 
Community, Social and 52.9 
Personal Services 
All Employers 
17.6 
100.0 100.0 
Source: National Manpower Board, 1983 cited In Fajana, S. 2000, op cit, p. 69. 
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Table 24- Employment Cbange in Manufacturing, 1995-1996 
Industry 1995 1996 Employment 
Change 
Total Manufacturing 513ý976 490,867 -23,109 
Food Products 56,356 57ý860 +1,504 
Beverages 17,233 15,278 -1,955 
Textiles 155,753 154,605 -1,148 
Wearing apparel, 5,519 5,559 +40 
except footwear 
Leather products 5,600 5,764 +164 
Footwear, except 135 138 +3 
rubber or plastic 
Wood products, except 2ý650 
fumiture 
Fumiture, except metal 84,605 
3,042 +392 
54,299 -30,306 
Paper and products 12,255 111918 -337 
Printing and publishing 19,865 20ý270 +405 
Industrial chemicals 74 74 0 
339 
Other chemicals 33,988 
Rubber products 16ý215 
Plastic products 15,400 
Other non-metallic 9,789 
products 
36,468 +2,480 
19,683 +31468 
15,669 +269 
8,826 -963 
Iron and steel 3,470 3,299 -171 
Fabricated metal 52,329 56,189 +3,860 
products 
Machinery, except 5,559 6,186 +627 
electrical 
Machinery (electric) 8,884 8,070 -814 
Transport equipment 4,588 4,297 -291 
Other manufactured 3ý709 3,553 -156 
products 
Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organisation- UNIDO (2003) op cit. 
Employment Change data compiled by this Author from UNIDO Data. 
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Table 25 - Average Employment by Firm Size, 1990-2000 
Wbole Sample 
Micro 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Very Large 
African 
Non-Affican 
Local 
Foreign 
1990 
410.9 
(806.5) 
57.4 
(65.5) 
92.75 
(79.4) 
206.7 
(214.14) 
287.54 
(195.28) 
1 64033 
1,545.5) 
220.22 
(484.64) 
622.02 
1994 
361.2 
(758.6) 
63.4 
(66.71) 
90.39 
(76.50) 
143.02 
(80.86) 
308.24 
(192.20) 
1,716.6 
(1,603.1) 
223.95 
(531.02) 
554.12 
(1,113.30) (1,054.46) 
152.73 
(193.45) 
654.05 
1,105.36) 
151 . 00 
(213.55) 
602.51 
1998 
335.5 
(71 5.6) 
39.71 
(44.8) 
76.18 
(36.72) 
148.82 
(71.09) 
292.18 
(119.19) 
1,623.6 
(1,376.4) 
200.22 
(497.49) 
553.42 
(974.82) 
130.28 
(187.37) 
590.69 
(1,110.20) (1,030.74) 
1999 
317.8 
689.3 
35.77 
(41.6) 
68.32 
(20.92) 
150.7)) 
(56.35) 
289.92 
(105.56) 
1,596.4 
(1,397.3) 
194.02 
(500.44) 
484.86 
(902.44) 
125.01 
(178.61)) 
533.36 
(982.16) 
2000 
296.6 
638.1 
28.88 
(10.66) 
70.32 
(13.98) 
140.74 
(26.71) 
292.80 
(79.84) 
1,482.2 
(1,229.2) 
182.34 
(468.69) 
479.08 
(819.83) 
121.61 
(158.92) 
520.59 
(917.32) 
Source: World Bank, 2001, cited in Marchat et al. 2002, op cit., p. 36 
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Table 27 - Inflation Rate, 1980-2001 
Year 
1980 
1981 
Inflation Rate (Percent) 
9.9 
20.9 
1982 7.7 
1983 23.2 
1984 39.6 
1985 5.5 
1986 5.4 
1987 10.2 
1988 38.3 
1989 40.9 
1990 7.5 
1991 13.0 
1992 44.5 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
1 st Quarter 
2nd Quarter 
3rd Quarter 
4th Quarter 
2001 
57.2 
57.0 
72.8 
29.3 
8.5 
10.0 
5.6 
6.9 
2.7 
0.9 
3.3 
6.9 
I st Quarter 11.9 
2nd Quarter 16.6 
3rd Quarter 18.4 
4th Quarter 18.9 
Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Abuja, Nigeria. 
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Table 28- Petroleum Products Pricing (2000-2002) 
PRODUCT PETROL DIESEL KEROSENE 
Initial price/litre 
(1999) 
N20.00 N19.00 N17.00 
Government 
increase/litre (2000) 
N10.00 N10.00 N10.00 
% increase 50% 52.60% 58.80% 
Labour's demand 0% 0.00% 0.00% 
Final negotiated 
price/litre 
N22.00 N2 1.00 N17.00 
Negotiated % 
increase 
10% 10.50% 0% 
Bargaining power 
(Government) 
20% 19.96% 0% 
Bargaining power 
(Labour) 
0% 0% 58.80% 
Initial price (2000) N22.00 N21.00 N17.00 
Government 
increase/litre (2002) 
N6.00 N5.00 N7.00 
% increase 27.27% 23.81% 41.18% 
340 
Labour's demand 0% 0% 0% 
Final unilateral N26.00 N21.00 N17.00 
price/litre 
Unilateral % 27.27% 23.81% 41.18% 
increase 
Bargaining power 100% 100% 100% 
(Government) 
Bargaining power 0% 0% 0% 
(Labour) 
Source: Petroleum price increases compiled by the Author from NLC records 
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Table 29- Total Annual Petroleum Revenues and Percentage Contribution of 
Oil to Gross Domestic Product in Nigeria, 1992-2002 
YEAR TOTAL REVENUE 
(BILLIONS NATRA) 
OIL AS % GDP 
1992 217.386 52.6 
1993 206.893 53.5 
1994 171.786 44.2 
1995 236.411 40.4 
1996 307.602 43.6 
1997 326.640 38.9 
1998 203.731 27.0 
1999 721.018 21.4 
2000 1,585.0 37 
2001 1,712.0 36.1 
2002 1,574.0 30 
Source: 'Nigeria Factsheet', 2003. Human Rights and Oil Workshop- January 
31,2003 downloaded from 
. 
http:, //'Ias. beýkeley. edul/africa/Events//OilHk/--Niicieria%2OFactsheet. pdf 4-- 
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Table 30-Nigeria's Import and Expoits: Oil and Non-Oil, 1970-2001 (=N=million) 
Year/Quarter Imports (ciý exports & Re-Exports (fob) 
oil Non-Oil Total oil Non-Oil Total 
1970 52.2 704,2 756.4 510,0 3754 885A 
1971 50.4 1.029.5 1,079.9 953.0 340A 1,293 4 
1972 45.2 944.9 990.1 1,176.2 258.0 1,434.2 
1973 41.0 1,183.8 1,224.8 1,893.5 384.9 2,278.4 
1974 52.4 1,684.9 1,737.3 5,365.7 429.1 5,794.8 
1975 118.0 3,603.5 3,721.5 4,563.1 362.4 4,925.5 
1976 95.0 5,053.5 5,148.5 6,321.6 429.5 6,7 
-5'1 .1 1977 102,2 6,991.5 7,093,7 7,072.8 557.9 7,630.7 
1979 110,0 8,101.7 8,211.7 5,401.6 662.8 6,064.4 
1979 230,0 7,242.5 7,472.5 10,166.8 670.0 10,836.8 
1980 227.4 9,869.2 9,095.6 13,632,3 554.4 14,196ý7 
1981 119.8 12,719.8 12,839.6 10,680.5 342.8 11,0233 
1982 225.5 10,545.0 10,770.5 8,003.2 203.2 9,206.4 
1983 171.6 8,732.1 8,903.7 7,201.2 301.3 7,502.5 
1984 282.4 6,895.9 7,178.3 8,840.6 247.4 9,088.0 
1985 51.8 7,010.8 7,062.6 11,223.7 497.1 11,720.8 
1986 913.9 5,069.7 5,983.6 8,368.5 552.1 8,920.6 
1997 3,170.1 14,691.6 17,861.7 28,208.6 2,152.0 30,360.6 
1988 3,803.1 17,642.6 21,445.7 28,435.4 2,757.4 31,1928 
1989 4,671.6 26,188.6 30,8602 55,016.8 2,954.4 57,971.2 
1990 6,073.1 39,644.8 45,717.9 106,626.5 3,259.6 109,886.1 
1991 7,595.3 79,424.9 87,020.2 116,959.1 4,677.3 121,53-54 
1992 19,937.2 125,974.2 145,911.4 203,292.7 3,973.3 207,266.0 
1993 41,329.3 124,771.1 166,100.4 213,778.8 4,991.3 218,770.1 
1994 42,349.6 120,439.2 162,788.8 200,710.2 5,349.0 206,059.2 
1995 155,825.9 599,301.8 755,127.7 927,565.3 23,096.1 950,661,4 
1996 162,178.7 400,447.9 562,626.6 1,286,215.9 23,327.5 1,309,543.4 
1997 166,902.5 678,814.1 845,716.6 1,212,499.4 29,163.3 1,241,662.7 
1999 175,854.2 661,564.5 837,418.7 717,786.5 34,070.2 751,856.7 
1999 211,661.8 650,853.9 862,515.7 1,169,476.9 19,492.9 1,188,969.8 
2000 198,735.9 764,229.0 962,963.9 1,920,900.4 24,822.9 1,945,723.3 
2001 
1 st Quarter 51,670.0 259,724.2 311,394.2 535,052.6 5,420.9 540,473.4 
2nd Quarter 54,000.0 294,097.9 348,097.9 549,500.9 5,610.3 555,111.2 
3rd Quarter 55,004.3 309,178.0 364,182.3 497,120.5 11,687.6 509,809.1 
4th Quarter 54,800.3 268,991.5 323,791.8 391,548.2 5,289.9 396,838.1 
2002 
1 st Quarter 56,371.8 31,927.0 376,098.8 352,946.2 21,134.0 374,081.3 
2nd Quarter 54,281.3 164,502.4 218,783.7 385,706.6 26,7572 412,463,8 
3rd Quarter 63,225.4 262,298.4 325,514.1 500,151.1 19,852.7 520,003.8 
4th Quarter 65,192.50 263,791.50 328,984.0 541,417.70 
. 
26,907.70 
. 
568,325.4 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 13 Part D (External Sector 
Statistics, 2003), p. 172. 
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Table 31- Nigeria's Total Foreign Trade: Oil and Non-Oil, 1970-2001 (=N=million) 
Year/Quarter Total Trade Balance of Trade Oil Non-Oil Total oil Non-Oil Total 
1970 5622 1,079.6 1,641.8 457.8 -328.8 129.0 
1971 1,003.4 1,368.9 2,372.3 902.6 -688.1 214.5 1972 1,221.4 1,202.9 2,424.3 1,131.0 -686.9 444.1 1973 1,934.5 1,568.7 3,503.2 1,852.5 -798.9 1,053.6 1974 5,418.1 2,114.0 7,532.1 5,313.3 -1,255.8 4,0575 1975 4,681.1 3,965.9 8,647.0 4,445.1 -3,241.1 1,204.0 1976 6,416.6 5,483.0 11,899.6 6,226.6 -4,624.0 1,602.6 1977 7,175.0 7,549.4 14,724.4 6,970.6 -6,433.6 537,0 1978 5,511.6 8,764.5 14,276.1 5,291.6 -7438.9 -2147.3 1979 10,396.8 7,912.5 18,309.3 9,936.8 -6572.5 33643 1980 13,859.7 9,422.6 23,282.3 13,404.9 -8313.8 5091.1 1981 10,800.3 13,062.6 23,862.9 10,560.7 -12377.0 -18163 1982 8,228.7 10,748.2 18,976.9 7,777.7 -10341.8 -2564 1 1983 7,372.8 9,033.4 16,406.2 7,029.6 -8430.8 -1401.2 1984 9,123.0 7,143.3 16,266.3 8,558.2 -6648.5 1909.7 1985 11,275.5 7,507.9 18,783.4 11,171.9 -6513.7 46582 1986 9,282.4 5,621.8 14,904.2 7,454.6 -4517.6 2937.0 1987 31,378.7 16,843.6 48,222.3 25,038.5 -12539.6 124989 1988 32,238.5 20,400.0 52,638.5 24,632.3 -14885.2 9747.1 1989 59,688.4 29,143.0 88,831.4 50,345ý2 -23234.2 27111.0 1990 112,699.6 42,904.4 155,604.0 100,553A -36385.2 64168.2 1991 124,453.4 84,102.2 208,555.6 109,262.8 -74747.6 34515.2 1992 223,229.9 129,947.5 353,177.4 183,355.5 -122000.9 61354.6 
1993 255,108.1 129,762.4 384,870.5 172,449,5 -119779.8 52669.7 
1994 243,059.8 125,788.2 368,848.0 158,360ý6 -115090.2 43270.4 
1995 1,083,391.2 622,397.9 1,705,789.1 771,739A -576205.7 195533.7 
1996 1,448,394.6 423,775.4 1,872,170.0 1,124,037.2 -377120.4 746916.8 
1997 1,379,401.9 707,977.4 2,087,379.3 1,045,596.9 -649650.8 395946.1 
1998 893,640.7 695,634.7 1,589,275.4 541,932.3 -627494.3 -85562.0 
1999 1,381,179.0 670,334.0 2,051,513.8 957,837.2 -631338.0 326499.2 
2000 2,467,880.1 511,753.0 2,979,633.1 2,057,341.1 -462173,6 1595167.5 
2001 
1 st Quarter 596,175.6 230,549.7 826,725.3 477,360.6 -220507.3 2568533 
2nd Quarter 612,595.8 265,112.9 877,708,7 489,83TO -254691.5 235145.5 
3rd Quarter 560,870.3 286,270.3 847,140.6 436,801.7 -263694.3 173107.4 
4th Quarter 455,479.6 239,686.0 695,165.6 331,057.0 -229905.6 101151.4 
2002 
1 st Quarter 405,554.6 269,584.7 675,139.3 308,280.7 -205958.6 102322.1 
2nd Quarter 436,874.6 143,823.8 580,698.4 343,26& 1 -126573.1 216695.0 
3rd Quarter 560,322.3 221,924.8 782,247.1 451,221.9 -209205.7 242016.2 
4th Quarter 603749.9 225474.2 829,224.1 
_ 
491255.1 -208126.6 283128.5 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 13 Part D (External Sector 
Statistics, 2003) p. 173. 
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Table 33- NUPENG Wage Demands, Actual Ralse and BargamIng Power (1999-2003*) 
YEAR RAISE ACTUAL UNION POWER 
DEMANDED RAISE (? ) 
1999 150 75 50 
2000 150 8.5 5.6 
2001 200 10 5.0 
2002 200 12.5 6.25 
2003 150 16 10.67 
There were no data for the perlod between 1994 and 1998 when NUPENG was 
proscribed by the military regime. 
Table 34- Industrial actions in Nigeria's Oil Industry, 2000-2003 
Name of Nature of Duration Number of 
company/agency industrial action davs, Ný-eeks lost 
Major oil Non- 11/09/200 to 8 days 
marketers except implementation 19/09/2000 
AP and of the effect of 
NOLCHEM Ple. minimum wage 
legislation on the 
condition of 
employment 
Department of Transfer of the 6/03/2000 to 4 days 
Petroleum Safety and 10/03/2000 
Resources (DPR) Environment 
Unit to the 
newly-created 
Federal Ministry 
of Environment 
Major oil Unfair labour 27/11/2000 to 12 days 
producing and practices of 7/12/2000 
service employers 
companies (accused of 
favouring 
expatriates at the 
expense of 
356 
Nigerian workers 
Federal Increases in the National strike 13 days 
Government of pump price of from 6/06/2000 
Nigeria petroleum to 13/06/2000 
products 
NOLCHEMPIc Unpaid salaries 26/01/2001 to 30 days 
9/03/2001 
Texaco Nigeria Demand for 9/05/2001 to 6 weeks 
PIC 100% rise in 13/06/2001 
allowance 
Tidex Nigeria Demand for 5/06/2001 to 7 days 
Ltd. wage increases 12/06/2001 
Chevron Nigeria Expatriate quota 11/06/2001 to 8 days 
PIC and casualisation 18/6/2001 
NAOC (Agip) Expatriate quota 18/03/2002 to 16 days 
and casualisation 2/04/2002 
NNPC opposition to the 23/07/2002 1 day 
privatisation. of 
NNPC 
DPR Demand for 14/02/2003 to 7 days 
increase in 21/02/2003 
357 
remuneration or 
staff and 
autonomy for the 
DPR 
TotalfinaElf Management's 7/03/2003 to 12 days 
refusal to allow 18/03/2003 
workers to 
present their 
grievances to the 
visiting officials 
of the company 
from the head 
office in France 
Warri Refinery Demand for 1/04/2003 to 3 days 
refurnishing of 3/04/2003 
facilities 
Transocean. Demand for 18/04/2003 to 19 days 
Nigeria Plc helicopter crew 7, 5/05/2003 
Source: Records obtained from NUPENG, 2003 
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APPENDIV List of organisations and interviewees 
NUBIFIE: 
1. National President 
2. General Secretary 
I Head of Research 
4. Three branch representatives 
5. National Treasurer 
ASSBIFI: 
1. Secretary-General 
2. One branch Chairman 
3. One ex-branch Chairman 
NUFBTE: 
1. National President 
2. General Secretary 
3. Head of Research 
4. Flour Mills PIc branch Chairman 
5. Flour Mills PIc branch Secretary 
NLC: 
1. Deputy President 
2. One senior official 
NUPENG: 
1. National President 
2. General Secretary 
3. Senior Organising Secretary 
4. Head of Research 
PENGASSAN: 
I- Secretary-General 
2. Head of Research and Training 
3. Conoil Plc representative 
FBN Plc: 
1. Head of Human Capital 
2. Principal Manager (Industrial Relations) 
UNIC Insurance Plc: 
1. Personnel Manager 
Conoil Ple: 
1. Industrial Relations Manager 
Flour Mills Plc: 
1. General Personnel Manager 
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